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Abstract
This thesis looks at the rapid rise in living standards in western Europe during the 1950s. It 
argues that this rise occurred as a result o f structural changes in the labour force, changes 
that were associated with the high growth rates and industrial expansion o f the period.
The thesis looks specifically at the Netherlands, where rising living standards went side by 
side with wage control. The purpose of wage control was to enable funds to be made 
available for industrial expansion. The wage control system and industrialisation polices are 
described, along with critiques that have argued that wage control failed to hold down wage 
levels. This alleged failure is rejected as the explanation o f the rapid rise in living standards.
A test o f the effect of full employment on wage levels shows that wage rates in a number 
o f industries where demand for labour was extremely high rose measurably by more than 
they otherwise would have done, but nowhere near enough to explain the rise in incomes 
during the period.
The effects of sectoral change on male incomes are also calculated. Manufacturing 
increased its workforce during the period by recruiting young workers, new entrants into 
the workforce, who received higher pay than they would have received working in other 
sectors. Earnings have a tendency to rise with age, and the combination of these factors 
resulted in a median rise in male real incomes o f over a hundred percent across the 1950s. 
A contribution to this rise was also made by the movement o f older male industrial 
workers into office work, and by the movement of self-employed craftsmen into industrial 
employment.
The rise in participation o f unmarried women, particularly after 1952, increased the amount 
of earnings brought into households, with the result that household incomes rose even 
faster than male earnings.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
In the period following the Second World War, the standard o f living of the western 
European population rose more rapidly than at any time in its previous history. The effect 
on people’s lives was enormous. It had the result, according to Milward, that by 1968 the 
proportion of the western European population threatened by serious economic hardship 
had fallen from around three-quarters to about a fifth1
It was in this period that the mass o f the western European population became part o f the 
“consumer society” . Milward claims that the rate o f acquisition o f cars, TVs, refrigerators, 
washing machines, furniture, clothing and so forth, rose to a higher level than ever before2. 
He gives no figures to substantiate this, but other studies seem to bear him o u t Bowden 
and Offer show that the mass diffusion of household appliances, such as occurred in the 
USA during the 1920s, began in Britain during the 1950s3, while Rostow’s figures show the 
ownership o f private automobiles in Britain, France, West Germany and Italy increasing 
more rapidly during that decade than previously4. The nature of consumer durables 
changed to reflect this new mass market. For example, by the end o f the 1950s, the western 
European car market was dominated by the small, basic vehicle, such as the Volkswagen 
Beetle, the Citroen 2CV, the Renault 4CV, the Fiat 500 and the Morris Minor, designed 
merely to hold four people and their luggage5.
Rising living standards were a consequence o f rising wages. Rising living standards in this 
context means that people were buying more, and this they could only have done for a 
sustained period if their incomes had risen. The majority of the western European 
population in the 1950s relied on wages (and, to a lesser extent, salaries6) for their incomes7. 
Mass consumption therefore meant spending wages, and increased consumption can only 
have occurred when real wages were rising.
The rise in wages is not easy to explain. It is obvious that it is associated with the 
unprecedented growth in GDP during the period. Between 1950 and 1973, a period that 
has been termed the “European Golden Age”, real European GDP per capita grew at an
1 Milward (1992) p. 21.
2 Ibid. p. 21.
3 Bowden and Offer (1994) p. 730.
4 Rostow (1990) p. 171.
5 Williams etal (1983) p. 223.
6 While the distinction between wages and salaries can be important, usually it is not. Henceforth, unless 
otherwise specified, “wages” means “wages and salaries”.
7 ILO (1963), Table 4A. The only countries in non-Communist Europe where this was not the case were 
Greece and Turkey.
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average annual rate o f 3.8%, as against a rate o f just one percent a year between 1913 and 
19508, while cyclical fluctuations were, in general, mild9. But to state the connection is not 
to explain it.
Explanations at the time tended to assume that income was being redistributed towards the 
poorer sections o f society as a result o f government action. Crosland, for example, noted 
the existence o f rising living standards in Britain as eady as the beginning o f the 1950s, 
pointing out that, while per capita consumption hardly rose between 1938 and 1950, 
average working class consumption did increase. He attributed this to the redistributionist 
effect of the policies o f the post-war Labour government10. Myrdal also argued that 
government policies had led to redistribution, but the mechanism he proposed was 
indirect. Lecturing at Yale in 1958, he argued that “full employment” policies had 
strengthened the bargaining power o f workers against that o f their employers, enabling 
them to extract higher wages. He also argued that similar developments in other markets 
improved the bargaining position o f other groups within the population that had normally 
not done particulady well, such as the farmers11. Both these analyses seemed to confirm a 
social-democratic analysis, implying, as they did, that poverty was being voted away, 
without serious social and economic upheaval.
However, the role of government in this process has to be queried. Rising material living 
standards were to be found in countries, that experienced conservative and non­
interventionist governments as well as ones governed by social democratic and 
interventionist parties.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that increased investment, not government policy, was 
responsible for full employment. Matthews, for example, considering the causes of full 
employment in the UK between the end o f the Second World War and the 1960s, 
compares this period with the inter-war years. O f the possible factors that could have made 
a contribution to full employment, the biggest change was in the level o f investment12. This 
created a demand for labour, and Matthews concludes that part of the reason for full 
employment was the trend increase in the scarcity o f labour relative to capital13.
Kindleberger suggests, in a related argument, that the state of the labour market permitted 
the high levels of investment. However, in contrast to Matthews, he bases his argument on
8 Crafts & Toniolo (1996) p. 2.
9 Ibid. p. 3.
10 Crosland (1956) pp. 44-45.
11 Myrdal (1960) pp. 32-33.
12 Matthews (1968) p. 568.
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the abundance, not the scarcity, o f labour. He argues that the major factor shaping the high 
levels of growth in the 1950s was the availability of a large supply o f labour. This came 
from a variety o f sources and differed between countries. It came from a high rate of 
natural increase (the Nethedands), transfers from agriculture into services and industry 
(West Germany, France and Italy), the immigration o f refugees (West Germany), and the 
immigration o f unemployed and underemployed workers from Mediterranean countries 
(France, West Germany and Switzedand). Those countries with no substantial increase in 
the labour supply (Britain, Belgium and the Scandinavian countries) grew, on the whole, 
more slowly than others14. He does not argue that the availability o f excess labour 
determined the growth, but rather that the elastic supply o f labour supported high levels o f 
investment15.
More recendy Eichengreen has attempted to account for the “Golden Age” in terms of a 
relative redistribution o f income away from wage earners. He argues, along with 
Kindleberger, that the proximate cause o f high growth was investment, pointing out that 
the net investment rates in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s were neady twice as high as 
before or since16. Such a high investment rate was possible, he maintains, for two reasons. 
Firsdy, the opening-up o f the western European economies and consequent export growth 
enabled investment to be made where it was most productive and where comparative 
advantages could be exploited. Secondly, wage moderation stimulated the supply of 
investment by making profits available to future investment, and stimulated demand for 
investment by making it profitable. (In this, he takes up a point made by Kindleberger17.) 
He speculates that wage moderation can be explained as an expression of the desire on 
both sides o f industry not to repeat the disasters of the inter-war years18. As examples of 
countries where wage rises were moderated, he gives the Nethedands, West Germany, 
Norway, Belgium and, perhaps surprisingly considering its reputation, the UK19.
The relationship between the high growth rates and wages is therefore not clear. On the 
one side, Myrdal argues that full employment allowed trade unions to push up wages, while 
on the other Eichengreen and Kindleberger argue trade unions moderated their wage 
demands to allow investment. It is not possible for both these positions to be correct - 
although it is conceivable that they are both wrong.
13 Ibid. p. 568.
14 Kindleberger (1967) p. 3.
15 Ibid. p. 4.
16 Eichengreen (1996) p. 38.
17 Kindleberger (1967) pp. 33-34.
18 Eichengreen (1996) p. 41.
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This thesis argues that economic growth in the 1950s translated into wages growth because 
o f the changes that it brought about in the structure o f the workforce. These changes 
included, most importantly, an increase in the proportion o f the workforce employed in 
manufacturing and an increase in women’s participation in paid employment. This 
introductory chapter sets the scene. Section 1.1 defines what is meant by the various 
definitions o f wages growth, and explains how wages growth can be affected by structural 
change to the workforce. Section 1.2 explains why the Netherlands has been chosen as an 
example. Section 1.3 explains the structure o f the thesis.
1.1 Wages growth.
Eichengreen does not define what he means by “wage moderation”. He appears to use it to 
refer to both wage costs and wage rates. Put another way, his argument seems to be that 
wage costs rose less than the increase in productivity, thereby enabling greater sums to be 
available for investment; the low rate o f growth of wage costs was a consequence o f the 
low rate o f growth o f wage rates. But the phrase “wage moderation” could also mean a 
relatively low rate o f growth in the incomes of wage earners. Eichengreen also seems to use 
it in this sense, when he talks about workers agreeing to defer compensation20.
This section attempts to make distinctions between the various meanings o f the word 
“wages”. The intention is not to indulge in word games, but to ensure that, when 
measuring wages growth in one form or another, it is clear what, in reality, is being 
discussed. The definitions are then used to suggest a mechanism by which economic 
growth could have caused disposable income to rise without wage rates eating into the 
funds available for investment
The rate o f growth o f wages can appear very different depending on which definition o f 
“wages” is used. The word can be used, from the point o f view o f the employer, to mean 
“wage costs”. From the point o f view o f the wage earner, there are, broadly speaking, four 
major ways in which it is used. It can mean the wage rate at which the worker is employed, 
the worker’s actual earnings, the income o f the household to which the worker belongs, or 
the income that the worker receives after household expenses are paid and intra-household 
income transfers are made. The measurement o f each o f these is, in turn, in one respect or 
another, contentious and may well have to take further subjective factors into account.
19 Ibid. pp. 45-46.
20 Ibid. p. 43.
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The wage rate, or rate o f pay, forms the basis on which earnings are calculated. This could 
be on the basis of the rate per hour or, for salaried staff, the rate per month or per year, or 
it could be on the basis of piece rates or commissions.
Earnings are what the worker is paid by the employer. These can include such things as 
overtime payments and bonuses. Earnings can be measured on a weekly or an annual basis 
- which will give different results in the case of, for example, seasonal workers - and can be 
measured before or after the deduction o f tax and insurance contributions.
Household income is the total amount o f income brought into the household. In a 
household with a single breadwinner, this will be the same as earnings, and is therefore 
sometimes confused with earnings. But it will vary with the number o f earners in a 
household as well as with their earnings, and it can also contain non-wage components, 
such as when a household contains both wage earners and self-employed workers. 
Household income can be measured before or after housing costs.
Personal disposable income is what the individual receives. This is the result o f income 
transfers within the household, after the payment o f collective costs such as rent and food 
bills.
The rates o f growth o f these are not necessarily all the same. Each one is in part dependent 
on the structurally previous one but is also in part dependent on other factors. For 
example, earnings will vary as wage rates change, but will also vary with the amount o f 
overtime worked.
Changes in the employment structure o f the workforce will cause earnings to grow at a 
different rate than wage rates. A worker can increase his or her earnings by moving to a 
higher-paid job. Movement o f large numbers of workers from a lower-paid to a higher paid 
sector - such as would happen as the lower-paid sector contracted and the higher-paid one 
expanded - will tend to cause earnings to rise independently of changes in wage rates. 
According to Pollard, for example, the movement o f wage earners into higher-paid jobs 
accounted for about half the long-term increase in wages in Britain in the period before the 
First World War21.
Changes in the age structure o f the workforce will also affect the growth o f  average 
earnings. For example, since younger workers tend to earn less than older ones, a fall in the 
average age o f the workforce will be accompanied, if wage rates are held constant, by a fall 
in the level o f average earnings.
21 Pollard (1992) p. 151.
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In the same way, changes in the makeup o f household incomes will cause these to grow at 
different rates to the overall growth of earnings. A rise, for example, in the participation 
rate o f women in paid employment will, ceteris paribus, increase household incomes 
independendy o f any changes in earnings levels22. In the same way, increased social security 
payments, such as old-age pensions or family allowances will also increase household 
incomes without an increase in earnings. On the other hand, changes in the relative costs 
o f household expenditure will affect the amount available for personal incomes. For 
example, legal restrictions on rent rises in a period o f rising household incomes will result 
in a greater proportion o f household income being available for distribution as personal 
incomes.
Wage costs will not necessarily rise or fall at the same rate as any of these. On the face o f it, 
wage costs might be thought of as direcdy related to earnings, since these are what the 
employer hands over to workers. But the cost o f employing a worker includes other 
components - such as employers* insurance contributions and contributions to employees* 
pension schemes, as well as costs arising from provisions such as canteen facilities, which 
are incurred by the sheer fact o f employing anyone - and the costs o f these may well rise at 
a substantially different rate to those of earnings. But what might be o f more importance to 
an employer is the relationship of the marginal cost o f employing a worker to the worker’s 
marginal product. Studies have suggested that, at least in the short run, these are not 
identical. For example, Kotlikoff and Gokhale’s study o f 300,000 employees working for a 
Fortune 1000 company between 1969 and 1983 concluded that, for most workers, their 
productivity exceeded the sum of their earnings and other compensation when young, but 
was lower when old. The exceptions were the sales personnel, whose earnings were pardy 
based on commission23. An implication o f this is that a firm’s net wage costs will vary, ceteris 
paribus, not just according to variations in the actual earnings o f its employees but also 
according to their age profile.
1.2 The case o f the Netherlands.
This thesis looks at the case o f the Netherlands. This country has been described by 
Eichengreen as “prototypical” in its combination of wage restraint - in the form of wage
22 Under the conditions, that is, o f the 1950s, when women tended to be members o f households whose main 
breadwinner was a man.
23 Kotlikoff & Gokhale (1992) pp. 1235-42.
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control - and high investment24. Its rate o f growth o f foreign trade over the period was 
typical, slightly lower than that o f West Germany, slightly higher than that o f France25, 
while its rate o f growth of national income between 1950 and 1962 was about the average 
for north-west Europe as a whole26. The object o f the substantive chapters o f the thesis is 
to use the case of the Netherlands to create an explanatory model which could then be of 
use in looking at rising living standards in other countries and in western Europe in general.
As with other western European countries, the Dutch economy grew at a historically 
remarkable rate following the recovery from the Second World War. The expansion of 
1950-73 was the fastest and longest the Netherlands had experienced since the seventeenth 
century27, an upward trend only interrupted in 1958 when real income per capita briefly 
fell28. The expansion o f industry during the 1950s played a significant role in this growth. 
Between 1948 and 1962, industrial production more than doubled29, with industry’s 
contribution to national income rising from 31% in 1938 to 42.5% in I96030. The growth 
o f the export trade helped considerably in this. Between 1950 and 1973, Dutch foreign 
trade grew at an average annual rate of 9.26%31, with industrial products becoming more 
important. Over the period 1949-60, the volume o f industrial exports grew by 400%, rising 
from 55% o f exports in 1949 to 62% in I96032.
Overall, there was an increase in prosperity during the 1950s. Between 1948 and 1962, real 
national income per capita rose by almost 60%, while consumption per capita by value was 
one-third higher in 1962 than in 194833. The growth in consumption was also typical in the 
way that it involved widening ownership of consumer durables. The per capita quantity of 
consumer durables bought each year rose by more than sixty percent between 1953 and 
I96034. By 1958, sixty percent of all households had the use of a washing machine - 
although not all of them fully-automatic - and by the end of the decade almost all 
households had a vacuum cleaner35. Ownership o f televisions increased. When the Dutch 
television service began in 1951, there were only a hundred television sets in the entire
24 Eichengreen (1996) p. 45.
25 Maddison (1991) p. 148.
26 Denison (1967) p. 17.
27 Griffiths (1986) p. 95.
28 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 210.
29 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 4.
30 Abert (1969) p. 8.
31 Maddison (1991) p. 148.
32 Abert (1969) p. 7.
33 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie pp. 4-5.
34 Jaardjfers voor Nederland 1959-1960 Table 357.
35 Van Rossem etal (1993) p. 59.
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country. Ten years later there were more than a million36. The ownership of motor vehicles 
expanded rapidly too. Between 1952 and 1958, the ownership of mopeds increased by 
more than three times, from 217 000 to 925 000, and the number o f motor cars more than 
doubled from 170 000 to 425 00037.
This thesis argues that the major factor behind rising disposable incomes was the changing 
structure of the workforce. This changing structure was, in turn, a consequence of 
increased industrialisation, which resulted in the expansion of employment in 
manufacturing, from about 25% of the workforce in 1947 to just over 30% in I96038. The 
higher rates o f pay offered in manufacturing would have meant that earnings rose as a 
consequence, an increase that would have been amplified by the increasing proportion of 
the manufacturing workforce in white-collar occupations, while increasing female 
participation in the paid workforce (including higher paid jobs than previously for 
teenagers) would have led to additional increases in household income.
The thesis attempts to evaluate how much structural changes to the workforce contributed 
to increasing household incomes. It looks at what structural changes occurred, and 
attempts to calculate the effect o f these.
It confines itself to the period between 1945 and 1960. Rising living standards were an 
established fact o f life by 1960, and there are a number o f reasons why this particular year 
is a good breakpoint. The census o f 1960 gives a good picture o f the changes to the 
workforce since the first post-war census in 1947. The institutional context changed the 
previous year, with the break-up o f the Labour-Catholic coalition that had ruled the 
Netherlands since the Second World War, while the labour market changed after 1961, 
with numbers o f skilled workers going abroad to work, helping create a shortage o f skilled 
labour that led to the collapse o f wage control in 1963. The inclusion of the period o f post­
war recovery before the beginning o f the “Golden Age” is justified on two grounds. Firstly, 
the availability o f the data (e.g. the timing o f the post-war census) sometimes makes it 
unavoidable. Secondly, a number o f the trends that contributed to the rise in living 
standards, such as increased industrial employment, had their origins in the recovery from 
the chaos o f the immediate post-war world.
36 Ibid. pp. 61-62.
37 Ibid. p. 58.
38 1? Algemene volkstelling, 31 m i 1960 Deel 10A , Table 2.
- 17-
1.3 The structure o f the thesis.
Chapter 2 gives an account of the economic development of the Netherlands between 
1945 and the beginning of the 1960s. It explains the relationship between wage control and 
the government's industrialisation policy. It then goes on to explain the institutional 
background to changes in the Dutch economy, in particular those in the labour market. 
This includes a description of how wage control worked and why the trade unions backed 
it. The chapter ends by describing broadly the effects o f industrialisation on the Dutch 
economy.
Chapter 3 considers the effectiveness o f the wage control system. It looks at the arguments 
o f Roberts in the 1950s, van Hulst in the 1980s, and Brander, van Hulst and Mieras in the 
1990s, all o f whom argued that wage control had little or no effect, together with the 
arguments o f their critics. The chapter concludes that none o f the arguments show that 
disposable incomes rose because o f a failure o f wage control to hold down wages.
Chapter 4 describes how the workforce changed its structure during the period. It identifies 
a number o f significant changes, the most important being the growth o f employment in 
manufacturing and the decline o f employment in agriculture. It shows that there are 
important distinctions between the male and female workforces, and how these changed. 
The chapter also describes the pattern o f unemployment over the period and how this 
changed over time.
Chapter 5 tests the hypothesis that real wages grew as a direct result o f full employment. In 
particular, it takes up MyrdaTs argument that full employment enabled trade unions to push 
up wage rates. The chapter concludes that, although some effects on wage rates of full 
employment can be found, these rises were not large enough to account for the rise in 
earnings.
Chapter 6 tests the hypothesis that changes in the occupational and sectoral structure of 
the workforce account for the rise in incomes. It looks at the effect of the increase in male 
employment in manufacturing on men's earnings. It finds that the major part o f income 
growth can be accounted for by the increase in the number o f young men employed in 
manufacturing.
Chapter 7 looks at the effect of structural change on household incomes. The reason for 
this is that earnings are not the same as disposable income. Disposable income is mediated 
through the household, and, ceteris paribus, the growth of household income can be used as 
a proxy for the growth o f disposable income. The chapter measures the effects on
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household incomes of the increased earnings o f sons living in their parental homes and the 
increased participation of women in the paid workforce. It concludes that, by increasing 
household incomes, these boosted disposable income by an amount greater than their 
apparent magnitude, but that it is not possible to calculate a precise amount.
Chapter 8 sums up the results. It then briefly looks at data from a selection o f other 
countries in western Europe to see if the Netherlands was an exception. It ends by 
discussing some implications o f these results.
The thesis uses published sources throughout The figures used are, to large extent, taken 
from census data and from reports and series published by the Dutch Central Bureau for 
Statistics (CBS). The publications o f the CBS can often be found in libraries that contain 
statistical material generally, as well as in the KottinkUjke BibHotheek, the Dutch national 
library. They are also, usually39, to be found in the libraries at the CBS offices in Voorburg 
and Heeden, and many thanks are due to the staff in these libraries for their all their 
assistance in my search for the data used here.
39 Unfortunately, some o f the older publications are missing.
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Chapter 2. Wage Control and the Industrialisation 
of the Netherlands.
This chapter explains the background to the Dutch labour market during the 1950s. It 
discusses two important features: wage control and the industrialisation policy. It explains 
what these were and the relationship between them.
The chapter begins by explaining the reasons for the industrialisation policy. It looks at the 
state o f the Netherlands in the aftermath o f the Second Wodd War, both in terms o f the 
immediate crisis and the problems it faced in the longer term. It explains why the 
industrialisation policy was adopted and how wage control was used to assist it. It also 
looks at how this policy related to political developments in the Netherlands.
The chapter then explains the operation of the wage control system. It describes the 
complex set o f institutions used to control wages growth, and describes how the system 
changed over the period. It also explains why the system had the backing o f the trade 
unions.
It ends by looking at the outcomes o f industrialisation. It describes how die expansion o f 
manufacturing played a major role in solving the post-war economic problems faced by the 
Netherlands - in particular, its role in the disappearance o f unemployment and the 
appearance o f full employment.
2.1 The Netherlands after the Second World War.
Wage control and industrialisation were a consequence o f the economic and political 
situation the Netherlands found itself in following the Second World War. They were a 
practical response to the economic problems and became an integral part of the Dutch 
political consensus because o f the way that the political system developed after the war.
The immediate problems faced by the Dutch economy in 1945 were those resulting from 
war and occupation. There is general agreement that war damage in the Netherlands was 
greater than in other western European countries40, with industrial production in the third 
quarter o f 1945 (the first full quarter after liberation41) only reaching 38% o f the pre-war 
level42. The first post-war estimate of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
40 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 185.
41 The liberation o f the Netherlands was completed on 5 May 1945.
42 Ibid. p. 189.
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suggested that, even if consumption were frozen at the minimum necessary for existence, 
economic recovery would take at least five years43. Per capita income, already lower in 1940 
than in 1929, fell still further during the occupation, and, during the last stages of the 
occupation, in the “hunger winter” o f 1944-45, consumption fell well below the level o f 
subsistence. Funds were needed to raise consumption levels, which restricted those 
available for investment. Inflation threatened: taxation more than doubled between 1940 
and 1945 but nonetheless failed to cover public expenditure, and there had been a five-fold 
increase in the monetary stock44. War damage to the Dutch capital goods stock amounted 
to over a quarter o f its pre-war value45. The merchant marine was reduced to about half the 
pre-war tonnage and the railway rolling stock was devastated, with only five out o f 300 
electric engines fit to use. There was a shortage of 300,000 houses: out o f a population of 
just under ten million., more than one million did not have proper living accommodation46.
Recovery from these problems began almost immediately and was largely achieved by the 
end o f the decade. By the autumn o f 1945, the Dutch consumer was getting 2,200 calories 
a day, against between 400 to 600 in the occupied west o f the country during the weeks 
immediately before liberation47. Industrial production reached the pre-war level in 194748, 
and per capita national income surpassed the 1929 pre-war peak in 194849. Rationing was 
abolished in 1949 with the exception of coffee, which remained rationed until 195250. The 
only sectors o f the economy that had not reached their pre-war levels o f production by 
1950 were coal mining and ready-made clothing51. The period of recovery is generally 
regarded as having ended in 195052.
But, beyond the immediate crisis, the economy also faced serious structural problems. 
Indonesian independence, finally granted after five years of military struggle in 1949, meant 
the loss o f between ten and fifteen percent o f national income53. The end o f colonial rule 
meant not just in the loss o f the function o f Amsterdam as a trade centre but also in the 
disappearance of a large protected market. And, perhaps most importantly in the
43 Ibid. pp. 186-187.
44 Klein (1980) pp. 5-7.
45 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989). p. 186.
46 Klein (1980) pp. 5-7.
47 De Liagre Bohl, et al (1981) p. 144; van der Zee (1982) p. 224. These latter figures are not typing errors. A 
representative o f  the British Ministry o f Food in the Hague reported, immediately after liberation, that there 
were some 20,000 cases o f extreme starvation in that city alone - around five per cent o f the population [van 
der Zee (1982) p. 300].
48 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 204.
49 Klein (1980) p. 7.
50 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 202.
51 Ibid. p. 204.
52 Messing (1981) p. 25.
53 Klein (1980) p. 8.
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immediate post-war context o f the “dollar gap”, it meant the loss of the triangular trade 
flow which had brought dollars to the Netherlands as the result o f East Indian trade with 
the USA54. Traditionally, Indonesia had supplied the Nethedands with a balance of 
payments surplus55, and in the late 1940s a deficit appeared in the Dutch trade balance 
amounting to some 14% of GNP, the largest deficit, in terms o f proportion of 
international trade, o f any country within the dollar area56. Additionally, a rapidly growing 
population - its rate o f increase averaged 1.3% per annum between 1950 and I96057 - raised 
the spectre o f increasing poverty and unemployment. Rising population had led to a fall in 
per capita national income between 1929 and 193958, and had contributed to the growth of 
unemployment59.
The government’s industrialisation policy was a response to these structural problems. It 
was initially formulated by a civil servant at the Ministry o f Economic Affairs, G. A. 
Kohnstamm, who defined the problem as being how to maintain full employment with a 
growing working population and how to get rid of the enormous balance o f payments 
problem. He went on to argue that, since the Dutch economy was already strongly 
specialised in the tertiary sector and since agriculture needed to shed labour rather than 
increase it, it followed that industrialisation must be the only way to increase employment60.
Economic development in the nineteenth century and in the first four decades o f the 
twentieth century had left the Netherlands with a geographically uneven pattern of 
industrialisation. Industrial growth took off in the 1890s, dominated by “old” sectors such 
as food and textiles, with the “new” sectors, such as chemicals and the paper industry, 
becoming important only after 1910. By around 1930, the industrial picture o f the 
Netherlands was characterised by a mosaic o f regional specialisations. Labour-intensive 
industry had become concentrated on the periphery, in Twente and North Brabant, while 
capital-intensive industry was concentrated in Holland61. Elsewhere, development had been 
more differentiated, with brick-making in the river area, mining in South Limburg, and 
agricultural industry in the eastern part o f Groningen and in western North Brabant62.
54 De Smidt & Wever (1987) p. 6.
55 Van Zanden (1988) p. 468.
56 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 192.
57 Abert (1969) pp. 2-3.
58 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 129. Population rose by 12.9% between 1929 and 1939, while national 
income increased by only 10% in the same period.
59 Ibid. p. 155.
60 Ibid. pp. 242-243.
61 “Holland” is used throughout this thesis in the strict sense o f the provinces o f North and South Holland, 
rather than in the colloquial sense o f the Netherlands as a whole.
62 De Smidt & Wever (1987) pp. 13-14; van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 7.
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Figure 1. T he N etherlands at the beginning o f  the 1950s.
Van Zanden and Griffiths argue that this distribution can be explained to a large extent by 
the modernisation in the nineteenth century of the two strong sectors o f the economy: 
agriculture and international services. The modernisation o f agriculture was coupled with 
the rise of industrial development: thus, at the heart o f industrialisation in eastern 
Groningen and western North Brabant could be found sugar, potato meal, strawboard and 
milk factories. In the west o f the country, the adoption o f economies o f scale in the service 
sector led to the rise of steam boat lines and railway companies in the 1860s, giving the 
country its first capital-intensive enterprises. These in turn played a decisive role as
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suppliers o f capital and as customers o f modem shipbuilding and machine building in 
Holland after 189063.
Geographical factors also played a role. The Netherlands is poor in raw materials, which 
have to be imported and are therefore cheapest in port cities. These port cities, as centres 
o f trade, they argue, possessed a capital-rich citizenry, a variety o f occupational groups with 
specialised skills and a large, relatively prosperous market. Consequently, development here 
involved the industrialisation of traded goods, such as sugar refineries and beer brewing, 
the growth o f luxury industries dependent on highly-skilled workers, such as the diamond 
and printing industries, businesses linked to the ports, such as shipbuilding and machine 
building, and businesses such as ready-made clothing, directed at the domestic market that 
employment resulting from this industrialisation created64.
The growth o f industry in Holland led to rural underemployment elsewhere. The process 
o f geographical specialisation brought about the end o f rural industry, and consequently the 
agriculturalisation o f the countryside65. This in turn released labour for urban industry. 
Industrialisation in Twente, the Achterhoek and North Brabant was largely based on the 
supply o f cheap labour released as a result o f the decline o f agriculture-related household 
industry66.
The existing industry was adversely affected by Indonesian independence. Colonial rule had 
aided the growth o f industry. The cotton industry in Twente grew on the demand for 
cotton goods from Java, while the Dutch machine tool industry specialised in building 
machines for the Javan sugar industry67.
Much scope existed, therefore, for the further industrialisation o f the country, and between 
1948 and 1962, the government attempted to promote economic growth by encouraging 
industrial expansion. To this end, the Ministry o f Economic Affairs issued eight 
Industrialisation Notes, the first in 1949. These were neither economic plans in the narrow 
sense nor rigid outlines, and the basis o f the economy remained entrepreneurial 
production, based on private ownership of industry. Messing summarises the 
industrialisation policy as an attempt to shape a climate in which the entrepreneur dared to 
take risks68, while Dercksen suggests that it should be seen as a Dutch example of
63 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) pp. 5-6.
64 Ibid. p. 6.
65 De Smidt & Wever (1987) p. 14.
66 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 6.
67 Ibid. p. 7.
68Messing (1981) p. 26.
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indicative planning69. The First Industrialisation Note70 o f September 1949 spoke o f the need 
to expand the workforce in manufacturing by 215,000 by mid-1952, and the next two 
notes, published in 1950 and 1951, had the character of reports on the progress achieved. 
From the Fourth Industrialisation Note the plans were less specific, and the Eighth 
Industrialisation Note o f 1963 brought the policy to a formal end71.
Wage control was intended as a means by which the funds necessary to finance 
industrialisation were to be made available. The First Industrialisation Note declared that the 
success o f the industrialisation policy depended on the Dutch people being prepared to use 
the expected rise in national income - flowing from increases in productivity and 
production in general - not in increased consumption, but instead to direct it towards 
increased industrial investment72. The wage control system was supposed to ensure that the 
rise in national income was not distributed in higher wages.
Wage control already existed at the time the industrialisation policy was decided on. Wages 
were originally frozen by the occupying power in 1941, although they had tended to 
increase through wage drift73. The wage freeze was left in operation after the liberation as 
an emergency measure, because the economy was threatened by an expanding money 
supply74. This threat o f high inflation was drastically reduced by the currency reform of 
September 194575, but wage control continued during the period of economic recovery. 
Pen has described the thinking behind the initial retention o f wage control as being that 
real wage levels in 1945 were higher than the economy could cope with, and that, with the 
setting of wages according to the minimum level o f consumption, an advance was given on 
later improvements in productivity76. From this, it was just a short step to using wage 
control to aid industrial development The prior existence of the wage control system 
meant that the instruments for ensuring that this redirection occurred were already in place.
Industrialisation needed additional labour as well as additional capital. For this reason, the 
government also expanded the technical education system. The First Industrialisation Note
69 Dercksen (1986) p. 27.
70 Strictly speaking this was entitled the Memorandum concerning Industrialisation in the Netherlands (Nota intake de 
industrialisatie in Nederland), its successors being the Second Memorandum concerning the Industrialisation of the 
Netherlands, etc. But since they are referred to in Dutch as De eerste industrialisatienota, De tweede 
industrialisatienota, etc. (a usage dating from, and given semi-official recognition by, the Second Industrialisation 
Noti), they will be referred to in the text as the First Industrialisation Note, the Second Industrialisation Note, etc. 
References to their contents use their “correct” names, as does the bibliography.
71 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) pp. 242-243.
72 Nota intake de industrialisatie in Nederland p. 39.
73 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 94.
74 Windmuller (1969) pp. 116-117; van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 187.
75 Ibid. p. 188.
76 Pen (1963) pp. 322-323.
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claimed that the number o f youths that got no further education after lower school was far 
too large. It saw this as being caused by ignorance o f the higher wages that a skilled 
education could bring in later life, combined with the attractiveness of immediate higher 
earnings (between the ages o f 14 and 22, the unskilled were higher paid, on average, than 
the skilled). Additionally, it claimed that too few o f those that continued in education were 
educated for a job in industry77. This problem was solved by expanding the number of 
trade schools from 106 in 1946 to 187 in 1953, the number o f students attending these 
increasing over the same period from 35,118 to 58,100. The Minister o f Education 
reported in December 1952 that the proportion o f youths that had left school for further 
education had risen from 60% in 1938 to 83% in 1952, two-thirds o f the increase having 
been taken up by industrial education78.
In addition, as a further measure to restrict unemployment, the government sought to 
encourage emigration, although in the long run this probably had little effect The First 
Industrialisation Note stated that if industrialisation failed to increase employment, there 
would have to be large-scale enforced emigration o f young job-seekers79. But it was 
believed in any case that industrialisation would be limited in its effects, and migration 
schemes were set up with a number o f other countries outside Europe80. The majority of 
those emigrating under this scheme went to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the USA and 
South Africa, the net migration to these countries totalling around 400,000 between 1946 
and 1975. The scheme peaked in 1952, when 52,000 people emigrated, and emigration 
slowed with the growth in employment after 1955. In practical terms, the scheme ended 
with the extremely low rates o f unemployment in the early 1960s81.
These were all political decisions and took place in the context o f an attempt to change the 
structure o f Dutch political life. The pre-war system o f political parties was based on the 
division o f Dutch society into ideological blocs. This system grew up in the period between 
1870 and 1920. Known as ver^uiling - usually translated as “pillarisation” - it involved the 
population being grouped on religious and ideological grounds, with organisations such as 
political parties reflecting this division. The division o f the population into these blocs, 
known as “pillars”, permeated the whole o f social life: the schools system, leisure activities,
77 Nota in %ake de industrialisatie pp. 33-34.
78 De Liagre Bohl etal (1981) p. 278.
79 Nota in ^ake de industrialisatie in Nederland p. 6.
80 Ministry o f Social Affairs and Public Health (c. 1951).
81 Hofstee (1981) pp. 95-96.
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the mass media82, cultural life, etc. By the inter-war years, the system had stabilised around 
four blocs - Protestant, Catholic, Liberal and Social Democratic - and the ideological and 
religious differences between these blocs were used by the various party elites to bind their 
supporters closer to them83.
Immediately after the Second World War, the Dutch People’s Movement (Nederlandse 
Volksbeweging, or NVB) was set up to try and “break through” this system. This movement 
had its origins during the occupation in discussions held in the internment camp at St- 
Michielsgestel, where a large proportion of the Dutch political elite was imprisoned. It 
aimed to prevent a return to the pre-war system of politics, based on religion and class, and 
proposed instead the founding of a “personalist-socialist” party, whose programme was 
envisioned as a third way between individualism and collectivism. In June 1945, Professor 
Schermerhom, the leader o f the NVB, was appointed Prime Minister84.
The founding o f the Labour Party at the beginning o f 1946 was intended as part o f the 
“breakthrough” process. The Labour Party was formed out o f the coming together o f two 
currents. One was the NVB. The other was a strand within the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders 
Party (SDAP), the existing social-democratic party, led by those like Willem Drees and 
Koos Vorrinck, the party chairman, who wanted to create a party of the centre-left that 
would attract other layers o f the population as well as workers85. Together with a number 
o f smaller organisations, the NVB and SDAP merged to form a party that they hoped 
would attract sufficiendy broad support to gain an overall majority in parliament The 
“breakthrough ideal” was expressed in the Labour Party’s slogan in the May 1946 elections: 
“In service o f the whole people”86 (i.e. as opposed to a specific section, such as workers).
The “breakthrough ideal” was linked to a rejection o f pre-war liberal economic policies87. 
The policies o f the Colijn government during the 1930s had failed to solve the problems of 
the depression. The government had assumed that the key to recovery was the recovery o f
82 This paragraph is written in the past tense and the system has faded away. But path dependency has its 
effects. Dutch television and radio programming, for example, is still based on a framework derived from this 
system - and, as a glance into any Dutch newsagents will confirm, echoes of the system can be seen amongst 
the Dutch radio and television guides. Vengdiling determined the course o f  high politics and it penetrated deep 
into the trivia o f everyday life.
83 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) pp. 10-11. Whether the Liberals should be defined as one o f the pillars is a 
hotly contested subject [van Zanden (1998) p. 10], but the debate has no real implications for this study.
84 Koole (1995) pp. 46-47; Dercksen (1986) pp. 13-14; van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 184.
85 Bleich (1986) pp. 15-16.
86 Ibid. p. 27.
87 There is, o f course, no reason in the abstract why it was not possible to oppose both ver^ uiling and 
government intervention in the market. Indeed, this is what the Dutch liberals did believe, but they were a 
small minority at this time. The historical experience o f the Netherlands thus far suggested to most who 
considered die issue that ver%uiling and economic liberalism were intimately linked.
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business confidence, and to that end had argued the necessity for balanced budgets88. But 
by 1936, there were half a million unemployed - amounting to one in five o f the working 
population - with immense hidden unemployment89. In 1935, the SDAP, in a congress held 
together with its associated trade union confederation, the Nederlands Verbond van 
Vakverenigingen (N W ), adopted The Plan of LabouP0. This was an attempt, according to 
Tinbergen, one o f its authors, to be much more concrete about a solution to the depression 
than had traditionally been the case in Dutch socialist thought. It was much influence by 
Keynes, advocating the creation of increased demand by means of budget deficits91. It also 
identified increased industrialisation as a solution to the problem of the rapid growth of the 
Dutch population92. But a word much used in the document was “planning”. By this, 
Tinbergen explains, it was meant that political intervention was necessary in order to end 
the depression93.
Rejection o f economic liberalism was not confined to the advocates o f the “breakthrough”. 
Catholic thinking during the decade also turned towards the idea o f planning, although in 
this case government action was emphasised less. The emphasis here was on the notion of 
the ‘business organisation under law” (Pubdekrechtelijke Bedrijfsorganisatie, known as PBO) 
advocated by J. A. Veraarts. Under this form of organisation, councils, involving both 
employers and employees and having the legal power to establish wage and price policy, 
were to be set up in each branch o f business. The role o f the state was to be restricted by 
the subsidiarity principle: no task was to be taken up by a “higher” organ, such as the 
government, if it could be fulfilled by a “lower” organ, such as a business council. 
Protestant thinking was less complete in its support for planning, but the Christelijk- 
Historische Unie (CHU), one of the main Protestant parties, had a strong pro-planning
94wing .
The idea that the market could not be left to its own devices was therefore part of the 
political “common sense” of the immediate post-war period. This affected government 
policy in two ways. One was that certain o f the pre-war proposals were, to one extent or 
other, implemented in the post-war period, sometimes by those who had proposed them. 
For example, Hein Vos, director o f the SDAP’s scientific bureau and in charge of 
producing The Plan of Labour; became Minister o f Trade and Industry in the first post-war
88 Tinbergen (1982) pp. 36-37.
89 De Smidt & Wever (1987) p. 5.
90 Commissie uit N W  en SDAP (1936) p. 6.
91 Tinbergen (1982) p. 37.
92 Commissie uit N W  en SDAP (1936) p. 133.
93 Tinbergen (1982) pp. 38-39.
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government As such, he was responsible for creating the Central Planning Bureau95, which 
had as its first director the economist Jan Tinbergen, another o f the authors o f the Plan96. 
But the other effect o f this attitude was to focus political thinking on government 
intervention as a means o f solving practical economic problems.
Thus, the idea that the economic renewal o f the Netherlands could be achieved through 
government sponsorship o f further industrialisation became the dominant political 
consensus. And, because wage control was integral to industrialisation, this too became 
part o f this consensus.
Paradoxically, the failure o f the ‘‘breakthrough” may have contributed to the stability of 
this consensus. Lijphart, in his 1968 study o f the Dutch political system, argued that 
pillarisation had led to political stability as a result o f the party elites having to make 
compromises97. The “breakthrough movement” regarded this stability as being part of the 
problem, and may have thought o f it as stagnation rather than stability. But the supporters 
o f the “breakthrough” had, in the eventuality, to work within the system they opposed. In 
the general election of May 1946, the Labour Party not only failed to get a majority of the 
votes; it got a lower percentage o f the vote than its constituent organisations had received 
in total in the last pre-war election o f 1937. By and large, voters stuck by the old system98, 
and the Catholic People’s Party became the largest party in parliament99. For the next nearly 
twelve and a half years or so, until December 1958, the Netherlands was ruled by a series 
of coalitions dominated by the Catholic People’s Party and the Labour Party, the so-called 
“Roman-Red” coalition. Between 1946 and 1948, under the Catholic Beel, the cabinet 
consisted only o f Catholic People’s Party and Labour Party members. However, under the 
Labour politician Drees, the cabinets were formed on a “broad basis”100. This fact of 
coalition government may have itself generated consensus, by forcing political parties to 
concentrate on advocating those policies on which they could agree to work. As a result, 
until the end o f the 1950s, all the major political parties were committed to the same 
general thrust o f economic policy.
94 Buunk (1989) pp. 109-110.
95 Griffiths (1980) p. 137.
96 Messing (1981) p. 30.
97 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 10.
98 The major exception was the size o f the Communist vote, which is discussed below.
99 Nationale Rotterdamsche Courant Verkie^ngs Bditie 18th May 1946.
100 Bleich (1986) p. 51.
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2.2 The operation o f the wage control system
Dutch wage control in this period did not mean that the government arbitrarily set a wage 
norm and attempted to impose it. The institutions of the wage control system contained 
elements o f both consensus and control. The system was enforced by legal powers held by 
the government, in the person of the Minister o f Social Affairs, but consent was achieved 
by the involvement o f the employers’ associations and the trade unions in a system of 
organisations unlike any other in post-war Europe. Nor did the system remain static. It 
changed its method of working over time in response to economic development.
The central institution in the system was the Foundation o f Labour. This was set up during 
the occupation as an illegal forum for employers and the trade unions. In 1942 the 
occupation authorities disbanded the existing employers’ and trade union organisations and 
set up the Nederlands Arbeidsfront (Dutch Labour Front). This organisation never attained 
any legitimacy, and both employers and the leaders o f the now-illegal trade unions looked 
to a new framework o f industrial relations once the occupations ended. Illegal contacts 
between employers and trade union leaders led to the creation of an arena within which 
they could discuss common issues and the idea of the Foundation o f Labour came out of 
this101. It officially came into existence on 17 May 1945, when its constitution was 
notarised. From the beginning, it claimed the right to speak for the whole o f the private 
sector, and the government agreed to take no action in any area o f public policy relevant to 
the Foundation’s tasks without consulting it102.
Legal authority for controlling wages was vested in the Board o f Public Mediators103. This 
body had its origins in the pre-war system of industrial relations. The Industrial Disputes 
Act of 1923 set up boards for each region, whose job was solely to mediate between 
employers and workers. These regional boards were merged in May 1940 by the occupation 
power into a national organisation to enforce centrally-specified wage levels and working 
conditions. The national Board was abolished in October 1942, but was set up once again
101 Messing (1981) pp. 29-30.
102 WindmuUer (1969) pp. 282-283.
103 Known in Dutch as the College van Rijksbemddelaars, there are several different versions o f the English 
name o f this organisation used in the literature. As far as authors cited in this chapter are concerned, 
Windmuller and Abert both prefer “Board o f Government Mediators”, while Pen uses “Board o f Mediators” 
and the Dutch Ministry o f Social Affairs calls it the “Board o f Government Conciliators”. This does not 
exhaust the list o f translations. Van Zanden avoids the issue by using the Dutch name. The problem is the 
Dutch word rijk, for which there is no straightforward English equivalent. However, in this context, 
“government” seems to suggest that the Board’s members were supposedly responsible to whichever 
coalition happened to be in office, while “public”, like rijk gives a sense o f a wider responsibility to Dutch 
society.
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in May 1945, following the liberation104 and was given its legal powers in the Extraordinary 
Decree on Labour Relations of October 1945 (Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsmhoudingeti, 
generally referred to as the BBA). Originally intended as an emergency measure to deal 
with the desperate economic situation o f 1945, the BBA gave the Board the power to 
scrutinise all wages and other conditions o f employment, whether arrived at by individual 
or collective bargaining. It also gave the Board the duty to consult the Foundation of 
Labour before promulgating guidelines and making decisions105. The BBA contained two 
additional sections, one o f which restricted the termination o f individual employment and 
the other enforced a compulsory 48-hour working week. This latter provision only changed 
in 1961, when the working week was reduced to 45 hours106. The Board’s powers were 
legally enforceable. Employers who paid too much or too little were subject to prosecution 
and, if convicted, to a fine o f up to f l0 , 0 0 0  or a prison sentence of up to six months. There 
were only about eighty-five wage inspectors covering the whole country, so there was 
ample opportunity for evasion107, but, nonetheless, prosecutions were instituted, fines 
imposed, and even some employers sent to prison108.
The process o f determining wage rises usually involved a combination o f  collective 
bargaining and central control Following consultations with the Foundation o f Labour, the 
Minister o f Social Affairs would issue a global directive on the allowable size o f wage 
increases. The determination o f a wage limit thus, by its very nature, involved negotiations 
within the Foundation. Once the directive had been issued, the employers and trade unions 
in each branch of business negotiated a new labour contract (Collectieve Arbeidsov&reenkomst, 
usually referred to as a CAO). The Board o f Public Mediators examined the CAO in order 
to see if the ministerial directive had been followed, and it was either declared to be binding 
or it was rejected. In the latter case, a new CAO had to be agreed109
There existed, throughout the whole period, methods o f legally increasing rates o f pay 
outside the restrictions o f wage controL For one thing, not all wage and salary earners were 
covered by the BBA. Civil servants, teachers, the clergy and domestic servants were exempt 
in law, while managers and high-level administrators in the private sector were exempt in 
practice if their income exceeded a certain minimum110. For those industries that were 
covered by the BBA, the introduction of the “scientifically determined” job classification
104 Harmsen & Reinalda (1975) pp. 245-246.
105 Windmuller (1969) pp. 116-117.
106 Ibid. pp. 270-272.
]07 Ibid. pp. 315-316.
108 Pen (1963) p. 319.
109 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) pp. 94-95; Windmuller (1969) pp. 277-279.
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system could be used to increase wage rates above the allowed level o f rises. The intention 
behind this was to try and use wage differentials as a means o f stimulating productivity 
growth. In the first period after the war, when wage rates were initially set, jobs were 
officially classified as being skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, but this simple distinction 
proved too coarse. A new work classification system was initially introduced in 1948 and a 
uniform national system came into existence in 1952. From 1948, the Board o f Public 
Mediators considered the existence o f job classification as being a virtual precondition for 
favourable consideration o f special treatment concerning wage increases. In 1950, a survey 
somewhat hastily carried out showed that it had been 1 0 0 % introduced in the most 
important branches o f industry, but this figure has to be taken with a pinch o f salt. Another 
survey five years later showed that 60% o f workers in industry as a whole came under work 
classification. Even this figure may not be accurate. The metal industry introduced its own 
system during the 1950s, claiming that the standard system was unusable: a survey in 1963 
showed that 2 0 % of businesses in the metal industry were still not covered by job 
classification111. The final method o f increasing wages was the use o f incentive pay 
schemes. Bonus schemes were allowed as a means o f raising productivity and creating a 
greater differentiation in the wage structure. Because o f fears that misuse could be made o f 
these, the Board of Public Mediators restricted the wages that could be paid under these 
schemes to 20-25% above the amount that could be earned by payment by the hour. In a 
number o f cases this figure was later raised. This happened, for example, with the 
construction industry at the time when house building became a priority, when the excess 
that could be earned by bonuses was raised to 35%112.
These institutions formed part o f wider system o f organisations. The Central Planning  
Bureau (CPB) was set up in 1945 and given a statutory basis in 1947113. The main role of 
the CPB was to advise the government on policy, on the basis of its macro-economic 
predictions. To this end, it published an annual Central Economic Plan - not a plan in the 
sense o f setting prescribed economic goals but more a prognosis o f expected 
developments114. The Law on Industrial Organisation brought into existence the Social- 
Economic Council in 1950. This 45-member body - a third o f its members appointed by 
the trade unions, a third by the employers* associations, and the remainder, described as 
independent experts, appointed by the government - had the task o f advising the
110 Windmuller (1969) p. 272.
111 Windmuller etal (1987) p. 175-176.
112 Ibid. p. 175.
1,3 Griffiths (1980) p. 137.
114 Messing (1981) pp. 30-32.
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government on social and economic affairs115. Although legally responsible for the wages 
policy, it turned the responsibility for all questions relating to the technical administration 
o f wage control over to the Foundation o f Labour116. The Law on Enterprise Councils, also 
dating from 1950, obliged any enterprise with more than 25 employees to set up an 
enterprise council, elected by the employees, with the authority to advise on the running of 
the enterprise117. The only post-war nationalisation was that o f the Netherlands Bank, 
brought into state ownership in 1948118.
A further element in the system was the maintenance o f price control. The intention of 
price control was to keep the cost o f living down, thereby reducing upward pressure on 
wage levels and making it easier to hold them down. Rents were also controlled, further 
reducing pressure on the cost of living119.
Price controls were directed entirely from the centre. Their legal basis was the Price 
Escalation and Hoarding Act of 1939, which had been introduced, initially for a year, to 
combat price rises immediately preceding the Second World War, but continued to operate 
until it was replaced in 1961. The Ministry o f Economic Affairs could - and did - fix 
maximum prices for goods and services, although from 1949 onwards, according to 
Windmuller, the law was applied somewhat flexibly, with most prices being decontrolled, 
the exceptions being those that had an immediate impact on the cost o f living: foodstuffs, 
textiles, heating fuels, etc. The strategy the government used during this decade was known 
as “price surveillance”, which meant that as long as prices were kept within the terms o f ad 
hoc agreements between the Ministry o f Economic Affairs and the various trade and 
industry associations, the government refrained from using its powers120. Rent control 
seems to have been extremely important in holding down the cost of living: it has been 
calculated that if rents had risen in line with the cost of living between 1938 and 1950, the 
cost o f living would have risen at least 1 1 % more121
The wage control system went through three phases, two under the Roman-Red coalition 
and the third under the Catholic-Protestant-Liberal coalition that took office in 1959. 
Between 1945 and 1954, the “wage stop” system operated, under which general wage levels 
were only allowed to rise in proportion to the cost o f living122, followed from September
115 Windmuller (1969) pp. 117-118.
116 Ibid. p. 284.
117 Buunk (1989) p. 144.
118 Messing (1981) p. 32.
119 Van Zanden (1988) pp. 469-470.
120 Windmuller (1969) p. 335.
121 Van Zanden (1988) pp. 469-470.
122 Windmuller (1969) pp. 338-341.
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1954 by the “prosperity wage rounds”, under which workers were supposed to share in the 
new prosperity123. On two occasions, in 1951 and 1957, wage rates were deliberately 
allowed to fall behind rises in the cost o f living. From 1959, under the new coalition, 
general wage rises were governed by a more differentiated system.
The stabilisation o f wage rates, essential to begin operating wage control, was completed by 
October 1946. After failing to stabilise wages at 125% of the level of May 1940, and then at 
132%, a new approach was introduced in the Autumn o f 1945 based on the notion o f the 
“social minimum budget”. This minimum was derived from the results o f a survey made by 
the Central Bureau of Statistics. These results were used to calculate the weekly minimum 
income that could maintain a working-class family o f four. In larger cities, this figure was 
set at f35, while in smaller towns and the rural areas, where the cost o f living was less, it 
was lower124. The principle followed was o f equal real - not nominal - wages for equal 
labour. The Mediators established five wage zones altogether. They also set a uniform wage 
differential between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, with semi-skilled earnings 
10% above the unskilled and skilled earnings 20%, a ratio that was maintained until 1959125.
Following the stabilisation o f wages, the government announced that no further rises in 
real wages would be allowed without increases in the productivity o f labour. However, 
three general increases were allowed as a consequence of rises in the cost o f living. In 1948, 
a wage rise o f a guilder a week was allowed for all those with an annual income o f less than 
B700, as compensation for the reduction o f subsidies on various foodstuffs. In September 
1949, the guilder was devalued, and this was followed by the recommendation that all 
workers over 23 be allowed a wage rise o f 5% from 1 January 1950 as compensation. The 
rise was later extended to certain categories o f worker under 23. In September 1950 a 
compulsory rise o f 5% was imposed for all workers over 23, as well as some under. This 
was aimed at helping those receiving lower earnings, the rise being limited to a maximum 
of £15 a month, f3.36 a week or 7 cents an hour, depending on the basis o f the worker’s
123 Windmuller e td  (1987) pp. 181-182.
124 The “social minimum budget” was the reason for the compulsory 48-hour week. Since the minimum 
hourly rate was calculated on the basis one forty-eighth o f the minimum weekly wage, a working week o f less 
than 48 hours would reduce earnings below what was considered the minimum [Windmuller (1969) pp. 270- 
272].
125 SER (1952) p. 7, Windmuller (1969), pp. 338-341.
126 Ministry o f Social Affairs (c. 1951). Van Hulst claims that there was an additional “off-the-record” wage 
increase o f 6% in August 1947 [van Hulst (1984) p. 258].
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It is perhaps useful to put these figures in context. In 1950, some fifty-eight percent o f men 
who received incomes got £3000 or less127, just under sixty guilders a week. The CBS were, 
at this time, conducting a continuing survey of families living on an income o f between 
forty and sixty guilders a week, whose average size, during the first quarter o f 1950, was 
about three people. These families spent an average of around three hundred guilders on 
food during the quarter: approximately f54 of this on bread and just over f40 on meat128. A 
guilder a week in 1950, therefore, was approximately a quarter of an average family’s 
expenditure on bread or a third o f their expenditure on meat.
At the beginning of 1951, real wage rates were deliberately cut as an anti-inflationary 
measure. This was a direct consequence o f the outbreak o f the Korean War. Import prices 
rose rapidly, while, at the same time, the Netherlands was faced with a large increase in 
defence spending due to its NATO commitments. Dutch foreign exchange reserves began 
to drop and balance o f payments difficulties appeared. In February 1951, following a report 
on the situation by the Social-Economic Council, the government cut food subsidies by 
fifty percent, leading to a ten percent rise in the cost of living. As compensation, the trade 
unions accepted a compulsory rise o f five percent in wage rates, effectively a cut in real 
wage rates o f five percent129.
This “consumption restriction” lasted until the beginning o f 1954. A small one-time 
payment to workers was made in late 1951, .followed by a wage rise of 2% in 1952 as 
compensation for the workers’ contribution to the compulsory unemployment insurance 
scheme. The last general wage rise in this phase of wage control was a compulsory general 
rise o f 5%, payable from January 1954, whose intention was to remove the effects o f the 
1951 wage cut130.
Under the “prosperity wage rounds”, wage increases were supposed to be tied, not to the 
cost o f living, but to the need for an increase in the standard o f living. The workers’ share 
in rising prosperity was supposed to be ensured by keeping constant the “employees* share 
in the national income”. This share was defined as the ratio o f wage income per employee 
in the private sector and national income per head, at factor cost, o f the working 
population131, a definition that arose out o f a series o f debates within the Social-Economic 
Council on how to define “equitable” distribution o f income132. The first pay rise granted
127 Inkomensverdeling 1950, table 4.
128 Maandschrift CBS (1950) p. 1060.
129 Abert (1969) pp. 80-81; Windmuller (1969) pp. 341-342.
130 Windmuller (1969) pp. 341-342; Windmuller et al (1987) p. 180.
131 Van der Marel (1964) p. 775.
132 Abert (1969) pp. 20-21.
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under this system, in September 1954, was a non-compulsory increase limited to a 
maximum o f six percent. Because o f a high level of profits and a scarcity o f labour, 
employers tended to pay the full amount133. According to van Zanden and Griffiths this 
was the first major increase in real wage rates since the 1920s134. There was no wage rise 
granted in 1955, despite a rise in the price o f milk and in rents at the beginning o f the year, 
and the trade unions were restricted to seeking improvement in conditions, which could 
not amount to more than three percent o f the annual wage135, but in 1956, following a 
difficult session o f the Foundation of Labour, a six percent increase was granted. This was 
composed o f two parts: a compulsory rise of three percent and a rise to the maximum of 
three percent, to be negotiated within each branch of business. In practice, it has been 
suggested, levels o f unemployment were so low that, as in September 1954, employers paid 
the full amount136.
In 1957, for the second time, wage rates were deliberately cut as an anti-inflationary 
measure. Two wage rises were allowed for social purposes: a rise to compensate for the 
introduction o f contributory old-age pensions, and a rise to compensate for a national rent 
rise137. But, in response to a report from the Netherlands Bank that a balance o f payments 
deficit had appeared, the Social-Economic Council recommended that national expenditure 
be reduced by f700 million, half the cut in capital expenditure, half in consumption. The 
government accepted the report and, in response, cut public expenditure, raised taxes and 
the insurance premium, and raised rents and the guaranteed prices o f farm products. As a 
consequence o f these measures, the cost o f living rose twelve percent, while wage rates 
rose by only eleven percent138. The result o f this “second consumption restriction” was to 
worsen the 1957-58 recession139. Industrial production did not rise, unemployment rose by 
around three percent, and the trade unions began to express unhappiness about the 
situation140.
It was under these conditions that the Labour Party fell from office. During 1958, the party 
suffered a rapid loss o f membership, and it did badly in the provincial elections141. There 
was considerable criticism from within the Labour Party itself over government policy, and,
133 Windmuller e ta l{1987) pp. 181-182.
134 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 47.
135 The decision as to whether or not any improvement in conditions broke this rule would, o f course, be 
made by the Board o f Public Mediators.
136 Windmuller et al (1987) pp. 182-183.
137 Ibid. p. 183.
138 Abert (1969) pp. 80-81.
139 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 239. They cite a study showing that Dutch economic policy during the 
1950s was - contrary to its popular image - generally pro-cyclical (p. 237).
140 Windmuller etal \1987) p. 184.
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in November, at a national rally o f party members, Burger, the chairman of the party 
fraction in the Second Chamber142, outlined a list o f seven conditions for continuing the 
coalition. In protest at this, the Catholic People’s Party found an excuse to break up the 
coalition143. In the subsequent, 1959, elections, the Labour Party lost seats, while the 
Catholic People’s Party and the Liberals gained. A new coalition was formed under the 
Catholic De Quay, with the participation o f the Liberals and the two main Protestant
144parties .
It was the failure o f the De Quay government to satisfactorily reform the system that led to 
collapse o f wage control in 1963. During the economic boom of the mid-1950s, there had 
increasingly been calls for the wage-control system to be reformed. Both the employers, on 
the one hand, and the confessional parties and trade unions, on the other, began to 
demand a more differentiated method o f determining wages145. It was felt that the system 
did not allow the more prosperous branches o f industry to attract labour by offering higher 
wages, while it put a burden on industries where productivity could not increase by forcing 
them to raise wages when they could not afford it146.
The new policy introduced in 1959 stated that wage increases had to be justified on the 
basis of increases in productivity in individual industries rather than the economy as a 
whole147. This did not, however, lead to a restructuring o f the labour force. There were two 
major problems. The first was that no one actually knew how to calculate the increase in 
productivity in a single branch o f industry, since reliable data were hard to find148. The 
other was the flawed assumption behind the policy. This assumption was that the branches 
o f business experiencing labour shortages were those in which productivity was increasing. 
In fact, there was little or no relation between increasing productivity in a given sector and 
the shortage o f labour that it faced. For example, productivity was growing in agriculture, 
but this meant that it was able to shed labour, while, in the building industry, a slight 
increase in productivity coincided with heavy demand for labour149. During the boom at the
141 Bleich (1986) p. 76.
142 The Second Chamber is the more powerful o f the two parliamentary chambers, being the directly elected 
one. The First Chamber represents the provinces.
143 Koole (1995) p. 230.
144 Bleich (1986) p. 89; Koole (1995) p. 172.
145 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) p. 100.
146 De Wolff & Driehuis (1980) p. 41.
147 Abert (1969) p. 85.
148 Abert (1969) p. 86; de Wolff & Driehuis (1980) p. 41.
149 Van Zanden & Griffiths (1989) pp. 100-101. Indeed, this should not be unexpected. In general, in a period 
o f general economic expansion, low-productivity sectors would have to have attract more labour than high- 
productivity ones if they are to maintain their share o f output.
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beginning o f the 1960s, registered unemployment fell to one per cent150, employers had 
trouble hanging on to workers, and “black wages” - illegally high wages - spread 
throughout the private sector151. In September 1963, the Amsterdam dry dock company 
ADM raised its wage rates. This rise was illegal, but the company desperately needed to 
attract labour, since the size o f the workforce threatened to fall below the minimum level at 
which the company was able to function152. The rise at ADM led to strikes breaking out 
elsewhere as workers demanded similar increases, and industrial peace was only restored 
when the claim of the trade unions for a ten percent wage increase in 1964 was accepted153. 
In October 1963, the three major trade union confederations issued a joint statement that 
accused the government o f following a programme that failed to contribute to the 
improvement o f the social climate, and stated that the unions were no longer prepared to 
work with an “unrealistic” wage policy154. The loss of trade union support meant the end of 
the post-war system o f wage control. As a kind of farewell echo, a form of wages policy 
continued in operation until 1967, but without involving wage control155.
2.3 The trade unions and wage control.
Wage control was backed by the major trade union confederations as a means o f generating 
jobs. There were three main confederations. The Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen 
(N W ), formed in 1906, has already been mentioned in connection with The Plan of Labour. 
It was associated with the SDAP before the Second World War and the Labour Party 
afterwards. Confessional trade unions also existed. In 1909, Protestants created the 
Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond (CNV) and the Catholics set up their own organisation the 
same year, giving it the name o f the Kathodeke Arbeidersbeweging (KAB) when they refounded 
it after the liberation156. The attitudes o f these organisations were dominated by the fear of 
the return o f unemployment on the scale o f the 1930s. Job creation became a priority for
150 De Wolff & Driehuis(1980) p. 41.
151 Windmuller (1969) p. 229.
152 Nieum Rotterdame Courant 12 September 1963,18 September 1963.
153 De Wolff & Driehuis (1980) pp. 41-42.
154 Nieum Rotterdamse Courant 5 October 1963.
155 Windmuller e t a l { m i )  p. 172.
156 Buunk (1989) pp. 142-143. The division between secular and two confessional organisations was similarly 
to be found amongst the employers: the Centmal Sociaal Werkgevers Verbond (CSWV) associated with the 
Liberals, the Catholic Nederlands Katholiek Werkgevers Verbond, and the Protestant Verbond van Protestants- 
Christelijke Werkgevers in Nederland. There also existed a secular organisation of industrialists - the Verbond van 
Nederiandse Werkgevers - which had a considerable overlap in membership with the CSWV [Windmuller (1969) 
pp. 248-253]. Likewise, the split between secular, Catholic and Protestant was a feature o f farmers’ and small 
businessmen’s organisations [Windmuller (1969) pp. 243-244].
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them after 1945, and wage control was seen as an essential contribution to this. In 1964, a 
joint publication of the three confederations stated:
“The lag in the wage level during the 1950s was accepted by design so that 
industry could earn profits which would pay for expansion and modernisation 
o f the productive apparatus. From a social point o f view, this policy was 
deemed necessary to create employment for a rapidly growing labour force.” 157
Wage control would not have worked without their cooperation. The system depended on 
an explicit acceptance by the majority of the trade unions that it benefited their 
memberships. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the system, in the eyes o f trade union 
members, was probably enhanced by the participation o f the trade unions in the 
Foundation o f Labour and the Social-Economic Council, and by the fact that trade union 
objectives could be pursued through these organisations.
Eady opposition to trade union acceptance o f wage control effectively disappeared by 
1950. It is often stated that the social harmony apparent in the Netherlands during the 
1950s was due to the sense o f national solidarity built up during the Second World War158. 
However, this does not seem to have been the case. The period that followed the liberation 
was a period o f conflict, with the level o f strike activity in 1946 and 1947 being well above 
that experienced in the 1950s. The figures are shown in Table 2 . This conflict was reflected 
in the political arena, with the Communist Party massively increasing its share o f the vote 
in the main industrial cities in the May 1946 general election: thirty percent o f the vote in 
Amsterdam, as against less than thirteen percent in 1937, and eighteen percent in 
Rotterdam, versus four percent in 1937159. This vote held up in size in the provincial and 
municipal elections held in the following few weeks160.
The opposition to wage control was associated with the Communist-led United Trade 
Union Confederation (Eenheidsvakcentrale, or EVC), an organisation that grew out o f trade- 
union resistance activity during the occupation161. At the time of the liberation it was the 
largest trade union confederation, and was still the largest in 1946 in Amsterdam and the 
industrial area to the north o f the city162. The EVC was not just opposed to wage control 
but also to trade union involvement in the Foundation o f Labour163, in other words, to 
trade union involvement in what was to become the post-war consensus. The size o f the
157 Cited in Windmuller (1969), pp. 350-351.
158 For example, Windmuller et al (1987) p. 205.
159 Nationale Rotterdamsche Courant Verkieqngs Editie 18 May 1946.
160 Nationale Rotterdamsche Courant Verkie i^ngs Editie 31 May 1946; Nationale Rotterdamsche Courant 17 July 1946.
161 Harmsen & Noordegraaf(1973) pp. 791-852.
162 Harmsen & Reinalda (1975) p. 282.
163 Ibid. p. 283.
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Year N W KAB CNV
1946 242645 182821 93994
1950 381554 296410 155627
1952 420776 321478 174750
1953 435683 334714 182295
1954 453949 347268 191138
1955 463121 360986 199693
1956 468047 381733 206283
1957 500332 411991 215956
1958 486249 395047 218683
1959 476894 395869 218449
1960 486743 400396 219019
1961 506964 411785 223789
1962 507666 417780 224865
Sources: Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1943-1946, Table XVTI.2 
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1947-1950 .Table XXTV.2 
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1951-1952, Table 355.
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1953-1954, Table 347.
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1955-1956, Table 347.
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1957-1958, Table 373.
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1961-1962, Table 387.
Table 1. M embership o f  the main trade union confederations, 1946-1962.
EVC’s support in the main industrial centres suggests that there existed a strong minority 
o f the post-war Dutch population who initially did not go along with the major political 
leaderships.
The EVC was opposed by a broad spectrum of opinion. The Catholic Church issued a 
letter on observances forbidding Catholics to join the EVC, a report of the Dutch 
Reformed Church advised its members to keep their distance164, and the N W , KAB and 
CNV all brought pressure on employers not to negotiate with the EVC165. Within the EVC 
itself, there was growing tension between Communists and others, culminating in a split in 
1948, in which the syndicalist-led opposition took away the EVC’s support amongst the 
Rotterdam dockers to form a new organisation (the Ortafbankelijk Verbond van 
Bedrijfsorganisaties, or OVB)166. Following the split, both the EVC and the OVB withered, 
and swifdy became irrelevant to the wider story.
By and large the rank and file of the trade union movement seemed to approve o f the 
action of the mainstream trade unions. There are three things that point to this: the failure
164 Ibid. p. 255.
165 Ibid. pp. 270-271.
166 Ibid. pp. 292-293.
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of the EVC to hold its membership, the growth in membership o f the trade unions that 
supported government policy and the low level o f strikes.
The demise o f the EVC was probably a result o f the growth in membership of N W  and 
confessional trade unions rather than a cause of it. Communists in other western European 
countries managed to retain the leadership o f substantial sections of the trade union 
movement despite Cold War opposition and despite any reservations that large numbers of 
non-Communist trade unionists may have had concerning Communist politics. In any case, 
the Communist vote, although it declined from its post-liberation high, did not collapse at 
the same rate as the EVC’s membership figures. In the June 1956 general election, for 
example, the Communist Party still received nineteen percent o f the vote in Amsterdam167.
This suggests there must have been positive reasons for the support that Dutch workers 
gave to the N W , KAB and CNV, whose affiliated unions they joined in increasing 
numbers (see Table 1). This growth was not just a reflection o f the growth in the size of 
the working population. Until the 1958 recession, trade union membership grew as 
proportion o f the workforce, from slightly more than a third o f the workforce in the late 
1940s to forty per cent in 1957168.
The number o f working days lost through strikes remained low, by international standards, 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s169. They were also low when compare with the 
standards o f the Netherlands during the late 1940s. For example, as can be seen from 
Table 2 , the number of workers who went on strike in 1957 was less than two percent of 
the equivalent number in 1946.
Nonetheless, there were years in which the number o f working days lost through strikes 
was comparable to the numbers experienced in the late 1940s. The number o f working 
days lost began to rise as unemployment fell rapidly during 1955 and 1956, while the 
number o f workers involved in industrial action in 1960 was actually more than in 1946. It 
was in 1960 that the first major official strike of the postwar period took place, when the 
building workers were called out over the refusal o f the employers to sign a new CAO170, 
and the number of working days lost per thousand workers was actually higher than the 
equivalent number in the U.K. that year171. The strikes that broke out in the autumn of 
1963 that broke the wage control system have been already mentioned.
167 Nieum Rotterdamse Courant 14 June 1956.
168 Windmuller (1969) pp. 128-129.
169 ILO (1963) p. 400.
170 Van Zanden (1999) p. 83.
171 ILO (1963) p. 400.
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Number o f  
strikes/lockouts
Number o f  
workers involved
Number o f  
working days lost
1946 270 74800 681600
1947 272 62590 203400
1948 183 18660 131400
1949 116 14935 289353
1950 79 20822 162485
1951 85 15260 66740
1952 40 3793 31237
1953 58 11326 29852
1954 91 21203 59283
1955 63 24018 132805
1956 80 38102 212805
1957 37 1629 7214
1958 73 5310 37300
1959 48 8091 13997
1960 121 84810 467391
1961 43 9500 24656
1962 24 2383 9084
1963 104 30406 37757
Sources: Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1947-1950, table X.6.
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1955-1956, table 348.
Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1963-1964, table 406.
Table 2. The numbers o f  industrial disputes in the Netherlands, 1946-63.
The existence o f brief periods o f militancy suggest that there may be positive reasons for 
the longer periods of peace. It has been suggested that the absence o f widespread industrial 
unrest is consistent with the stable nature of Dutch society172, but it is clear that Dutch 
workers - or at least, some o f them - are prepared to go on strike, vote Communist, etc. 
Even taking into account these were always a minority, it is also the case that there were 
long periods when these workers were not prepared to go on strike. Differences in national 
conditions might be able to explain, broadly, differences between countries over a period 
o f time, but what they cannot do is to explain variations in behaviour in a single country. 
The low propensity to strike of a traditionally militant group o f workers such as the 
Amsterdam dockers over much, but not all, o f this period suggests that conditions, over 
much but not all o f this period, were such as to make militancy unnecessary.
172 Roberts (1958) p. 134. In fact he is making the same point as is being made here: that the relevant 
comparison for looking at workers’ satisfaction is not with the strike level o f other countries, but rather how 
the Dutch strike figures vary from year to year. But as is noted in Chapter 3, because of the date o f his study, 
he makes the point in the defence o f the opposite conclusion.
-42-
2.4 The industrialisation o f the N etherlands.
By the time that the industrialisation policy came to an end in 1962, the Dutch economy 
had improved its position considerably. The Eighth Industrialisation Note announced that, as a 
result o f the magnitude o f economic growth, the fear o f structural problems had 
disappeared and there was therefore no need of further industrialisation plans173. GNP in 
1962 was about twice that in 1948, while the volume of exports was about five times the 
level174. The balance o f payments had been in deficit in 1949, 1950 and 1951, and had only 
been covered by the receipt o f Marshall Aid175. The deficit disappeared in 1952, and the 
balance o f payments was in continual surplus for the rest o f the industrialisation policy, 
with the exception o f 1956 and 1957, when deficits occurred due to pressures from 
increased consumption176.
The expansion o f industry played an important part in this. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between investment, industrial production and employment over the period. As can be 
seen on the graph, the Eighth Industrialisation Note identifies three phases o f 
industrialisation177. The first industrialisation period lasted from 1948 to 1952, and formed
»w»
' R eg iste red  labour reserve (m ale and fem ale) seaso n a lly  co rrected  (left-hand scale)
. . . . . . . . .  industrial production (excl. building) seaso n a lly  co rrec ted , 1 9 4 8 -1 0 0  (right-hand scale )
“ “  “  V olum e of gro99 investm ent in th e  private se c to r  (excl. aircraft and ship building) seaso n a lly  








'S e c o n d  industrialisation period*" 
imfcmmmi ImmiiiwAuuu «&♦ IMS
•0Mkuiiuu 
1*81
Source: SKchtste nota in ta ke  dr mdustriaUsatie van Nederland
■luJ
10831307
Figure 2. U nem ploym ent, investm ent and industrial production, 1950-62.
173 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 113.
174 Ibid. p. 4.
175 van der Eng (1987) p. 166. Van der Eng argues the effect o f Marshall Aid was to enable the deficit to be 
maintained.
176 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 5.
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1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Index of industrial production 1) 100 112 116 117 127 141 150 157 161 161 177 199
Manufacture of earthenware, glass, etc 100 109 121 121 121 129 134 139 148 138 148 156
Chemicals 2) 100 121 128 121 130 143 152 160 173 178 189 199
Leather and rubber 100 106 97 100 111 119 128 133 139 134 152 160
Mining 100 106 108 108 108 108 109 110 113 119 122 130
Metal industries 100 113 119 121 137 165 184 190 188 189 225 273
Paper manufacture 100 116 132 120 142 156 165 168 185 183 204 224
Textiles 100 108 114 114 129 138 141 143 144 139 144 152
Gas, electricity and water 100 113 119 128 140 155 164 182 193 197 211 231
Pood processing 100 109 110 114 119 123 129 134 138 140 143 156
Notes: 1) Excluding building 8c construction 
2) Excluding petroleum products
Sources; Jaam jfm  vt*r N tdtrhm i 1953-1954 table 180 
Jporajfen m tr Nederland, 1959-1960 table 204
Table 3. Indices o f  industrial production, 1949-60.
the initial phase of industrial growth. It was characterised by a rapid increase in the volume 
o f industrial production, with the volume o f industrial exports rising by 180%178. During 
this period, the basic industries expanded179 and an industrial infrastructure was built up in 
the less-industrialised regions outside the west o f the country180. Between 1952 and 1957, 
industry developed at a slower rate that in the previous period181, but the growth in 
employment was much greater than expected182 (shown in Figure 2 as a rapid fall in 
registered unemployment). In the third period, between 1957 and 1962, investment, 
production and the productivity o f labour all exceeded their growth targets, but the 
increase in employment occurred in the service sector, not in industry183.
The pattern o f industry, both in terms o f the relative importance of specific industries and 
in terms o f its geographical pattern, changed as the result o f industrialisation. The changing 
relationship between industries can be seen in Table 3. Production increased in industry as 
a whole, but was considerably higher in the “new” industries, such as metalworking and 
chemicals, than in the “old” industries, such as textiles. Higher growth still was found in 
the branches o f industry producing the basics for expanded industrialisation: iron and steel 
production doubled between 1955 and 1960. The growth o f the paper industry, one of the 
faster-growing branches, was also highest where it produced capital goods. The production 
o f paper for writing and typing rose by 180% between 1949 and 1960, roughly correlating 
with the growth of the white-collar labour force, while the production o f packaging and
177 Ibid. p. 3.
178 Vierde nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 1.
179 Ibid. p. 11.
180 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
181 Zesde nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 1.
182 Ibid. p. 10.
183 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 6.
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Age group
Under Under Under Under Under Under Total
20 25 40 50 65 70
Agriculture 25.31% 19.71% 17.61% 17.86% 18.72% 19.21% 19.72%
Mining 1.53% 1.70% 1.90% 1.91% 1.79% 1.76% 1.74%
Manufacturing 38.83% 32.12% 30.78% 29.94% 28.82% 28.61% 28.40%
Building & construction 6.01% 5.54% 7.51% 7.99% 8.46% 8.48% 8.44%
Public utilities 0.35% 0.43% 0.72% 0.88% 1.02% 1.00% 0.99%
Trade, banking and insurance 10.06% 9.37% 11.94% 12.75% 13.11% 13.18% 13.20%
Transport & associated industries 5.70% 6.20% 7.90% 8.58% 9.10% 9.02% 8.95%
Services 3.44% 5.68% 9.94% 10.41% 10.60% 10.52% 10.45%
Unknown 0.06% 0.07% 0.07% 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.05%
Temporarily unemployed 8.71% 19.17% 11.64% 9.61% 8.31% 8.16% 8.05%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: 12e vo/kste/Sng 31 mm 1947, SerieA Dee/ 2 table 3.
Table 4. The percentage o f  the male workforce in each age group, by sector, on  31st
May 1947.
cartons, essential for marketing the output from production, rose by 146% over the same 
period184. The major part o f the expansion o f industry took place outside the already- 
industrialised west. O f 796 industrial establishments founded in the Nethedands between 
1953 and 1956, some seventy percent (558 of them) were set up outside the west185, and 
this “other Nethedands” received eighty-two percent o f the total increase in industrial 
employment between 1950 and 1962186.
For most o f the period, there was full employment At the beginning the oudook was not 
good. Table 4 shows male employment by age group in 1947. Eight percent of the male 
workforce was unemployed, but employment was skewed towards older men, and almost 
twenty percent o f under-25s were unemployed. This latter figure may well understate the 
problem. The high proportion o f under-25s working in agriculture looks suspiciously as if 
there was also a shortage of jobs for young men in the countryside, with - particulady 
teenagers - getting casual work on farms. In other words, for the under-25s, the 
employment picture in 1947 looked remarkably like the picture for the workforce as a 
whole in 1936. It would not have been unreasonable at the time to have assumed that, once 
the demand for labour resulting from post-war reconstruction had subsided, the situation 
would worsen for the over-25s as well. The unemployment rate fell to 1 .2 % in 1948, but 
the First Industrialisation Note refers to this figure as unusually low and as being due to 
abnormal factors187.
184 Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1953-1954, table 190; Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1959-1960table 216.
185 Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1959-1960, table 134.
186 Achtste nota inc(ake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 62.
187 Nota in %ake de industrialisatie in Nederland p. 7.
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Between 1948 and 1952 unemployment rose, for two reasons. Up until 1951, the number 
o f jobs increased, but not at a rate sufficient to match the increase in the working-age 
population188, and between 1951 and 1952 the number o f jobs actually fell189. Registered 
unemployment rose to more than three percent of the working population190, exceeding the 
two percent level, considered the definition o f “full employment”, for the first time since 
1 9 4 7 191 The actual proportion of the workforce without jobs was not high, but the fact 
that it was growing, and had crossed a psychological threshold, seemed threatening.
From 1952, the employment situation brightened considerably. In fact, it brightened so 
much that the government feared it would cause the economy to overheat Between 1952 
and 1957, the working population grew more rapidly than can be accounted for by 
demographic factors alone. The Sixth Industrialisation Note attributes this to the extremely 
high demand for labour drawing numbers o f workers into the labour market who would 
have otherwise remained outside - particularly women192. Half the increase in industrial 
employment between 1948 and 1962 took place in these five years193. This all ended with a 
rise in unemployment in 1957 to 1959, associated with the second consumption restriction, 
which, while not great, took three years to disappear194. The growth in employment in the 
years 1957-62 occurred in the service sector, particularly in the medical and health sectors, 
the professions, hotels and catering, and entertainment. The traditional areas where the 
Dutch service sector had been strong - commerce and finance - showed no spectacular 
growth. The professions, however, expanded in areas like accountancy, economic advice, 
and engineering and architectural bureaux - areas connected with industrial expansion195.
2.5 Conclusion.
The industrialisation policy, therefore, seems to have achieved its aims. The policy was a 
political response to the problems facing the Netherlands following the Second World 
War, and its two objectives were attained: the balance o f payments deficit disappeared and 
there was full employment. This success was apparently achieved through a broad political 
consensus, involving not just the major political parties but also the employers and trade
188 Derde nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 7.
189 Vierde nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 9.
190 Windmuller, de Galan & van Zweeden (1987) p. 210.
191 Ibid. p. 180.
192 Zesde nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p.10.
193 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland p. 26.
194 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
195 Ibid. pp. 28-29.
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unions. Wage control formed a central part of this consensus, being necessary in order to 
ensure that the fruits o f economic growth went to investment rather than consumption.
But this still leaves the apparent contradiction between the success of wage control and the 
growth in consumption unresolved. This is not something that can be resolved by looking 
at the institutional framework, but by investigating the wage control system in quantitative 
terms.
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Chapter 3. Wage Control and Incomes Growth.
This chapter considers the argument that wage control had little or no effect on wages 
growth. Three arguments, all different, are considered: that o f Roberts in the 1950s, that of 
van Hulst in the 1980s, and that o f Brander, van Hulst and Mieras in the 1990s. A section 
o f the chapter is given to each of their arguments and those o f their critics.
The chapter concludes that none o f the studies show that incomes rose because wage 
control failed to control the growth o f wage rates.
3.1 Critics o f wage control: Roberts.
Roberts’ study of wage control in the Nethedands forms part o f a wider study that he 
makes of wages policy in general. Writing two-thirds of the way through the 1950s, Roberts 
defines the “problem o f our day” as being to find an appropriate wages policy that will 
ensure that national income rises, that a fair share of the nation’s wealth goes to working 
people, and that full employment, stable prices and a healthy balance o f payments with the 
rest o f the wodd are maintained196. He looks at the cases o f the UK, the USA, Australia, 
Sweden and the Nethedands. These countries are chosen because, he argues, the 
government o f each, after its own fashion, has interfered with the freedom o f collective 
bargaining - the least interference in the UK, the most far-reaching in the Netherlands197. 
He concludes from his study that a centralised form of wage control is “ill-fitted” to cope 
with the complexities o f a developed industrial economy198.
He treats the Dutch wage control policy as being primarily concerned with holding down 
inflation. This is perhaps a consequence o f his overall approach to his question. Having 
identified a common policy - or, at least, broadly common - amongst the five governments, 
he treats them as having a common motive for having adopted it. He does not consider in 
his study the possibility that policies similar in appearance might have been adopted for 
very different reasons. Therefore, rather than discussing the specific historical and 
economic background o f Dutch wages policy, he formulates its objectives in a somewhat 
abstract manner. He states two o f these: the maintenance of economic stability by
196 Roberts (1958) p. 11.
197 Ibid. p. 24.
198 Ibid. p. 172.
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controlling the general level o f wages, and the establishment of equitable and satisfactory 
wage differentials between occupations199. He gives no reference for either of them200.
On this basis, he argues that Dutch wage control policy was unsuccessful. The elaborate 
system of wage controls, he states, did not save the Netherlands in the 1950s from rates of 
inflation similar to those found in other countries. The reason he proposes for its failure in 
this respect is that preventing wage increases builds up tremendous pressure. When the 
pressure is released, it creates an explosion. This, he argues, is precisely what happened in
1950-51,1953-54 and 1956. On each o f these occasions a restocking and investment boom 
was underway. There was rising demand for resources, stimulated by an active monetary 
and budgetary policy. This created pressure under which the price o f labour could easily be 
pushed up by the unions. When it became absolutely necessary to check economic 
expansion because of the deterioration in the balance o f payments, investment was curbed 
and stocks were reduced. If this had not happened, Roberts argues, there would have been 
no fall in demand for labour, and wage regulation would have been ineffective. This, he 
says, is proved by the way that regulation collapsed when stocks had to be rebuilt201. All this 
occurred under conditions o f relative industrial peace. The number o f industrial disputes 
fell sharply after 1951, and it might be tempting, Roberts suggests, to attribute this to wage 
control. However, he points out, a similar thing happened in the 1930s, while, in 1955 and 
1956 there seemed to be evidence o f a growing dissatisfaction with the system. Over these 
two years, the average number of working days lost in strikes was over 172000, as opposed 
to 88000 a year over the whole period 1951-56202. In any case, the record of social stability 
in the Netherlands, as indicated by figures on divorces, suicides, alcoholism, crime and drug 
addiction, led him to expect a relatively low strike rate203.
Haas criticises Roberts’ assessment o f the wage control system on the basis o f Roberts’ 
interpretation o f the policy’s objectives. Haas argues that the practical objective o f avoiding 
excessive wage increases did not reflect a specific Dutch dislike o f a continuing decline in 
the value o f money, but rather reflected the basic characteristics o f the Dutch economy. It 
had an extremely high dependence on foreign trade, with Dutch exports f.o.b. in 1957 
being larger than those o f Japan, and larger than those o f Australia and New Zealand 
combined. Since it was essential for the Dutch to keep exports competitive, it was
199 Ibid. p. 121.
200 The second objective may in fact refer to the principle used in setting uniform wage differentials between 
municipalities and between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the immediate post-war period.
201 Roberts (1958) pp. 130-131.
202 Ibid. p. 133.
203 Ibid. p. 134.
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therefore necessary, he goes on, that export prices rise not more - and preferably less - than 
those o f other countries. The Netherlands also had a rapidly expanding population, with a 
density exceeding that o f Japan by forty percent, and that o f England and Wales by fifteen. 
The annual rate o f population increase was 1.2%, the same as Japan’s and three times that 
o f the UK. Haas concludes that emphasis on wage control can be explained by the need, 
on the one hand, for competitive exports and, on the other, for heavy investment to 
provide jobs for the increasing population, explains the emphasis on wage restraint204. The 
success or failure of wages policy has to be judged on its effect on the economy as a whole, 
and to this end he makes a series o f comparisons between Britain and the Netherlands. 
These comparisons suggest that the Dutch economy did rather better than the British. 
Between 1953 and 1957, gross domestic capital formation amounted to 23% of GNP in 
the Netherlands, compared to just 14.6% in Britain. Between 1950 and 1956, Dutch real 
GNP rose an average o f 4.3% a year, as against a British rate of growth of 3.8% a year, 
Dutch exports at constant prices grew at 10.1% a year while Britain’s grew 2%, and Dutch 
prices rose by 3.8% a year against an annual rise o f 4.9% in Britain. Haas also believes that 
wages policy proved helpful in avoiding excessive wage increases and therefore enabled the 
economy to grow rapidly - including a rapid growth o f exports - without bringing about 
serious inflationary strains205.
Haas also argues that the increase of earnings at a faster rate than regulation wages was not 
inconsistent with wage control. The index o f actual earnings rose faster than the index of 
wage rates, and Haas notes that there are a number of ways that this might happen without 
wage control being breached. These ways include shifts in employment from lower to more 
highly-paid occupations - with more skilled jobs, relatively fewer female workers, shifts 
from agricultural to industrial employment, etc - or changes in the pattern o f working 
practices, such as increasing piece work, higher piece-rate earnings as productivity 
increases, increasing shift work and increasing overtime. Haas argues that, in the 
Netherlands, some of these factors have been more important than others, and were 
deliberately encouraged in order to foster increased productivity. During the period 1951- 
55, the proportion o f industrial workers working on piece rates rose from forty-five to 
fifty-four percent and there was a rapid increase in the application o f merit rating and job 
evaluation systems206. What Haas does not do, however, is to give any figures that back up 
his argument. He merely leaves the explanation as a possibility.
204 Haas (1960) pp. 178-179.
205 Ibid. p. 196.
206 Ibid. p. 199.
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In addition to Haas’ objections, it should be noted that Roberts’ argument is factually 
flawed: the “wages explosions” on which he partly bases his case did not occur. Their 
inclusion in his argument is, most likely, the result o f his looking at wage index figures 
without investigating what they represent. It should also be said that his description o f 
economic stop-go reads more like a description of the British economy in the period than 
the Dutch. In fact, in a functioning wage control system, where wages are successfully held 
down and raised from time to time when it is deemed necessary by the authorities, the 
wage index would be expected to remain more or less constant over the medium term, its 
level changing by means o f sudden rises occurring over a very short period. Roberts’ 
“wages explosions” can be seen to be the result o f the normal running o f the wage control 
system. His “wage explosion” o f 1950-51 was the result o f the compulsory 5% pay rise in 
September 1950, while that o f 1953-54 was the consequence of the compulsory wage 
increase introduced in January 1954. Neither o f these was the result o f the breakdown o f 
the system. The wage rises o f 1956 might be considered to be a little different, in that a 
high demand for labour in the context o f extremely low unemployment turned a six 
percent maximum increase into a six percent norm. Wage drift also increased during this 
period, as will be discussed later. He is also correct about the rise in strike activity in 1955 
and 1956, but his date o f writing prevented him from seeing a subsequent dramatic fall in 
this, with the number o f working days lost in 1957 totalling just three percent o f the 1956 
number207.
3.2 Critics o f wage control: van Hulst
A similar critique to Roberts’, although more quantitative in its methods, was made by van 
Hulst in 1984. Like Roberts, van Hulst is concerned in his work with wage control in 
general, looking at its operation in the United Kingdom, the USA and the Netherlands. In 
the case of the Netherlands, he looks not just at wage control during the 1950s, but at all 
the periods o f wage control between the end o f the Second World War and 1980. This 
means that he lumps wage control during the period of the industrialisation policy together 
with the later periods o f wage control, when the objective was to reduce the rate o f 
inflation.
As with Roberts, he does not look to the historical reasons why wage control policies were 
adopted in specific instances but proposes general motives. He lists five possible theoretical
207 See Table 2.
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arguments for wage control. The first three he describes as neo-classical in nature: it can 
lower the natural rate o f unemployment, it can weaken inflationary expectations and it can 
break through wage rigidity. The last two are post-Keynesian: it can break through the 
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” and it can break through the “target real wage” strategy208. These last 
two reasons perhaps need some explanation. The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” he defines as a 
problem of whether an employee should moderate his wage demands or not. It is in the 
interest o f an employee to moderate his wage demands to achieve such ends as full 
employment and wage stability, but it is also in his interests to better his own position in 
the wage hierarchy. He therefore has, on the one hand, no interest in moderating his wage 
demands if others are not going to do so, nor, on the other, in moderating his wage 
demands if others actually do moderate theirs209. By “target real wage” strategy van Hulst 
means the tendency for trade unions, when in a negotiation, to strive to reach a defined 
level o f achievable wages210.
He concludes from the empirical evidence that, in the countries studied, wage control had 
very litde effect. He finds the theoretical arguments for wage control are not backed up by 
any evidence211, and explains this by claiming that employers in a western economy possess 
innumerable means of evading wage norms212, the methods used depending on the
213concrete circumstances .
Van Hulst tested the effectiveness o f Dutch wage control using an econometric model 
based on the VINTAF-II model of the Dutch economy, developed by the Dutch Central 
Planning Bureau. This states that
,w,d^j + c 
where
1 = the percentage annual change in wages paid per employee in the private sector;
pc = the annual percentage change in the consumer price level;
y/ a = the annual percentage change in the productivity of the private sector 
(measured as its income divided by the number o f workers employed);
w = the rate of unemployment;
208 Van Hulst (1984) p. 63.
209 Ibid. pp. 80-82.
210 Ibid. p. 59.
211 Ibid. pp. 274-279.
212 Ibid. p. 280. “Employers” here is not a misprint for “employees”.
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d = the percentage change in income tax and insurance deducted from income; 
c = a constant term;
Two variations on this model were used:
+ a  3 w -I + a  a d +as
where the subscript o f - V 2 indicates a half-year delay214. The first equation specifies the 
Phillips effect as linear, the second as curved215.
The crucial question, as van Hulst sees it, is whether the coefficients o f the explanatory 
variables are so stable as to be uninfluenced by wage control. He achieves this by splitting 
the period under study into two sets of periods he calls “policy on” and “policy o ff ’216 and 
running a separate regression for each set If the results o f the “policy on” regressions are 
significantly different from the “policy off* ones, then wage control can be said to have 
had an effect. Two different versions o f this division were used:
policy on (PON): 1951-59,1971,1974,1976,1980
policy off (POFF): 1960-70,1972-73,1975,1977-79
and
policy on (PON5): 1951-62,1971,1974,1976,1980
policy off (POFF5): 1963-70,1972-73,1975,1977-79
the difference between these being whether or not wages in the period 1960-62 - the period 
when the De Quay government attempted to set wage control norms by branch o f industry 
- can be considered to have been controlled217. The calculations begin in 1951 because it is 
only from that date that data for income tax and social insurance payments become 
available218.
213 Ibid. p. 281.
214 Ibid. p. 233.
215 Ibid. p. 234.
216 Ibid. p. 237.
217 Ibid. p. 242. Presumably van Hulst treats 1962 as the last year o f post-war wage control since this was the 
last complete year it was in operation. He uses annual totals for his wage figures.
218 Ibid. p. 235.
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By using two definitions o f when wage control was in operation and two variations on the 
basic model, van Hulst creates four pairs o f results to compare. In addition, he gives the 
result for the entire period. All ten results are given below, for reference. The point o f the 
exercise, for van Hulst, is to see if the results structurally differ between periods when wage 
control was in operation and periods when it was n o t
The results obtained for the first model were219:
1951-80: 1 = 2.843+ 0.930pc , +0.859 V. , -0 .7 1 7 w -i + 0.361d
(2.789) (9.286) - -  (5.432) V 7  a  (3.587) 2 (2.199)
2 2
PON: 1 = 1.557 + 0.893pc_>+1.177[ I . “ 0.631 w -i + 0.401 d
(1.567) (10.579) 2 (7.95l) V/ d J— (3.043) 2 (3.138)
2
POFF: l = 4.314 + 0.992pc_L+0.509( y  - 0.859w - i+ 0.417d
(2.565) (5.137) 2 (1.816) V  d J— (2.625) 2 (l.!20)
PON’: l = 1.526 + 0.916pc_i + 1.087\ 7/  -0 .5 9 0 w -i + 0.392d
(1.750) (10.479) 2 (7.757) V7 d J— (3.063) 2 (2.979)
POFF*: 1 = 6.246 +0.939pc_i + 0.414 Y/  .-1 .0 5 9 w_i + 0.127 d
(2.554) (4.151) 2 (1.228) d  (2681) 2 (0.273)
2
r 2 = 0.85
r 2 = 0.95
r 2 = 0.73
r 2 = 0.93
r 2 =  0 .6 6
(t-statistics in brackets).
The results o f the second model were220
1951-80: 1 =-1.083 + 0.914pcJL + 0.96ll % , -  3.401 (V,J i+0.340d
(1.145) (8.963) 2 (6.251) V7 a  (3.297) 9 0-990)
2
r 2 = 0.84
219 Ibid. p. 238.
220 Ibid. p. 240.
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PON: l = -2.371+0.906pc_i + 1.186[ y/C \ -5.160()/,) i +0.298d
(2.802) (11.158) 2 (8.501) V (3.326) y  W  (2J293)
r 2 = 0.95
POFF: 1 = -0.421 + 0.945 pc_i + 0.7091 V 3.3281 V j  1+0.482d
(0.217) (4.644) 2 (2.515) v  J. (2124) ? (1,220)
2
r 2 = 0.69
PON’: 1 = -1.800 + 0.914pc_i+1.1561 V . . -3 .259U < J 1+0.361 d
(1.932) (9.944) 2 (8.104) V/ a  (2.757) o (2-591)
2
POFF’: l = -0.001 + 0.918pcj. + 0 .6 7 0 (% ] , -3 .8 3 ? ()4 )j . + 0.324d
R 2 = 0.92
(O.OOO) (3.562) 2 (l.945) V  a  / _ £  (1.968) 2 (°-643)
2
R2 = 0.58
• j  1 <2On the face o f it, there seem to be large differences between these. The value o f r  . varies 
enormously, as does the significance o f the change in income tax and insurance payments. 
The contribution of productivity increases also shows differences. But van Hulst argues 
that the results of a Chow test show that the results are not structurally different221.
He also recalculates the regressions using a dummy variable for each period o f wage 
control. These took the form:
l  =  a i p c _ i  +  a 2 ^ / ^ Q  j + a s w - A + a u d  +  6*5 
2 
+ 6*6  D l  +  6*7 D 2  +  6*8 D 3  +  6*9 D 4  +  6*10 D 5  +  6*11D 6  +  6*12 D 7
1 = P\VC^ + P2{^ /C)j+ +^ 5
~2  2
+ A D i + /?7 D2 + A D 3 + ^ 9 D4 + AoD5 + A iE >6 + A 2 I>
where
and
221 Ibid. p. 244.
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D x is a dummy for the years 1951-54,
D 2 a dummy for 1955-59,
D 3 a dummy for 1960-62,
D 4 a dummy for 1971,
D 5 a dummy for 1974,
D6 a dummy for 1976,
and D 7 a dummy for 1980.
As with the previous regressions, estimates were made twice, once treating 1960-62 as years 
o f wage control and once treating them as not. This was achieved by omitting D3 from the 
second regression. In no case are the t-statistics for any period of wage control significant, 
thereby showing, van Hulst concludes, the insignificance o f the wage policy. He also notes 
that the sizes o f the dummies are small222. The exception to this is the dummy for the 
period 1951-54, which shows a small, though not statistically significant, downward 
pressure on wages of between 0.1%-0.5% per year, which van Hulst suggests shows that a 
more substantial moderation o f wages in 1951-53 was undone in a wages explosion in 
1954223. He concludes that this implies that wage control can have an effect on the timing 
o f wage increases, but not on their growth in the middle-to-long term224.
Van Hulst argues that the imposition of wage control merely led to the growth o f illegally 
high wages - the so-called “black wages”. He argues that there was no effective 
enforcement o f the policy, with only 85 civil servants to run the system nationally and a 
maximum o f ten percent o f transgressions noted by them resulting in prosecutions, mostly 
small fines225. As an example of how wage levels exceeded norms he cites the period of the 
“general wage norm”, between 1948 and 1953. During this period, he suggests, the growth 
in wages paid per employee should have been in step with the consumer price index (since 
under this policy wage rises were only supposed to be given as compensation for price 
rises, keeping real wage rates fixed), but in fact exceeded them by around 1.5% per year226. 
He cites Windmuller, de Galan and van Zweeden as stating there was sizeable black wage 
formation in the mid-1950s227, and quotes them as stating that, for the period 1945-63, 
wages were generally 2%-3% above the legal wage level, and 10% in certain sectors (such as
222 Ibid. pp. 245-246.
223 Ibid. p. 247
224 Ibid. p. 253.
225 Ibid. p. 199.
226 Ibid. p. 215.
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the building industry) and regions with temporary large shortages of labour. He cites a 
different study by Hessel which estimates that wages in this period averaged 3%-7% above 
the prescribed level228.
Dercksen and Woltjer criticise van Hulst’s thesis on several grounds. Appearing as a review 
o f van Hulst’s book, their critique confines itself to discussing his comments on the 
Netherlands. In this, they criticise the way in which he compares wage levels with the goals 
o f wage policy, and they recalculate his regressions in a different manner and obtain very 
different results.
They argue that van Hulst’s interpretation o f wage control is too restricted, not just in his 
analysis o f its goals but also in its methods. They argue that wage control can have other 
purposes than those suggested by van Hulst - it can be an instrument for the management 
o f economic cycles, an instrument to create space for investment and an instrument to 
compel a more just distribution o f income - and its effectiveness has also to be judged on 
these grounds229. Furthermore, they accuse van Hulst o f seeing wage control as being only 
a “mechanical instrument o f coercion”, which is why he emphasises avoidance and possible 
ineffectiveness, rather than seeing it as a symbolic expression o f a global agreement 
between participants in the labour market concerning the control o f wages growth. This 
element o f consensus can be seen, they argue, by the way that wage control in the 1940s 
and 1950s was primarily only possible through the support o f the employers’ and workers’ 
organisations; when this support fell away in the 1960s, it meant the end o f wage control230.
They further argue that the way in which van Hulst compares earnings growth with the 
goals o f wage policy is wrong. Van Hulst, they note, operationalises wages growth as the 
growth o f the sum of wages per employee. The goals o f wage control he operationalises in 
three ways, depending on the period in question. He defines wage control between 1945 
and 1953 as granting wage rises according to rises in consumer prices, and from 1954 to 
1958 as granting wage rises according to rises in consumer prices and rises in productivity. 
Wage control from 1959 to 1962, he defines as being like that of 1954 to 1958, but with the 
addition o f compensation for rent rises in specific years.
They find two things wrong with this. Firstly, they believe van Hulst’s translations o f the 
goals of wage policy are too crude: for 1951-3 and 1957-8, van Hulst’s norms are too high, 
because o f the consumption restrictions; in the years following the consumption
227 Ibid. p. 219.
228 Ibid. p. 222.
229 Dercksen & Woltjer (1985) p. 129.
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restrictions his norms are too low, because they do not take account o f undoing the effects
takes no account o f the upward movement o f wages due to considerations o f justice and 
the promotion o f performance-related pay.
measure o f wages growth, in that it hides a number o f important facts. First, not all wages 
came under the jurisdiction o f wage control. Between 1945 and 1962 about 20% of all 
employees fell outside. Second, in the immediate post-war years, one goal o f the policy was 
a more egalitarian wage structure, with agricultural workers in particular benefiting. And 
third, wage rises were allowed where they were due to the introduction o f piecework 
systems based on official “scientifically-measured tariffs”. The effects o f a more just wage 
structure and the introduction o f piecework are difficult to measure231. Nevertheless, using 
growth in the wages o f male industrial workers to represent those who came under the 
wage control system, they argue that it can be seen that wage rates and weekly wages did 
not move in parallel between 1949 and 1962: for the first ten years wage rates rose more 
strongly than weekly wages, while between 1959 and 1962 weekly wages rose more 
strongly232. They also suggest that using annual changes in wages is likely to give a distorted 
picture, since, although wage increases were always allowed in one specific year, they were 
seldom incorporated into all wage rates in that same year233.
Dercksen and Woltjer’s recalculation o f van Hulst’s regressions in a different form allows 
them to argue that wage control was effective. From van Hulst’s figures they conclude that, 
in periods o f wage control, wage growth appears to average some 0.5% lower than in 
periods of no wage control, making wage growth some 6 % lower over the period 1951-62 
than it otherwise would have been234. But in order to create a sharper test than van Hulst 
attempted they recast his equations into a single regression that distinguishes the effect of 
wage control on all the coefficients, not just the constant terms. The results o f this are:
230 Ibid. pp. 129-130.
231 Ibid. pp. 131-133.
232 Ibid. pp. 133-134.
233 Ibid. p. 134.
234 Ibid. p. 136.
of the consumption restrictions; and for 1945-62 as a whole his norms are too low since he
Secondly, they criticise his use o f the growth of the sum of wages per employee as a
r 2 = 0.84
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where
d l = dummy for the wage control years 
!
p c  = dl x pc
w' = dl x w 
d ' = d l x d
The first line shows the effect o f the independent variables in the years when wage control 
was not in operation, and the second line shows the difference in the effect during the 
years when it was. The effect o f any variable during the years o f wage control can be 
obtained by adding the value of its coefficient reported in the first line to the coefficient of 
its equivalent in the second.
Dercksen and Woltjer point out two features they see as significant. The first is that the 
sum of the intercept term and the effect o f the dummy variable - what they term the 
autonomous component o f wage growth - is lower in the years o f wage control (6.25% - 
4.72% = 1.53%) than, in the years when it is not in operation (6.25% - 0%). This, they 
argue, would suggest that wage control was effective in holding back the tendency o f wages 
to rise autonomously - i.e. to “drift”. The second is the greater significance o f the 
contribution o f productivity increases to wage formation in the years of wage control than 
in the years o f no control. They suggest these two features together can be interpreted as 
meaning that, in years o f wage control, the lower autonomous component o f wage rises 
defined a space for wages to increase on account o f rises in the productivity o f labour235.
Van Zanden’s critique o f van Hulst, like Haas’ critique o f Roberts, revolves around the 
international competitive position of the Netherlands during the 1950s. He argues that this 
improved due to the post-1945 wage policy, price policy and exchange rate policy236, and 
that this has to be judged in the context o f the structural problems facing the Dutch 
economy237. By means o f the offensive devaluations of 1944 and 1949, and by keeping the 
cost o f living low - enabling wage levels to be kept low - he argues the Netherlands became
235 Ibid. pp. 136-137.
236 Van Zanden (1988) p. 464.
237 Ibid. p. 468.
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a land o f relatively low wages and prices, instead o f what he describes as its previous state 
as an island of dearness238.
By comparing Dutch wages with those of those o f a number of other countries, he shows 
that wage control did have an effect. He makes two comparisons: he compares nominal 
hourly wages against their relative levels in 1938, and he estimates the relationship between 
hourly wages, prices and growth. The first comparison is an attempt to see whether Dutch 
wages moved in the same manner as those of the Netherlands, major competitors. He 
compares Dutch nominal hourly wages with those o f West Germany, Belgium, France, 
Denmark, the UK and the USA239. He demonstrates that, relative to these other countries, 
Dutch hourly wages fell sharply between 1948 and 1953, but that this fall was largely 
undone in 1954; thereafter wages followed the cost o f living240.
The relationship between hourly wages, prices and growth over the period 1948-62 was 
compared using data from Belgium, West Germany, the UK, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Italy, Switzerland and the USA. Two regressions were made, the first o f prices and growth 
on wages, the second identical but with a dummy for the Netherlands:
wages = 0.04 +1.18 * prices + 0.48 * growth
(0.02) (2.26) (2.59)
R 2 = .631 F = 5.99 
wages = -  0.90 +1.30 * prices + 0.48 * growth -  23.48 * dummy
(0.06) (2.80) (292) (l.72)
R 2 = .753 F = 6.10
Van Zanden notes that these show a significant contribution from prices and growth on 
wages, with the addition o f a dummy for the Netherlands increasing the value of R2 and the 
F-statistic. Plotting the actual values against the fitted value o f the first equation shows that 
only in the Netherlands and the UK was the increase in wages less than expected241. He 
concludes from all this that changes in wages in the Netherlands between 1947 and 1953 
cannot be explained by reference to the labour market242.
238 Ibid. pp. 473-474. This is a reference to the exchange rate policy o f the Colijn government before 1936, as 
a result o f which wages and prices rose sharply leading to a fall in the Dutch share o f the world market. Even 
though the competitive position o f the Netherlands improved after the devaluation o f the guilder, van 
Zanden argues that it remained “unfavourable” [Ibid. p. 468].
239 Ibid. p. 468.
240 Ibid. pp. 470-471.
241 Ibid. pp. 472-473. Van Zanden explains the results for the UK as being due to there being a form o f wage 
control in operation there between 1948 and 1951.
242 Ibid. p. 473.
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3.3 Critics o f wage control: Brand er, van Hulst and Mieras
Brander, van Hulst and Mieras are also concerned with the effectiveness o f wage control in 
general, but deal only with the Dutch experience. Their intention is to look at incomes 
policy as a potentially powerful tool of macroeconomic policy, and their purpose is to 
assess whether the Dutch government has succeeded in making wage control work when 
governments such as the British have failed 243. They conclude that “the alleged success of 
Dutch incomes policy is more myth than reality”244.
They make their assessment by the use o f a bargaining model of wage determination. They 
give two reasons for using such a model. The first is a theoretical point Any model for 
wage determination in a developed industrialised country needs to take into account that 
wage determination is the result o f negotiation. Since they are interested in the outcome of 
bargaining, it is necessary for them to model the process. Their second reason is empirical. 
Their examples suggest that a bargaining-augmented Phillips curve is a good empirical fit 
for Dutch wage development in the post-war period245. In their bargaining model, changes 
in wage rates are determined by wage claims by employees and wage offers by employers. 
This gives the equation
W = ( l - b ) W c +bW 0
where
W = the annual change in the wage rate
Wc = the annual change in the wage claim
WQ = the annual change in the wage offer
b — the relative bargaining power o f the employers.
Wage claims are defined as being dependent on changes in consumer prices, annual 
productivity growth, and the social security contributions and taxes paid by employees, 
while wage offers are determined by changes in producer prices, annual productivity 
growth (again) and social security contributions by employers. The relative bargaining 
power o f employers is defined as a function o f the level and change in the previous year’s 
employment, and the number of strikes in the current year.
Putting these together gives
243 Brander et al (1996) p. 899.
244 Ibid. p. 905.
245 Ibid. p. 902.
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W -  Pc + ^ i(Py — Pc)+ s 2H + a 3dtt + &4 Ut_j + a 5AUt_j + a6S  + a7
where
Pc = the percentage change in the inflation rate relevant to employees (consumer 
prices)
Py = the percentage change in the inflation rate relevant to employers (producer 
prices)
H = annual productivity growth
dtt = the sum of the social security contributions paid by employers, and social 
security contributions and taxes paid by employees.
U = the level of employment
8  = the number o f strikes.
The regression gives a good fit for the period 1953 to 1990, with an adjusted R2 o f 0.949. 
All coefficients are significant and have the sign that the authors expect, and the Durbin- 
Watson coefficient does not flag for auto-correlation246.
The model is used to compare periods when an incomes policy was in operation and 
periods when it was not. They define an incomes policy as a policy whereby the 
government proclaims a limit to the allowed outcome o f wage negotiations. Any resulting 
wage restraint is therefore essentially involuntary. An effective incomes policy is therefore 
one that keeps the nominal rise in wage rates below what would have been the case in 
conditions o f unrestricted wage formation247.
They make two sets of comparisons. First, they check if wage control generally had any 
effect on the regression, and, following this, they check if specific periods o f wage control 
had an effect.
They use two methods to check the effect o f wage control generally: the dummy variable 
method and the split estimation method. The dummy variable method involves multiplying 
all variables by a dummy, set to one for years in which wage control was in operation and 
zero for years in which it was not. This is the same technique as used by Dercksen and 
Woltjer in their discussion o f van Hulst’s 1984 study. Brander et al found no effect using 
this technique. None of the dummies created by this method was significantly different 
from zero and a Chow test could not reject stability. They conclude from this that there
246 Ibid. pp. 903-904.
-62-
was no structural shift in the wage equation as a result o f wage control. The split equation 
method involves running separate regressions for periods o f wage control and no wage 
control. They find no difference between the two regressions, suggesting there was no 
difference between the two sets of periods248.
To check if specific periods o f wage control had an effect, they use an additive dummy for 
each period o f what they consider to be more or less homogenous policy. These periods 
are 1953-54, 1955-59, 1960-62, 1971, 1974, 1976, 1980-81 and 1982. They find the 
dummies insignificant except for the periods 1955-59 and 1980-81, and a dummy added for 
the “wages explosion” o f 1964 also proves significant. They feel that this sudden increase 
in wage rates was a direct consequence o f the preceding wage control, and so they calculate 
the net effect o f wage control between 1955 and 1959, and the 1964 wage explosion. They 
find this was equal to a wage restraint o f 0.6% between 1955 and 1959. They conclude that 
the effect o f wages policy in this period was therefore ‘Very moderate”249.
There are two problem with this argument. The first is a methodological problem, the 
second concerns their confusion about the objectives o f wage control.
The methodological problem concerns the way in which they construct their 
counterfactual. What they attempt is a comparison between, on the one hand, what 
happened to wage rates under wage control and, on the other, what would have happened 
to them had wage control not been in operation. As a counterfactual - what would have 
happened had wage control not been in operation - they use the model defined above, 
describing the long-term path of wages growth. The problem here is that the model 
includes the periods of wage control, and it is not certain that this model would have been 
such a good fit had wage control been entirely absent. This question hinges on whether or 
not the operation o f wage control in one specific year would have had an effect on the 
longer-term development o f the economy, or whether its effects would merely have been 
confined to the year it was in operation. Brander et al implicitly assume that the latter is the 
case, and that the long-term growth o f wage rates is unaffected by the short-term presence 
or absence o f wage control. Because they build this assumption into their model, it is not 
surprising that their results show that wage control had no long-term effect.
Secondly, they confuse the immediate aim o f wage control with its long-term objective. 
What any wage control system must do, as they note, is to hold wage rates below what they
247 Ibid. p. 899.
248 Ibid. pp. 904-905.
249 Ibid. p. 905.
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otherwise would have been. This is not, however, the same thing as aiming to hold down 
wages in the long run. In the case of Dutch wage control in the 1950s, the objective, as we 
have seen, was to make funds available for investment in industry. It would be perfectly 
legitimate to argue that, in this case, the success o f the policy in the long run should be 
measured according to whether average wage rates were higher, once the investment took 
effect, than would otherwise have been the case. This is because the increased economic 
activity resulting from increased investment should have created new higher-paying jobs. 
The creation o f these jobs would have caused the average wage rate to rise - even if the 
rates offered in these jobs were lower than they would have been in the absence of wage 
control. In this scenario, the amount by which wages were held down in the years 1955 to 
1959 can be considered as a loan made by wage earners to investors. It can be considered a 
voluntary loan, because it was made with trade union participation, and the higher wage 
rates expected to be available as a consequence o f increased investment can be considered 
the interest that workers receive from the loan. What Brander et al show, from this 
perspective, is that the actual interest on the loan was, albeit to a small degree, negative. 
This is presumably a considerably better rate for investors than was available to them from 
banks during the period. The conclusion could be drawn from their study, therefore, that 
wage control in this period was unsuccessful, not from the point o f view of government 
policy, but from the point o f view of wage earners.
3.4 Wage rates and income growth.
None of the studies show that incomes rose because wage rates rose. It might be argued 
that this is an unfair comment because none o f them intended to show such a relationship. 
But some sort o f relationship between the two is nonetheless assumed in the studies. In the 
case of Roberts and van Hulst, income growth is used as a proxy for the growth of wage 
rates, while Brander et al see workers’ desire for increasing disposable income as the basis 
for demands for higher wage rates250. On the other hand, Brander et al seem to demonstrate 
that wage rate growth was held down in a period (1955-1959) in which consumption 
increased dramatically, which would suggest that the relationship between the growth in 
wage rates and the growth in disposable income is rather more complex than the earlier 
studies allow.
250 Ibid. p. 902.
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There are theoretical reasons for not assuming that earnings and wage rates will grow at the 
same pace. These reasons are particularly strong in the case o f the Netherlands during the 
1950s. Earnings - what the worker takes home at the end of the week or month - are, at the 
basic level dependent on wage rates. Wage rates are the rate o f pay per hour or month, or 
the rate o f pay for a piece o f work, etc. Ceteris paribus, earnings will move up and down as 
wage rates move up and down. But it is likely that the economic changes associated with 
Dutch industrialisation had an effect on this process. Manufacturing output increased faster 
than the output o f other sectors and, within manufacturing, some industries expanded 
more than others. It is inconceivable that this left the occupational structure o f the 
workforce unchanged. As industries expanded, some would have demanded more 
additional labour than others, due to different rates o f expansion, different levels o f 
productivity and differing rates o f productivity growth. Some declining industries may have 
even contracted their employment. This process will have been reproduced within each 
industry. Job structures will have changed as technical processes changed, and demand for 
old skills declined as demand for new ones expanded. Wage rates differ between 
occupations. A change in the occupational structure o f the workforce will therefore have 
altered the average wage rate, which will in turn have altered average earnings. This will 
have happened not just in industry as a whole, but also in each industry. If the proportion 
of the workforce in higher-paying occupations increased, then earnings will have risen 
independendy o f wage rates. As Haas notes, structural change can have its own effect on 
earnings.
There are also theoretical reasons for believing that disposable incomes will not grow at the 
same rate as earnings. Disposable income - what people have to spend - is mediated by the 
household. The workforce is not composed of isolated individuals, and for the most part 
workers live in households with others. They bring their earnings, to a greater or lesser 
extent, into the household, which usually contains one or more people with no income of 
their own. A household can also contain, o f course, more than one person receiving an 
income, and not every income brought into the household may result from wages or a 
salary. It could, for example, derive from a pension. There are common expenditures 
associated with living in a household, such as rent, and personal disposable income is what 
people have once common household expenses have been paid and the rest o f the income 
distributed amongst the household.
It is the level o f disposable income that determines the level o f consumption. The rate of 
growth of consumption is therefore dependent on the rate of growth of disposable income 
not the rate o f growth o f earnings. The rate o f growth o f disposable income is itself not a
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straightforward thing to measure, since disposable income is a complex function o f both 
household income and personal disposable income. Household income is used to pay for 
common expenditures relating to the household. Rent has been already been noted as one 
such expenditure. Food is another item that is usually paid for as a common expenditure, 
but, at certain times or under certain conditions, can also be an item o f individual 
expenditure. It is also normal (but again not in every case) for consumer durables such as 
washing machines and vacuum cleaners to be a household item, and therefore their 
purchase can be considered as part o f household expenditure. Personal disposable income 
is what is left over. But it may be that certain items o f household expenditure take the form 
of purchases by individuals. Food purchases, for example, may take the form o f payments 
from the wife/mother’s purse.
It follows that the relationship between the growth o f wage rates and increased 
consumption is a complex one. It involves, at a first approximation, two stages: the 
relationship between the growth of wage rates and the growth of earnings, and the 
relationship between the growth o f earnings and the growth o f household income. It also, 
strictly speaking, involves the relationship between the growth o f household income and 
the growth o f disposable income.
The relationship between the growth in wage rates and the growth in earnings can be 
simply stated. Earnings can rise even if wage-rates do not. It is the case that if wage rates 
rise generally, earnings will rise ceteris paribus, but even if wage rates remain constant, an 
increased proportion o f the workforce in higher-paying occupations will lead to an increase 
in average earnings.
Likewise, it is possible for household incomes to rise, even if the level o f earnings remain 
static, although the relationship is slightly more complex. It depends on changes to the 
occupational structure o f the household. The occupational structure of the household is 
defined here as the proportion o f household members, by their position in the household, 
working for wages or a salary. This is, then, the proportion o f heads o f household that 
brings earnings into the household, plus the proportion o f sons that earn wages, plus the 
proportions o f daughters, wives251, etc (e.g. other relatives, lodgers) who do the same. The 
occupational structure o f the household changes when one or more of these proportions 
changes. It can change in two ways: economic or demographic. An economic change to the 
relationship can occur when certain changes to the structure of the workforce, such as an
251 The way the Dutch data for this period are summarised, it is not possible for a man to have been the 
husband of a head o f household.
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increase (or decrease) in female employment, increases (or decreases) the proportion of 
household members bringing in earnings. A demographic change, on the other hand, can 
happen when, for example, the proportion o f sons and daughters o f working age increases 
(or decreases), and therefore increases (or decreases) the proportion o f household 
members earning wages or a salary252.
Changes to other sources o f household income also play a role. The most common other 
source in wage-earning families is probably a pension of one sort or another, but it could 
also be income from self-employment or profit from ownership of a business. If  any one 
o f these incomes increases or decreases, or if the proportion o f household members 
receiving these increase or decrease, then this too will have an effect on disposable income.
But the fact that these mechanisms determining the relationship between wage rates and 
household incomes can be identified means that it is possible to calculate, at least 
approximately, the effects that developments in the labour market had on disposable 
incomes. In order to do this, it is necessary to look at the growth o f wage rates, changes in 
the occupational structure o f the labour force and changes in the occupational structure of 
the household.
3.5 Conclusion.
It is possible, therefore, that earnings rose despite wage control. But this, in itself, does not 
indicate that wage control was ineffective. Van Zanden, in particular, shows that Dutch 
wage rates, at least during the first years o f the 1950s, rose less rapidly than the 
Netherlands* competitors.
But structural change produces its own effects on earnings. An increase in the proportion 
o f the population employed in higher-paid occupations will, in itself, cause earnings to rise. 
This, then, suggest the direction that this study should follow. The next chapter establishes 
how the structure o f the workforce changed. The subsequent chapters then attempt to 
establish the extent to which wage rates rose - and by how much this rise can explain the 
rise in male earnings - the effects o f the changing structure o f the workforce on earnings,
252 This ignores, o f course, second order effects. In the example o f  economic change to the occupational 
structure o f the household, average earnings will actually fall, ceteris paribus, while average household income 
increases, because women are paid less than men. This will also happen, ceteris paribus, in the example of 
demographic change, since younger workers are paid less than older ones. But, in this latter example, the 
increase in the number o f younger workers in the labour market will also most probably have an effect on 
wage rates, unless demand increases along with supply. However, the point here is to emphasise the 
immediate effects o f such changes.
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and by how much household income changed as a result o f the changing structure o f the 
workforce.
Chapter 4. The Changing Structure o f the 
Workforce.
This chapter investigates the changes in the structure o f the Dutch workforce during the 
1950s. It uses census data to describe the sectoral changes over the period as a whole. It 
establishes that the major part of employment growth was in manufacturing, and that the 
pattern of employment and employment growth of men and women differed. It looks at 
the pattern o f supply and demand o f labour, before going on to look at the growth of 
manufacturing employment in more detail. It also looks at the changing structure of 
women’s participation in the workforce.
Once the pattern o f changes to the structure o f the workforce over the period has been 
established, it will then be possible, in principle, to calculate the effect of these changes on 
earnings.
4.1 How the structure o f the workforce changed, 1947-60.
Changes to the structure o f the workforce, looked at in terms o f their effect on incomes, 
can be of three kinds. There are those changes that produce a net movement into higher- 
paying occupations, those that produce a net movement into lower-income occupations 
and those that, for all practical purposes, are neutral in their effects. These will, naturally, 
each produce a different outcome. In the first case, there will be upward pressure on 
incomes, in the second, downward pressure and in the third case, there will be no net 
pressure either way. Changes to income as a result o f such structural changes will, of 
course, only be one o f the factors that affect whether incomes rise or fall. It is entirely 
possible, in a given circumstance, that one or more of these other factors could be more 
important than structural change in determining how income changed. For example, a 
change in the real value o f money, affecting all incomes, may dominate in a particular 
historical case. Structural change will only determine the development o f income if it is 
strong enough to dominate the other potential pressures on income growth.
A broad outline o f how the workforce changed its structure between 1947 and 1960 can be 
obtained from census data. Censuses were taken on 31 May o f each o f these years, and the 
census reports give data on, amongst other things, the structure of the economically-active 
population at each o f these points in time. These data are categorised by branch of 
economic activity and, within each branch, by position in the business. Each o f these
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categories is divided by gender. Comparing the number o f people in equivalent categories 
in 1947 and 1960 reveals the broad outlines of the structural changes that occurred.
There are five different positions in the business reported in the census: head o f business, 
either employing others or self-employed; assisting in the family business253; white-collar 
worker; manual worker254; or temporarily unemployed. Two broader categories are also 
used here: the paid workforce and the employed workforce. These were created by adding 
the numbers in various o f the published categories. The paid workforce is defined as being 
composed o f those bringing in income from outside the family as a result o f their 
economic activity, and comprises heads o f businesses, white-collar workers and manual 
workers. Alternatively, it can be thought o f as the entire economically-active population 
with the exception o f those working in the family business and those temporarily 
unemployed. The employed workforce consists o f white-collar workers and manual 
workers - i.e. those employed for pay by someone else255.
The 1947 figures used for comparison in this section are taken from the reworked figures 
in the 1960 census report. This is necessary because the branches of economic activity 
given in the 1947 census report are categorised differently to those in the 1960 census, 
which used the 1958 version o f the International Standard Industrial Classification256. The 
1947 figures were reworked by the CBS to conform to the 1958 ISIC categories and the 
results were published in the 1960 census report257.
These census data confirm that the economically-active population increased in size. Table 
5 shows the crude figures, giving some sort o f ideas o f the magnitudes involved. It should 
be noted that these figures in themselves do not confirm that government policy was 
successful in creating new jobs, since the temporarily unemployed are included in the 
economically-active population. If the attempt to create jobs had failed, in other words, the 
figures would still have shown a rise. What the table does, however, demonstrate is a
253 This can be a wife, son or daughter assisting in the family business. The way the data are reported, it is 
impossible for a husband to assist in the family business, although it seems inconceivable that there was not 
at least one married woman who owned her own business and whose husband worked alongside her.
254 The terms “white-collar worker” and “manual worker” are here used as the translations o f  emphji and 
arbeider respectively. These are not strictly literal translations, since in the English language one could 
conceivably do a manual or white-collar job within the family business (e.g. a farmer’s wife might take 
responsibility for her husband’s account books). What the terms mean in this context are those employed in 
the wider jobs market for wages or a salary. The terms “salary earners” and “wage earners” were considered 
as an alternative, but these are equally vulnerable to the accusation o f being less than one hundred percent 
accurate as a translation.
255 It is possible that those assisting in the family business were also paid for their efforts, but this is regarded 
here as being a transfer o f income within the household.







Agriculture, fishing & hunting 558789 168909 727698 406381 40558 446939
Mining and quarrying 50844 1240 52084 59536 1160 60696
Manufacturing 816964 159832 976796 1065330 205111 1270441
Building & construction 293508 2574 296082 399868 5476 405344
Public utilities 37730 1238 38968 47664 2152 49816
Commerce, banking & insurance 357657 171756 529413 428288 220242 648530
Transport & communications 225767 17718 243485 267729 21144 288873
Services 547787 415230 963017 549112 430049 979161
Unknown type of business 33796 5106 38902 16603 2223 18826
Total 2922842 943603 3866445 3240511 928115 4168626
Source: 13eAlgemene volkstelhng, Deel 10 A ,  table 2.
Table 5. The D utch workforce in 1947 and 1960.
noticeable gender difference in the rises in numbers, with the economically-active male 
population increasing by almost eleven percent, while the number o f economically-active 
women - perhaps surprisingly at first sight - fell slightly.
As expected, the proportions working in each sector changed, with the workforce 
becoming more industrial. Table 6  shows that the proportion o f the population working in 
manufacturing increased, by more than five percentage points, more than matched by a fall 
in the proportion working in agriculture o f more than eight percentage points258. This fall 
was not caused by agriculture expanding less than other sectors, but in fact represents a fall 
in the actual numbers working in the sector - the only branch of economic activity where 
this happened.
The paid workforce expanded more than the economically-active population as a whole. 
While the number o f economically-active men259 increased by nearly eleven percent, the 
paid workforce increased by almost seventeen percent. In the case of women, the 
difference was even greater. A slight fall in the number of economically-active women 
disguised a rise o f over twenty percent in the number o f women in the paid workforce. In 
part, these differences were due to a fall in the proportions recorded as temporarily
257 The comparative data are published in 13‘ Algemne volkstelling Deel 10A , table 2. All figures in this section 
are taken from this table, unless otherwise stated.
258 The 1947 figure given here differs slightly from that given by some authorities. Messing (1981) p. 13 gives 
it as 19.3% of the economically-active population, as do de Liagre Bohl et al (1981) p. 277. They both quote 
the CBS’s 80-year survey Tachtigjaren statistiek in tijdsreeksen, which reproduces the figures from the relevant 
censuses. One o f  the differences between the 1947 and 1960 censuses is that the former does not include 
conscripts as part o f the economically-active population while the latter does, under “Services”. The figures 
give in Table 6 include conscripts as members o f the economically-active population in both years.
259 The words “men” and “women” are used in this study in the sense of “male members o f the population” 
and “female members o f the population”. In other words, the terms include minors.
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1947 1960
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Agriculture, fishing 8c hunting 14.45% 4.37% 18.82% 9.75% 0.97% 10.72%
Mining and quarrying 1.32% 0.03% 1.35% 1.43% 0.03% 1.46%
Manufacturing 21.13% 4.13% 25.26% 25.56% 4.92% 30.48%
Building & construction 7.59% 0.07% 7.66% 9.59% 0.13% 9.72%
Public utilities 0.98% 0.03% 1.01% 1.14% 0.05% 1.20%
Commerce, banking & insurance 9.25% 4.44% 13.69% 10.27% 5.28% 15.56%
Transport & communications 5.84% 0.46% 6.30% 6.42% 0.51% 6.93%
Services 14.17% 10.74% 24.91% 13.17% 10.32% 23.49%
Unknown type of business 0.87% 0.13% 1.01% 0.40% 0.05% 0.45%
Total 75.60% 24.40% 100.00% 77.74% 22.26% 100.00%
Source: HeAlgemene volkstelHng, Deel 10A ,  table 2.
Table 6. Structure o f  the D utch workforce, 1947 and 1960.
unemployed - in the case of men a fall from nearly three to less than half a percent o f the 
economically-active population, and, in the case o f women, from nearly two to around a 
quarter o f a percent But an even bigger contribution was made by the decline in family 
working. The proportion o f economically-active men assisting in the family business fell by 
more than a half, from nearly six to just over three percent, while the proportion of 
economically-active women fell even more - from over twenty-three percent to little more 
than ten.
Within the paid workforce, the proportion o f those employed by others - both as white- 
collar and manual workers - increased. As can be seen from Table 7, there was a rise in the 
proportion of the paid workforce who were employed as white-collar or manual workers of 
five percentage points, the largest increase in manufacturing. The number o f people who 
were heads o f businesses fell in all branches o f economic activity, the total falling by over
1947 1960
Heads of Employed Heads of Employed
businesses workforce businesses workforce
Agriculture, fishing & hunting 53.81% 46.19% 63.60% 36.40%
Mining and quarrying 1.91% 98.09% 0.48% 99.52%
Manufacturing 13.01% 86.99% 7.49% 92.51%
Building & construction 18.53% 81.47% 12.16% 87.84%
Public utilities 0.16% 99.84% 0.07% 99.93%
Commerce, banking & insurance 38.87% 61.13% 27.66% 72.34%
Transport & communications 14.94% 85.06% 8.80% 91.20%
Services 9.83% 90.17% 9.35% 90.65%
Unknown type of business 0.55% 99.45% 1.11% 98.89%
Total 21.38% 78.62% 16.29% 83.71%
Source: /3e Algemene volkstelling, Deel 10 A , table 2.
Table 7. The paid workforce in 1947 and 1960.
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1947 126Q
Whiteiollar Manual White.-c.oUai Manual
workers workers workers workers
Agriculture, fishing & hunting 2.53% 97.47% 4.33% 95.67%
Mining and quarrying 9.66% 90.34% 15.91% 84.09%
Manufacturing 15.29% 84.71% 23.45% 76.55%
Building & construction 6.53% 93.47% 9.20% 90.80%
Public utilities 28.11% 71.89% 35.10% 64.90%
Commerce, banking & insurance 72.51% 27.49% 79.01% 20.99%
Transport & communications 29.31% 70.69% 35.58% 64.42%
Services 43.83% 56.17% 54.81% 45.19%
Unknown type of business 50,88% 49,12% 13-43% 86,57 %
Total 29.43% 70.57% 37.53% 62.47%
Source: 13e AJgemene volkstelRng, Deel 10 A ,  table 2.
Table 8. Employees by branch o f  economic activity, 1947 and 1960, as a proportion
o f  the total num ber o f  employees.
ten and a half percent. The only branch in which the proportion of heads o f businesses was 
higher in 1960 than in 1947 is agriculture - which is the only branch in which the number 
o f white-collar and manual workers fell over the period.
The growth in size o f the employed workforce means two things. First, the fact that this 
was greater than the growth in size o f the paid workforce means that there was a net 
movement o f the economically-active population into being employed by others, rather 
than employing others or being self-employed. Second, its growth being greater than that 
o f the economically-active population means that economic growth did not just provide 
jobs for the expanding population. It confirms that, as was reported in the Industrialisation 
Notes, that it provided these jobs and more.
The number o f those employed in white-collar work increased more than the number 
employed in manual work. White-collar workers still formed a minority o f the employed 
workforce in 1960, but a larger minority than in 1947. As Table 8  shows, in 1947 there 
were three white-collar workers for every seven manual workers, but by 1960 this ratio had 
increased to three for every five manual workers. This increase did not affect all branches 
o f economic activity equally. The largest increase occurred in manufacturing, where the 
number o f white-collar workers increased from fifteen to twenty-three percent o f the 
employed workforce in the sector. This rise was not, however, at the expense of 
manufacturing’s manual workforce, which rose in size as a proportion o f the manual 
workforce from thirty-seven to forty-three percent.
By far the largest increase in the number o f jobs - that is, the number of those employed in 
white-collar and manual work - occurred in manufacturing. Manufacturing as a whole was
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Male Female Total
Agriculture, fishing & hunting -12.00% -1.30% -13.30%
Mining and quarrying 1.52% 0.00% 1.52%
Manufacturing 43.73% 8.18% 51.91%
Building & construction 17.41% 0.50% 17.91%
Public utilities 1.51% 0.14% 1.65%
Commerce, banking & insurance 12.90% 11.20% 24.10%
Transport & communications 9.35% 0.49% 9.84%
Services 0.88% 5.21% 6.09%
Unknown type o f business 0.42% -0.13% 0.28%
Total 75.72% 24.28% 100.00%
Source: /3e Algemene volkstelling, Deel 10 A ., table 2.
Table 9. N e t increase in employment in each branch o f  economic activity, 1947-60, 
as a proportion o f  the total net increase in employment.
responsible for over half the increase in jobs in the workforce as a whole, and almost three 
out of every five new male jobs. The other branches where large net increases occurred, as 
can be seen from Table 9a were amongst male workers in construction, and amongst both 
men and women in commerce, banking and finance.
The rise in manufacturing employment was concentrated in just a few industries. This is 
perhaps not surprising, since, as we have seen, certain industries - notably chemicals and
Men Women Total
Food processing (except beverages) 3.12% 1.42% 4.53%
Beverages 0.36% 0.09% 0.45%
Tobacco -0.25% 0.16% -0.09%
Textiles 3.30% 0.88% 4.18%
Footwear, other clothing apparel 0.55% 0.09% 0.63%
Wood industry (excluding furniture) 0.60% 0.08% 0.68%
Furniture 0.08% 0.18% 0.26%
Paper and paper products 1.63% 0.28% 1.92%
Printing, publishing etc 1.60% 0.59% 2.19%
Leather and leather gpods (excl. shoes) -0.06% 0.07% 0.01%
Rubber products 0.81% 0.08% 0.89%
Chemicals and chemical products 4.84% 0.85% 5.70%
Petroleum & coal products 1.30% 0.17% 1.47%
Stoneware, gjass and pottery 1.97% 0.17% 2.14%
Basic metal industries 2.23% 0.19% 2.42%
Manufacture of metal products 5.12% 0.45% 5.57%
Manufacture of machinery 5.15% 0.47% 5.61%
Manufacture of electrical machinery 6.33% 1.47% 7.80%
Vehicle manufacture 4.97% 0.47% 5.44%
Miscellaneous manufacturing 0.08% 0.02% 0.10%
Total 43.73% 8.18% 51.91%
Source: 13e Algemene volkstelling, Deel 10A, table 2.
Table 10. N et increases in manufacturing employment, 1947-60, as a proportion o f  
the total increase in manual and white-collar jobs.
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1947 I960
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Food processing (except beverages) 17.29% 9.43% 15.93% 14.23% 11.63% 13.79%
Beverages 1.43% 0.56% 1.28% 1.25% 0.70% 1.16%
Tobacco 1.92% 2.69% 2.06% 1.17% 2.48% 1.40%
Textiles 8.41% 15.16% 9.58% 8.15% 13.93% 9.12%
Footwear, other clothing apparel 5.05% 46.68% 12.26% 3.91% 34.03% 8.99%
Wood industry (excluding furniture) 3.49% 0.43% 2.96% 2.85% 0.58% 2.47%
Furniture 4.12% 0.83% 3.55% 2.94% 1.20% 2.64%
Paper and paper products 2.03% 2.22% 2.06% 2.54% 2.57% 2.55%
Printing, publishing etc 5.85% 5.16% 5.73% 5.19% 5.72% 5.28%
Leather and leather goods (excl. shoes) 1.27% 1.12% 1.24% 0.84% 1.05% 0.88%
Rubber products 0.80% 0.45% 0.74% 1.12% 0.61% 1.03%
Chemicals and chemical products 4.84% 4.72% 4.82% 6.72% 6.31% 6.65%
Petroleum & coal products 0.43% 0.05% 0.37% 1.20% 0.62% 1.10%
Stoneware, glass and pottery 5.50% 1.23% 4.76% 5.20% 1.47% 4.57%
Basic metal industries 2.71% 0.26% 2.28% 3.43% 0.81% 2.99%
Manufacture of metal products 8.25% 1.74% 7.12% 9.29% 2.80% 8.20%
Manufacture of machinery 6.46% 0.95% 5.50% 8.06% 2.26% 7.08%
Manufacture of electrical machinery 5.09% 4.18% 4.93% 7.91% 8.01% 7.93%
Vehicle manufacture 13.23% 0.95% 11.11% 12.67% 2.30% 10.92%
Miscellaneous manufacturing 1.82% 1.20% 1.71% 1-33% 0.94% 1-26%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: 13e Algemene volkstelRng, Deel 10A, table 2.
Table 11. The proportion o f  the employed workforce in each industry, 1947 and
1960.
the metal industries - showed dynamic growth, while other industries did not. Productivity 
growth will certainly have made a contribution to output growth, but some contribution 
from an expanding workforce is also to be expected. Table 1 0  shows that a number of 
industries actually contributed very little to employment growth, with the number o f men 
employed in the tobacco industry and in the leather goods industry both actually falling 
slightly. Most o f the increase in employment occurred in the chemical and metal industries, 
where the output growth was largest The increase in male employment in these industries 
accounted for twenty-nine percent of the increase in all jobs, amounting to three-eighths of 
the net increase in all male jobs and two-thirds o f the net increase in male jobs in 
manufacturing.
The industries that experienced the largest increases in employment were not necessarily 
those that employed the most workers. As can be clearly seen in Table 11, employment in 
some of the industries with the largest workforces fell during the period. The industry that 
employed the largest number of men in both 1947 and 1960 was food processing, but its 
employment share fell between the two dates. More than half of all women employed in 
manufacturing worked either in textiles or in footwear and clothing in 1947. In 1960, these
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Actual numbers 
31 May 1947 31 May 1960
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Note: This table omits those working in forestry, hunting and fishing.
Source: 13e Algemene volkstelUng, Deel 10 A ,  table 2.
Table 12. Changes in the structure o f  the agricultural population, 1947-60.
industries employed fewer than half o f the female manufacturing workforce, although they 
still took the largest shares o f any industries. Conversely, the fact that an industry provided 
one o f the largest increases in employment did not, o f course, mean that its share of 
employment rose. Vehicle manufacture provided some five and a half percent of the net 
increase in jobs, yet its share o f manufacturing employment fell. The reason is that this 
industry was already a large employer in 1947, and its growth in the subsequent thirteen 
years was not enough to maintain the proportion of jobs it supplied.
The only branch o f economic activity that experienced a fall in numbers was agriculture. 
Table 6  shows the proportion o f the economically-active population working in the sector 
falling from just under nineteen percent to just under eleven, and, as was pointed out, this 
represents an absolute, as well as a relative, fall in numbers. The largest falls in numbers are 
to be found in two areas. Amongst men, the largest falls took place in the numbers of 
manual workers and of sons working on the family farm. Amongst women, numbers fell 
across the entire sector. Table 1 2  shows a small decline in the number of male farmers, but 
the size of the decline is around the same magnitude as the size of the decline in heads of 
businesses in general. In contrast, the number of employed male agricultural workers and 
working sons nearly halved, but this fall was considerably less than the magnitude o f the
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14-19 20=24 25-29 30-39
AgCl
40-49 50-59 60-64 65&+ Total
Food processing (excluding beverages) 14.75% 11.97% 12.31% 12.45% 14.45% 15.02% 16.04% 14.99% 13.61%
Beverages 0.76% 1.36% 1.40% 0.94% 1.00% 0.89% 1.18% 1.35% 1.05%
Tobacco industry 1.01% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.89% 1.37% 2.35% 1.80% 1.08%
Textile industry 7.83% 7.46% 6.98% 7.79% 7.94% 8.77% 7.92% 2.71% 7.75%
Shoes & clothing 4.38% 4.53% 4.17% 4.53% 5.27% 6.42% 6.94% 13.75% 5.18%
Wood products (excl. furniture) 3.60% 2.79% 2.66% 2.41% 2.79% 3.15% 4.30% 4.62% 2.92%
Furniture 4.34% 3.86% 3.28% 2.73% 3.43% 3.46% 3.00% 7.44% 3.43%
Paper industry 2.24% 2.29% 2.17% 2.50% 2.40% 2.51% 2.23% 1.35% 2.36%
Printing and publishing 6.04% 4.70% 5.35% 4.03% 4.93% 5.11% 6.66% 8.34% 5.02%
Leather (excl. shoes) 0.95% 0.85% 0.77% 0.84% 0.83% 0.77% 0.81% 1.13% 0.83%
Rubber 0.90% 1.21% 1.17% 1.25% 1.16% 0.98% 0.73% 0.34% 1.10%
Chemicals 3.13% 5.04% 5.75% 6.59% 6.81% 5.29% 5.08% 3.16% 5.66%
Petroleum & coal products 0.28% 0.93% 1.56% 2.08% 1.57% 1.33% 0.45% 0.34% 1.38%
Stoneware, glass, pottery 3.79% 5.37% 4.81% 4.22% 5.28% 5.99% 5.85% 5.52% 4.96%
Basic metal industries 1.25% 2.29% 2.66% 3.99% 3.88% 3.44% 3.29% 0.68% 3.15%
Manufacture of metal products 11.06% 10.29% 9.86% 10.17% 8.88% 8.48% 8.73% 8.79% 9.64%
Manufacture of machinery 8.75% 8.90% 8.47% 8.51% 6.83% 6.19% 6.09% 5.52% 7.73%
Manufacture of electrical machinery 6.49% 9.10% 9.49% 8.74% 6.61% 5.66% 3.69% 1.01% 7.39%
Vehicle manufacture 15.42% 13.59% 13.74% 12.87% 12.97% 12.77% 11.61% 12.51% 13.26%
Other 3.04% 2.55% 2.48% 2.44% 2.07% 2.40% 3.05% 4.62% 2.51%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: 13t AJgcmtM valhstelitig Dtel 10A , table 4.
Table 13. Em ploym ent in manufacturing, by age, 1960.
contraction in the number o f women working in all roles in the sector. Here, the reported 
number dropped by about four-fifths, whatever the position on the farm, with the 
exception o f the small number o f female farmers, whose number only fell by three-fifths.
Some o f the fall in the number o f women reported as working in agriculture may be an 
artefact o f the figures: the consequence o f a standardisation o f the definition o f ‘^ working 
in the family business”. The 1960 census excluded all those worked fewer than fifteen 
hours a week, making the category more uniform than in previous censuses, where the 
definition was left to local discretion. However, in 1960, only 25000 people were excluded 
from the workforce as reported in the census, mainly in agriculture and retail, as a result o f 
having worked too few hours to qualify. It is not possible to calculate what effect this had 
with regard to comparisons with 1947, but the CBS notes that more pensioners and 
students were included in the workforce in that year’s census than in I960260. But even if all 
the 25000 excluded were women working on the family farm, this would still mean a fall in 
numbers over the period o f nearly two-thirds.
The age structure o f the male workforce in 1960 bore signs of the changes to its sectoral 
structure. This is an important element in the changing structure o f the workforce as a 
whole, since, as is shown in Chapter 6 , income is affected by age. The major changes in the 
structure of the workforce seem for the most part to have affected those at the younger 
end. Almost sixty percent of the manufacturing workforce in 1960 was under the age of
260 13? Algemene volkslelling Deel 10B, p. 7.
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forty, as opposed to less than fifty percent o f those in agriculture261. This effect was more 
marked in some industries than others, as can be seen from Table 13. The largest industry 
as regards employment, at all ages, was food processing, but the proportion working here 
was lower amongst those aged between twenty and thirty-nine than amongst those older, 
consistent with the notion that the decline in employment took place mainly amongst 
younger workers262. There were other “old” industries in which an older workforce can be 
seen, such as shoes and clothing, but this did not apply to all the industries that declined. 
Likewise, not all industries that expanded their workforces had disproportionately young 
workforces. There are those where this was the case, such as the metal industries - 
metalworking and the manufacture o f machine tools, electrical machinery and vehicles - 
but the workforce in chemicals was a little older.
The male workforce, then, changed in three major ways. It showed a rise in the number 
and proportion o f men working in manufacturing, it showed an increase in the number and 
proportion in paid employment and it showed an increase in the number and proportion of 
those employed as white-collar workers. All three aspects o f this have potentially important 
effects on men’s incomes. The increase in the proportion o f men employed as white-collar 
and manual workers is the corollary o f a decline in the proportion o f men owning 
businesses and the proportion o f those working in the family business. To put this another 
way, there was a change in the structure o f where men’s incomes came from. A greater 
proportion o f men in 1960 received their incomes from wages and salaries than did so in 
1947, a lower proportion from profits and from self-employment The effect o f this on the 
si2 es of men’s incomes was not likely to be neutral. The increase in the proportion o f men 
working in manufacturing would also probably have affected the income structure, as 
would the increase in white-collar working.
The female workforce had a different structure to the male. The most important difference 
was in the age structure, with half the economically-active female population being under 
the age o f 25. This proportion grew over the period from fifty percent in 1947 to fifty- 
three in I960263. The other crucial difference was that manufacturing was not as important 
a source o f employment for women as for men, with the commercial and financial sector
261 13? Algemene volkstelling Deel 1QA, table 4.
262 This may seem to be contradicted by the relatively high proportion o f the fourteen-to-nineteen year-old 
age group working in the industry, but this is likely to be an effect o f a relatively high proportion o f the 
industry’s workforce being unskilled. Unskilled workers tend to have left school at an earlier age than skilled 
workers, and so will be over-represented amongst the youngest age group. This is particularly the case in a 
country like the Netherlands, where large numbers o f  die skilled are educated in trade schools rather than 
given on-the-job training.
263 13' Algemene volkstelling Deel 10A, table 4, p. 25.
-78-
1947 I960
Working Economically-active Working Economicallyractive
family members outside the family family member? outside the family
Agriculture, fishing & hunting 15.05% 2.85% 3.31% 1.06%
Mining and quarrying 0.01% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12%
Manufacturing 0.45% 16.49% 0.32% 21.78%
Building & construction 0.06% 0.21% 0.03% 0.56%
Public utilities 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.23%
Retailing in shops
Commerce (excluding retail in shops),
7.12% 7.07% 4.64% 12.41%
banking & insurance 0.39% 3.62% 0.23% 6.45%
Transport & communications 0.15% 1.73% 0.23% 2.04%
Domestic service 0.00% 18.88% 0.00% 12.29%
Services (excluding domestic service) 1.95% 23.18% 1.35% 32.70%
Unknown type o f business 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.24%
Total 25.18% 74.82% 10.11% 89.89%
Source: 13e Algemene volkstelling, Deel 10 A ,  table 2.
Table 14. The female workforce by sector, 1947 and 1960.
employing about the same proportion o f the economically-active female population, and 
services264 employing considerably more. In 1960, some twenty-two percent o f women 
were economically-active in manufacturing, twenty-four percent in commerce, etc and 
forty-six percent in services.
A greater proportion o f economically-active women worked for pay in 1960 than in 1947. 
As Table 14 shows, the fall in the number o f women working on the family farm, together 
with a large fall in the number working in family retail businesses, altered the composition 
o f the female workforce. About a quarter o f all economically-active women worked in the 
family business in 1947. By 1960, this proportion had fallen to a tenth265.
The growth areas also differed from the growth areas o f male employment. The net 
increase in employment in manufacturing amounted to only a third o f the total net increase 
in women’s jobs between 1947 and 1960, with greater increases in commerce and in 
services. The net increase in commercial, banking and insurance jobs amounted to forty-six 
percent of the total increase- the increase in women’s jobs in retail work in shops alone 
amounting to almost thirty percent - while the net increase in service jobs exceeded sixty 
percent. O f equal importance was the decline in the number o f domestic servants, equal to 
about forty percent o f the total net increase in women’s employment.
264 “Services”, here, does not mean the service sector in general, but covers those classes o f business within 
the service sector that are not included within commerce, banking and insurance, and transport It covers 
such things as work in the public sector, teaching, social work, religious occupations and domestic service.
265 Even if all those excluded from the census because they worked fewer than fifteen hours a week were 
women working in the family business, this proportion would still have fallen almost as dramatically, from a 
quarter to an eighth o f the female workforce.
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4.2 The Supply and Demand o f Labour.
The changed structure o f the employed workforce is in one sense merely the product o f 
the satisfaction of employers’ demand for labour. The Dutch workforce in this period was 
expanding. Therefore, those branches o f economic activity that experienced increases in 
the proportion of the workforce that they employed were either those where a greater than 
average demand for labour was satisfied or, alternatively, were those branches whose 
demand for labour was satisfied by a greater than average amount. In other words, they 
obtained more labour than average because they wanted more, and got what they wanted, 
or they wanted the same as other branches, but were more successful at getting it. On the 
other hand, those branches whose proportion o f the workforce declined were either those 
which had a lower than average demand for labour, or those whose demand for labour was 
satisfied by a lower than average amount.
The changing pattern o f the supply and demand o f labour should therefore reveal one 
aspect of how the structure o f the workforce developed. The data given in the census 
reports show the state o f play at two points in this process, but to get a full understanding 
o f how the workforce changed, we need to know what happened between these two years 
in more detail. Two points seldom give a clear indication o f a trend. We need to know how 
each of the components o f the workforce’s structure changed over time, and at which 
points in the process - early in the period, later, at a constant rate throughout, or whatever - 
since the interaction between the changes in the structure o f the workforce was also an 
important component o f those changes. For example, the Industrialisation Notes state that 
industrial employment grew rapidly during the middle years o f the 1950s266, but that after 
1957 industry declined in importance as a source o f additional jobs267. From 1957, the 
growth in service sector employment became more important268. To calculate the effect on 
incomes o f net movements of labour between occupations, it is necessary to know about 
the growth o f industrial employment in the mid-1950s and the growth o f service sector 
employment in the late 1950s in more detail. It is also necessary to know about the growth 
o f industrial employment in the late 1950s. This may have been more important than the 
crude trend suggests if the low growth in numbers after 1957 is accounted for largely by 
the failure o f low-wage industries to expand their employment. Analysis o f the pattern of 
supply and demand of labour contributes to understanding this process.
266 Zesde nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland, pp. 19-20.
267 Achtste nota intake de industrialisatie van Nederland, p. 6.
268 Ibid. p. 28.
-80-
Changes in the supply and demand of labour will have had two effects on the structure of 
the workforce. First, it will have had an effect on the aggregate supply and demand of 
labour, influencing the overall labour market And second, it will have had differential 
effects on each branch o f economic activity.
Monthly data on the supply and demand o f labour are straightforward to obtain. They were 
assembled by the CBS269, and showed the registered demand for labour by employers and 
the numbers registered as seeking work at the end o f each month. The numbers registered 
as seeking work include all those seeking work, not just the unemployed, with those 
employed in the public works programmes being included. The data are broken down by 
branch of economic activity - the categories not being strictly comparable with those used 
in the 1960 census - and by gender.
The immediately striking feature revealed by these figures is the difference between the 
male and female labour markets, confirming the impression given by the census data. 
Figure 3 shows the development o f employers’ demand for labour as a percentage o f the 
number seeking work, for both male and female labour. The x-axis is positioned where this 
ratio is equal, with one person registered as looking for work for every job offered by an 
employer. Points on and above this axis therefore indicate a labour market in which the 
demand for labour is equal to or greater than its supply.
For much o f the period, the supply o f male labour exceeded employers’ demand. This 
occurred despite the level o f unemployment being extremely low. Figure 3 shows a strong 
seasonal cycle in the relationship between supply and demand, with a decline in relative 
demand during the winter months, and a rise during the summer. During 1947 and 1948 
this seasonal cycle dominated, with the demand for labour exceeding its suply during the 
summer months. But from thenceforth, the overall development of unemployment 
dominated. Between the winter o f 1948 and September 1954, employers’ demand for male 
labour was less than the number o f men seeking work. Until 1952 the trend was 
downward, with the highest ratio in that year lower than the low points in the winter of 
1951-52. This is the point in time when an actual fall in the number o f jobs combined with 
the demographic increase in the number of workers entering the market to raise 
unemployment over the three percent mark. But unemployment cleared extremely rapidly 
from the beginning o f 1953, with the number o f men seeking work in the September of 
that year having fallen to less than forty percent o f the figure in January and sixty percent
269 These data were published in Maandscbriji CBS until the end o f 1952. From January 1953, they were 











Figure 3. Em ployer’s demand for labour, 1947-60, as a proportion o f  the num ber
seeking work.
o f the September 1952 figure. The number continued to fall in 1954. The number seeking 
work in October 1954 - the lowest figure that year - was less than a third o f the January 
figure and little more than a third o f the number in October 1952.
During the middle years o f the decade, demand for labour generally exceeded its registered 
supply. Between September 1954 and October 1957, the only months in which this was not 
the case were the mid-winter months o f 1954-55 and 1955-56. Registered demand for 
labour actually remained greater than registered supply during the winter o f 1956-57. But 
the situation changed rapidly. The graph clearly demonstrates the sharpness o f the onset o f 
unemployment in the recession o f 1957-58. The number o f men seeking work in February 
1958 was neady three times the October 1957 figure. The slowness o f employment to 
recover from the effects o f the recession can also be seen. The number seeking work in 
January 1959 was actually higher than in January 1958, which in turn was higher even than 
January 1950 or 1951. Registered demand for labour did not exceed its supply again until 
May 1960.
The demand for female labour, on the other hand, exceeded its supply for almost the 
whole period. The level o f employers* demand for female labour did not differ as much 
from the level o f demand for male labour as might be expected, the number exceeding 
seventy percent of the male number in seven years out o f the fourteen reported. On 
occasions during these years, more women than men were sought, and, in the winter of 
1958-59, demand for female workers reached 140% of the demand for male workers.
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1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Manufacture of earthenware, glass, etc a 68 144 261 278 911 359 141 76 27 107 192 67 28
b 1357 431 322 240 198 623 777 1380 1800 998 411 823 1543
Diamond industry a 14 75 121 124 270 369 164 59 41 22 87 14 23
b 58 7 9 3 1 25 13 46 23 19 8 14 5
Printing and publishing a 102 155 195 305 373 283 145 121 59 82 169 140 98
b 561 406 466 124 80 254 379 502 584 607 251 470 617
Chemical industries a 62 111 173 176 214 129 91 75 58 70 120 81 57
b 242 133 108 118 75 299 722 880 1089 835 267 276 757
Manufacture o f wooden, cork Sc straw goods a 290 791 619 1383 2542 858 453 267 73 130 463 186 98
b 1778 804 875 33 405 1464 2346 2910 3215 2298 635 1752 2727
Clothing and cleaning a 248 360 557 1916 3010 1855 834 461 148 250 980 368 169
b 919 513 401 202 182 353 465 623 829 538 635 342 514
Leather, oilcloth and rubber industries a 177 459 528 771 1123 697 357 201 60 93 254 126 60
b 1102 460 396 168 343 658 1149 1672 1650 1425 515 1142 1711
Metal industries a 2595 4486 6228 7548 12134 6642 3254 2384 1406 2743 8493 3165 1519
b 13775 7160 4730 5833 4388 9023 17999 26262 30313 19849 6700 14807 26116
Paper industries a 51 97 88 138 390 129 58 50 200 18 38 9 7
b 266
*
148 123 56 60 170 245 438 410 324 138 231 519
Textile industries a 179 255 327 1357 1983 722 370 240 68 200 794 308 138
b 1830 1455 1245 507 442 1160 1867 2061 3096 2408 632 1545 2373
Food processing a 1331 1583 2327 2688 3623 2296 1286 732 264 333 838 428 181
b 1521 1135 649 565 543 1315 1867 3028 3098 1991 656 1591 2604
Total manufacturing a 5117 8516 11424 16684 26573 14339 7153 4666 2404 4048 12428 4892 2378
b 23409 12652 9324 7849 6717 15344 28406 39802 46107 31292 11008 22993 39486
Professional and office staff a 8267 8443 10264 9706 10101 8434 6314 5365 3340 3948 6368 4685 3485
b 2173 966 815 796 764 1641 1877 2390 2489 2273 1190 2060 3086
Total male labour force a 32413 49657 57143 77158 108554 64867 42922 33326 22775 41485 69539 52327 31555
b 45328 25123 21331 15359 12938 30960 52611 66960 76089 52579 21891 40157 66473
Key: a) Number of male workers registered as seeking wo dr 
b) Employers' demand for male labour
Sources: hSandsdnifi CBS
Sta a lt m aandstatistitk
Table 15. M en registered as seeking w ork and registered demand for male labour
from employers, 1948-60.
During the boom years o f the mid-1950s, relative demand for male workers was higher, 
with the demand for women being only seventy percent and less of the demand for men.
However, the numbers o f women registered as seeking work were small when compared to 
the equivalent numbers o f men, generally amounting to only between ten and twenty 
percent of the male figure. Only during the summer months o f the mid-1950 boom did this 
ratio exceed twenty percent.
The male labour market was dominated by manufacturing. Taking the September data as a 
proxy for the annual figures270, demand for manufacturing workers formed between fifty 
and sixty percent o f the employers’ demand for male labour throughout more or less the
270 Annualised data are used in order to eliminate the seasonal cycle, and September data are used because 
they reflect the state of the labour market at the point in time when the annual wages surveys were taken. The 
two sets o f data - labour exchange figures and wage rate survey results - are compared in Chapter 5.
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whole period. The supply o f manufacturing workers was not, however, o f the same 
magnitude. They formed only about ten to twenty percent o f men registered as seeking 
work, declining from slighdy more than twenty percent in the early 1950s to slightly less 
than ten percent in 1960 - with a sharp rise in the proportion in 1958, suggesting that 
manufacturing may have been harder hit by the recession than other sectors o f the 
economy.
By and large, demand for manufacturing workers exceeded their supply throughout the 
period. The only years in which employers’ demand for male labour in manufacturing was 
less than the number o f men registered as seeking work in the sector were 1950,1951,1952 
and - just lower - 1958. In 1956, by contrast, there were more than twenty jobs offered by 
manufacturing employers for every man who was looking for one o f them.
In contrast, employers’ demand for male professional and office staff remained lower than 
its supply. However, the trend was one o f increasing demand for these workers from 
employers. The numbers involved were considerably lower than is the case for 
manufacturing, but the slack in the labour market lessened steadily from 1952, as demand, 
measured as a proportion of the number seeking work in the area, grew steadily. This 
growth was only briefly interrupted by the 1957-58 recession.
Within manufacturing, there were differences between the various industries. As can be 
seen from Table 15, the male labour market in manufacturing was numerically dominated 
by the metal industries. Employers’ demand for men in this sector was never less than half 
the total demand for men in manufacturing. At the beginning o f the period, up until 1953, 
this demand varied somewhat wildly between a half and three-quarters o f the total, but, 
from 1953, the variations became steadier, fluctuating between about sixty percent and 
two-thirds. Likewise, the proportion of male manufacturing workers looking for jobs in the 
metal industries differed between the first and second parts o f the 1950s. Until 1956, it 
varied between forty-five and fifty-five percent of the total, but from 1957 it rose and 
remained steady at around two-thirds. Because of these high proportions, the relationship 
between supply and demand for labour in metalworking was roughly identical to that o f 
manufacturing as a whole. Other industries where a similar pattern can be found are food 
processing, textiles, and clothing and cleaning, but the numbers involved in these cases are 
not o f a comparable magnitude.
There existed industries where demand for additional labour did not fall below its supply in 
1957-58. These were o f two kinds. There were those industries that experienced a relatively 
rapid growth o f output, such as chemicals and the paper industry, where it might be
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1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Manufacturing a 569 821 906 1954 1559 1306 864 670 461 659 1022 802 654
b 11626 9537 8924 4048 5520 10643 15103 18226 20251 18912 11123 14792 17935
Commercial staff a 1047 1256 1337 1952 2010 1387 1406 999 728 983 1500 1381 1097
b 603 553 544 376 548 969 1486 1928 2219 1905 1408 1736 2766
Professional and office staff a 3111 3509 3351 3739 3944 3615 3319 2781 2290 2877 3679 2924 2393
b 1892 993 1184 1159 1358 2699 3217 3261 3865 3427 2832 4144 5222
Domestic service a 2992 3766 3982 4993 4942 4311 2958 2139 1308 1687 2305 1959 1469
b 4595 4586 4633 3572 3689 5025 6759 7274 7234 5615 5153 5619 7039
All female wo doers a 8987 10775 10969 14931 14597 13616 10586 8316 6761 8515 11714 10285 8288
b 20583 17589 17175 10095 12520 21792 29488 34595 37469 33814 23479 30083 37668
Key: a) Numbers of female workers registered as seeking work
b) Employers' demand for female labour
Source: Maandscbrift CBS
Sodak maemdstatistuk
Table 16. W om en registered as seeking w ork and employers’ demand for female
labour, 1948-60.
expected that the conditions for employment growth remained strong even in a recession. 
And there were those industries that experienced a relative decline in output, such as 
earthenware, the manufacturer o f goods from wood, cork and straw, and the manufacture 
o f leather and rubber goods. Here it would seem that decline was associated in some way 
with an inability to attract sufficient labour.
Somewhat misleadingly, the figures concerning the female labour market are also 
dominated by manufacturing. Table 16 shows the employers’ demand and numbers 
registered as seeking work in the main areas affecting women. Manufacturing formed 
around fifty percent o f total demand for women’s labour throughout the entire period, but 
only around six to eight percent o f the number o f women seeking work. Unlike the case of 
men, the numbers involved in the supply and demand of manufacturing labour never 
approached one another, with most years seeing ten or twenty jobs being offered for every 
one sought. The consequence is that the female labour market appears as though 
employers faced a permanent shortage o f workers..
But the figures also show a rise in the demand for female commercial and office staff, 
reflecting the shift in the nature o f female white-collar work. Over the same period there 
was a large decline in the numbers seeking domestic work, while the demand for 
commercial and professional and office staff grew both absolutely and as a proportion of 
the total demand for female labour. The demand for commercial staff, as a proportion of 
total demand, rose from some three percent at the beginning o f the 1950s to around seven 
percent in 1960. The demand for office and professional staff also more than doubled in 
proportion, from less than six percent in 1948 to twelve to thirteen percent during the last
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years of the 1950s. The gap between supply and demand for these workers lessened, and 
then became negative, over the period. Until 1954, the numbers seeking work were 
considerably greater than the demand from employers, with, in 1952, almost four women 
seeking commercial work for every job offered, and three after every office or professional 
job. But from 1954, with the exception o f 1958, employers’ demand exceeded the supply. 
Even in 1958, the demand for commercial staff barely exceeded its supply. By 1960, the 
situation had changed dramatically, with the ratio o f jobs offered to jobs sought being five 
to two in commerce, and four to two in professional and office work.
In domestic service, on the other hand, with the brief exceptions of 1951 and 1952, 
demand for labour continuously exceeded supply. The decline in the number o f domestic 
servants was therefore a consequence o f unsatisfied demand for labour. The gap between 
supply and demand expanded, with demand growing by fifty percent between 1948 and 
1960, and the number o f women registered as seeking domestic work falling by fifty 
percent over the same period.
4.3 The growth o f manufacturing employment.
The relative growth o f employment by industry reveals yet more about the changing 
structure o f the workforce. The census data show that the major growth in employment 
occurred in manufacturing, and the data on the supply and demand of labour are also 
dominated by manufacturing. These latter data also show that the relationship between the 
supply and demand of labour changed over time. But data on the supply and demand of 
labour do not tell the whole story. For example, they show the highest demand for labour 
in industries in which output grew the most, such as chemicals and paper, but they also 
show the same phenomenon in some industries in which a relative decline in output 
occurred. In order to make more sense of this, these data need to be complemented by 
data on how employment in industry actually changed.
Information about the growth o f industrial employment can be obtained from the Algemene 
industriestatistiek. This series is composed o f data gathered quarterly from a questionnaire 
sent out by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and concerns, with certain exceptions, 
industrial enterprises with ten or more personnel, including working owners and partners. 
The exceptions are that it does not include the building industry nor gas, electricity and 
water businesses purely engaged in distribution271, and it excludes home workers and those
271 CBS (1952) p. 902.
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on temporary military service272. As with the data on the supply and demand o f labour, the 
series was published in the Maandschrift CBS until 1952; from January 1953, it was published 
in the Sociale maandschrift.
Using figures from this source, a number o f series were constructed that traced the growth 
o f employment in mining and manufacturing. These series begin in the first quarter of 1948 
and they run up to and including the second quarter o f 1960, when the census was taken. 
It is not possible to start them earlier because the manner in which the various industries 
were categorised changed. Gas, electricity and water businesses were left out o f these series, 
but mining was included, since the data for mining include figures for various peripheral 
industries. Separate series were constructed for total employment, for men’s and women’s 
employment as a whole, and for manual and white-collar employment, by gender, as well as 
for each industry, broken down by gender and type of labour.
There were a couple o f difficulties that presented themselves in the construction o f the 
series. The first difficulty was technical, but the second involved the underlying basis o f the 
data. Neither problem, however, appears to create major difficulties in the interpretation of 
the data.
The first difficulty was created by the change in the basis o f the survey in the first quarter 
o f 1952. Enterprises that had not previously been included in the survey were now 
included, for several reasons. There were a number o f enterprises that had increased their 
personnel to ten o f more since the start o f the post-war survey. There were also a number 
o f enterprises that, although employing more than ten people, had previously escaped the 
notice o f the CBS. And there were enterprises that belonged to the metal industry, where 
the rules for inclusion had changed. Under the previous rules, metal enterprises were 
included only if  they included ten or more manual workers; now they followed the general 
rule273. However, the figures for the first quarter of 1952 are given on both bases. Growth 
from the fourth quarter o f 1951 to the first quarter o f 1952 was calculated using the first 
quarter o f 1952 data on the old basis, and growth from the first quarter o f 1952 to the 
second quarter o f 1952 was calculated using the first quarter 1952 data on the new basis.
272 Ibid. p. 904.
273 Ibid. p. 902. The other industries that did not conform to the “ten personnel” rule, were baking, where 
inclusion was dependent upon the amount o f flour used, and sugar, where the whole industry was covered. 
Both these come under the general category o f food processing, and do not concern the discussion in this 
section.
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The two series were simply put together, one after the other, and since no spurious 
structural break appeared, it was assumed that the resulting single series was accurate274.
The second difficulty concerns the proportion of the workforce included in the survey. The 
“ten personnel” rule means that not all manufacturing workers were included in the figures. 
The CBS calculated, from a comparison with the Algemene bedrijfstelting o f October 1950 
(which surveyed all businesses in the Netherlands) that the Algemene industriestatistiek 
covered about seventy percent o f industrial workers275. This would not have been a 
problem if the proportion had remained constant. But the decline in the number of 
businesses, noted from the census data, also involved growth in the size o f businesses. The 
crude figures show that while, in 1950, some twenty-six percent o f industrial workers were 
employed in enterprises comprised of ten workers or less276, this figure had fallen to sixteen 
percent by 1963277. This raises the possibility that trends may be distorted slightly, as small 
businesses disappeared from different industries at differing rates, but there is no reason to 
suppose that this potential distortion makes a serious difference to the conclusions drawn.
On top o f all this, the figures for the food processing industry were omitted from the 
constructed series. As we have seen from the census data, food processing was the industry 
employing the largest number o f workers, although the numbers were declining. What the 
Algemene industriestatistiek shows is that employment in this industry had a strong seasonal 
element, with numbers peaking in the third quarter and falling to their lowest in the first 
Because the numbers employed were so large compared to industry as a whole, these 
seasonal fluctuations overwhelmed year-on-year trends on occasion, and the industry was 
therefore omitted from the totals. This does not give an inaccurate picture o f the trends, 
however, since the construction o f annual series including food processing data and using 
one quarter as a proxy for the entire year give approximately the same results.
The overall employment figures display the same pattern as shown by the data on the 
supply and demand of labour. Figure 4 shows the quarterly percentage increase in the 
employment o f men and women in mining and manufacturing. From the middle o f 1949, 
five distinct periods can be seen: the initial burst o f growth at the end o f the 1940s, and
274 It was assumed that the “stitching together” o f the series in this way did not hide a structural break on the 
grounds that such a break would have been remarked on in the literature or have been obvious from other 
sources.
275 CBS (1952) p. 902.
276 2  Algemene bedrijfstelling, 16 Oktober 1950, deel 2 p. 23. The phrase “crude figures” is used because they 
suggest that some seventy-four percent o f the industrial workforce was covered by the Algemene 
















Figure 4. Quarterly changes in employment in mining and manufacturing, 1948-60.
through 1950; the slowdown and job losses associated with the first consumption 
restriction; the period o f consistent employment growth in the boom of the mid-1950s; the 
period of stagnation in 1957-1958, associated with the second consumption restriction; and 
the strong growth in employment at the end of the 1950s.
The growth o f women’s employment differed from that o f men. During periods o f fast 
growth, the female workforce increased more strongly than the industrial workforce as a 
whole, and during periods o f slower or negative growth, it grew more slowly or sustained a 
higher rate o f job losses. It also shows a more strongly seasonal character during the mid- 
1950s boom. This suggests, in apparent contradiction to the data on the supply and 
demand o f labour, that women’s employment in industry had a more temporary character 
than men’s, with women being more likely to be hired or fired in line with economic 
fluctuations. The explanation for this apparent contradiction disappears when the figures 
for the employment o f manual and white-collar female workers are looked at separately. 
The fluctuation in employment is more or less confined to manual workers. The figures for 
the supply and demand o f labour do not distinguish between manual and white-collar 
workers, but the implication here is that the unsatisfied demand for women in 
manufacturing was largely for white-collar staff.
277 3' Algemene bedrijfstelling, deel 2t table 3. This figure does not, however, include enterprises employing exactly 











Figure 5. Quarterly changes in male employm ent in mining and manufacturing 
(excluding food processing), 1948-60.
Within the male workforce, the pattern o f quarterly changes in manual and white-collar 
industrial employment also differed from each other, white-collar employment showing 
stronger long-term growth. Male manual workers formed the majority of the industrial 
workforce, and Figure 5 shows the quarterly growth rate in their numbers varying in more 
or less the same way as the industrial workforce as a whole. Over the longer term, as Figure 
6  shows, their numbers grew at a slightly lower rate than the industrial workforce as whole. 
In contrast, the white-collar workforce all but continually expanded. It grew along with the 
manual workforce between 1948 and the end o f 1950, but with the fall in manual 
employment during the first consumption restriction the gap in the long-term growth rates 
began to widen. The consumption restrictions slowed down the growth o f white-collar 
employment, but did not, except briefly, reduce the numbers o f white-collar workers: the 
only occasions on which negative growth occurred were in the second quarter o f 1949 and 
the fourth quarter o f 1952.
The pattern o f growth also differed between industries. The metal industries, employing
thirty percent o f the industrial workforce at the beginning of 1948, expanded their
employment more rapidly than industry as a whole during the early and middle 1950s.
From just over thirty percent in the first quarter o f 1950, their share of the industrial
workforce rose rapidly to nearly 33% by the first quarter o f 1952, and reached neady 35%
of the industrial workforce by 1956. They held this share through the 1958 recession, and it
exceeded 35% from the fourth quarter of 1959. The absolute number o f workers in the
-90-
200 T
Total workforce in mining and manufacturing 
Male manual workers in mining and manufacturing 












1948 1951 19601949 1950 1952 1953 1954 1955 1958 19591956 1957
Source: AJgmtne indus/riesialistiek
Figure 6 . The growth o f  employment in mining and manufacturing (excluding food
processing), 1948-60.
metal industries rose almost continuously from the start o f comparable data until the third 
quarter o f 1957, with only two small falls during the first consumption restriction. 
Numbers fell from the end o f 1957, only recovering their absolute level during the third 
quarter o f 1959; the number o f manual workers only recovered to its previous peak during 
the fourth quarter o f the same year.
The chemical industry, on the other hand, experienced continuous growth in its workforce, 
with not a single fall in the total number employed during either o f the recessions. But 
there were variations on this pattern within the chemical workforce as a whole. The 
number o f manual workers in the industry fell, by a small amount, during the first 
consumption restriction, but, unlike the number of manual workers in the metal industries, 
kept rising during the second. These falls in employment occurred within the female 
section o f the workforce: male manual employment kept rising, with the exception o f a 
couple o f occasions when it remained more or less static, throughout the entire period. The 
chemical industry’s share o f industrial employment rose from just over five percent in the 
third quarter of 1949278 to almost seven percent in the second quarter o f 1960.
278 No comparison can be made with earlier data, since, from the Algemene industriestatistiek o f the third quarter 
of 1949, the chemical works belonging to the State mines was classified under the chemical industry. Previous 
to this it was included under mining [Maandschrift CBS, (1950) p. 21]. This does not affect the figures for any 
other industry, since the works were included in the overall figure for the whole period.
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Employment growth in the textile industry remained very flat during the 1950s. Following 
a rise in employment during the recovery, numbers working in the industry fell during the 
first consumption restriction. Although there was a recovery in employment, it did not 
grow during the mid-1950s boom, the peak number of employment in the fourth quarter 
1956 not being much higher than the number employed in the fourth quarter o f 1954; for 
female manual workers, employment numbers peaked during the third quarter o f 1954. 
Overall employment in the industry was also flat during the recovery o f the late 1950s, and 
had not recovered its third quarter 1957 level by the second quarter o f 1960.
A similar story can be seen with the clothing and cleaning industries, where employment 
numbers fell during both consumption restrictions. Employment was slow to pick up after 
1958, and numbers had not recovered to their previous peak by the second quarter of 
1960.
4.4 Women’s participation in the workforce.
The participation rate o f women in the workforce in the workforce was considerably lower 
than for men. In 1947, twenty-seven percent o f women aged 14 and over were 
economically-active, as against eighty-five percent o f men. The ratio of economically-active 
women to men fell during the period, with the proportion o f women classed as 
economically-active only twenty-three percent in I960279. But this overall figure disguises 
important differences between married and unmarried women.
Overall, the participation rate o f married women fell, but this was the result o f two 
contradictory tendencies. Over the period, the number of married women in the paid 
workforce rose - from 47000 to 108000 - while the total number of married women classed 
as economically-active fell - from 198000 in 1947 to 173000 in 1960, a fall in numbers from 
ten percent o f all married women down to seven percent The reason for the fall in the 
overall figure was a decline in the number of married women working in the family 
business, from 152000 to 64000, which more than compensated for the rise in the number 
working for pay280.
The rise in married women’s employment outside the home occurred in the context of the 
easing of restrictions on married women’s work. Traditionally, the Netherlands was a 
religious, family-oriented society, in which work outside the home was regarded as
279 1? Algemene volkstelling Deel 10A, p. 17.
280 Ibid. p. 39.
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belonging to the husband’s role. Attitudes were, however, changing, and the way they were 
changing can perhaps best be seen reflected in the way that the rules o f public sector 
employment changed. In 1904, a Royal Decree established that female civil servants who 
married should be sacked281, but in 1942, because of a shortage of personnel - the result o f 
men being sent to work in Germany - the rule was temporarily suspended. Under the 
conditions of the postwar recovery, and also because o f political objections, the ban was 
only partially reinstated, bit by bit282. But in 1955 the Second Chamber passed a motion, 
proposed by the Labour member Corry Tenderloo, opposing the ban, which was abolished 
in 1957283.
In the private sector, meanwhile, the employment o f married women was increasing. This 
trend can be observed on an annual basis from the number o f labour cards issued. Under 
the 1919 Labour Code, all married women working in an enterprise outside the home had 
to be in possession of a labour card issued by the local mayor (as did all those, both male 
and female, under the age o f 18)284. This regulation, according to the CBS, was not always 
observed, which makes the reported figures on labour cards issued an underestimate o f the 
actual number of married women working outside the home. However, the CBS suggests 
that the trend they reveal is more accurate285. During the ten years, 1947-57, the percentage 
o f married women who possessed a labour card almost doubled286.
Nonetheless, despite these changes, the participation rate o f married women in the paid 
workforce was still extremely low in 1960. Table 17 calculates it as less than four percent of 
all married women living with their husbands, less than five percent o f married women 
under the age o f 6 S287.
The participation rate o f married women in the paid workforce was, in general, highest 
amongst those with husbands receiving average or less than average incomes. Table 17 
shows the proportions o f husbands, by occupation, who had wives in paid employment in 
1960. With the exceptions o f professionals and the small number o f married sons working 
in non-agricultural family businesses288, the only categories in which the percentages o f 
wives in paid employment were above average are manual and white-collar workers earning
281 Blok (1989) p. 119.
282 Ibid. pp. 122-124.
283 Ibid. p. 8.
284 Ibid. p. 100. The practice was abolished in 1971.
285 CBS (I960) p. 282.
286 CBS (1957) p. 276.
287 Blok (1989) p. 105.
288 Fathers working in the family business are categorised as self-employed.
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Occupational category of the husband
Head of agricultural of horticultural business
Other heads of business with personnel:
Shops
in industry with












income of f7,500 p.a. and over 
income of f5,500 - < £7,500 p.a. 
income of £3,750 - < £5,500 p.a. 
income of < £3,750 p.a.
Agricultural workers
Other manual workers:
income of f7,500 p.a. and over 
income of f5,500 - < f7,500 p.a. 
income of f3,750 - < £5,500 p.a. 
income of < £3,750 p.a.





Sources: 13eAjgemene volkstelling Deel 10A p. 49.
13e Algemene volkstelling Deel 10A table 9.






















































Table 17. The proportion o f  wives in the paid workforce, by husband’s occupation,
1960.
f7500 a year and less. (Average annual male income in 1959 was f6110289.) The proportion 
rises as the husbands’ earnings decline.
The picture drawn here is consistent with the results of a number o f surveys made in the 
1950s. An official report in 1951 on married women working in factories concluded that 
almost all o f them worked there out o f financial necessity290, while, according to a 
government report on married female civil servants the following year, sixty-two percent of 
these worked in order to improve their financial position and just six percent out of the
289 Ittkomensverdeling 1959 en vemogensverdeling 1960, table 15.















Source: / 3e Algemene volkstelRngDeel 1QA table 19.
Table 18. Percentage o f  married w om en in the paid workforce, by wife's age, 1947
and 1960.
love o f the job291. A survey by the Sociological Institute o f the Rijk University o f Utrecht, 
published in 1957, came up with a similar picture. Over eighty percent o f the married 
women they surveyed worked outside the home primarily for financial reasons292.
Labour force participation was also highest amongst married women in the youngest age 
groups. Table 18 shows the percentages o f married women in the paid workforce within 
each age group, in both 1947 and 1960. In both years, the percentages of married women 
in the youngest age groups who worked for pay were higher than the percentages in the 
older age groups. In 1960, about ten percent of married women under the age of twenty- 
five were recorded as being in the paid workforce. This is consistent with the findings of 
the 1957 survey mentioned above, which showed that the majority of working married 
women possessing labour cards had only recently married and were still childless293.
More married women may, however, have participated in the workforce than the raw 
figures suggest. This is not just a question o f married women not being declared as working 
because they had not registered. It follows from the methodology used in a census, which 
asks people if they worked during the previous week or whenever. As Goldin has pointed 
out, this gives the resulting figures an ambiguous meaning, depending on the homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of the workforce. In the case o f what she calls “complete homogeneity”,
291 Ibid. p. 108.
292 Ibid. p. 106.
293 Pott-Buter (1993) p. 192.
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each individual works an identical number o f weeks a year. In the case of the four percent 
participation rate in the Netherlands in 1960, this would mean that each married woman 
took part in the labour force for about a fortnight a year, standing a four percent chance of 
being in the workforce when the census is taken. “Complete heterogeneity”, on the other 
hand, means that some individuals are to be found in the labour force for the entire year, 
while others are not employed at all294. In this case, a four percent participation rate means 
that exactly four percent o f Dutch married women were in paid employment for fifty-two 
weeks. The truth, as Goldin also points out, is likely to be somewhere in between. That this 
is the case seems to be confirmed by the way that participation rates vary according to age. 
But even within each age group, the actual percentage o f women working may have been 
higher. For example, suppose each married woman under the age o f 25 worked for eight 
months before leaving to have a child295. In this case, fifteen percent o f them will have been 
in the workforce in any one year. This percentage will be lower, the longer the average time 
that they worked.
The participation rate o f women who had never married was considerably higher than this. 
O f the never-married female population between the ages o f 14 and 65, fifty-eight percent 
were economically active (including those who were daughters working in the family 
business) in 1947, a number that had risen to sixty-four percent by I960296. In other words, 
there was a tendency for women to work, but to leave sometime between getting married 
and giving birth to her first child. It is this that accounts for the high percentage o f women 
aged 25 and over without jobs, and it also accounts for the low participation rate o f Dutch 
women by international standards. Pott-Buter argues that this low participation rate is 
accounted for by the low rates o f economic activity during adulthood and middle age297.
This pattern o f participation means that the female labour market behaved in a 
considerably different manner than the male. There was a more rapid turnover in its 
composition, with each man in it for life, a woman for only a few years. This means that, in 
the case of men, changes in average incomes over a few years - a decade in this case - tells 
us something about changes in the incomes o f individual men. This is not necessarily the 
case with women, since the incomes that make up the average at each point in time might 
be the incomes o f entirely different individuals. In addition, the relationship between 
earnings and family income differs by the gender o f the owner. In the typical family, in
294 Goldin (1990) pp. 28-29.
295 The number here is chosen for ease o f calculation, rather than as an estimate based on evidence.
296 Blok (1989) p. 105.
297 Pott-Buter (1993) p. 161.
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conditions o f full employment, the father’s earnings were a constant element in the 
household income. The mother’s were not. These factors, combined with the very different 
occupational structures o f the male and female workforces, mean that the analysis of the 
male and female workforces, and the effects o f changes to them on incomes, should be 
undertaken separately.
4.5 Conclusion.
In the cases o f both men and women, the number and proportion of those working for 
wages or a salary increased. This is partly because the economically-active population 
increased in size, but it also reflects changes within this population. There was a decline in 
the numbers reported as working in the family business, as well as a decline in the numbers 
who were self-employed. The number o f those running businesses - both self-employed 
and employing others - fell, and there seems to have been some increase in the average size 
o f business, with a decline in the proportion o f small businesses in industry.
The growth o f the male labour force was strongly dominated by the expansion of 
manufacturing. Neady sixty percent o f the net increase in men in the paid workforce took 
place in manufacturing, with the largest proportion o f this going to the metal and chemical 
industries, where the growth of out put was highest. The age o f the workforce in chemicals 
in 1960 was slightly higher than average, suggesting that the expansion o f the workforce 
had involved the recruitment of experienced workers from other sectors. Otherwise, the 
age o f the workforce in the industries whose workforces expanded tended to be younger, 
suggesting that workers in these tended to be recruited at the beginning o f their working 
lives. After 1957, the service sector became more important as a source o f increased 
employment. The industrial workforce also became more white-collar, with the 1958 
recession not stopping the growth o f white-collar employment in manufacturing. 
Nonetheless, the growth o f white-collar employment did not take place at the expense of 
manual employment, and manual workers still formed the largest part o f the male 
workforce in 1960.
The female workforce was younger than the male, and was heavily oriented to the service 
sector. It became grew younger because the size of the never-married workforce expanded 
more than the size o f the married workforce. Despite an increase in the proportion of 
married women in paid work, by and large their participation rate remained extremely low. 
Overall, women’s employment in the service sector moved away from traditional areas, 
such as domestic service, into office and retail work.
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Using this information, it is in principle possible to calculate the effect of these changes on 
incomes. But first, we need to look at by how much and why wage rates grew during the 
period.
Chapter 5. Full Employment and Wages Growth.
This chapter looks at the effect o f full employment on real wage rates. The intention here is 
to attempt to establish the extent to which this accounts for the real rise in disposable 
incomes. The implication in some of the literature discussed above is that it played an 
important role. The various critics of wage control, discussed in Chapter 3, suggest that 
wage rates followed market conditions, with van Hulst, in particular, implying that rises in 
wage rates were directly reflected in rises in disposable income. From very different 
assumptions, Myrdal argues that hill employment enabled trade unions to negotiate higher 
wages than they otherwise would have done. The chapter is therefore a test o f both of 
these viewpoints.
The chapter begins by considering how the effects of full employment can be measured. 
The problem here is that there is no clear counterfactual as to what would have happened 
to wage rates in the absence o f full employment. The chapter therefore discusses a number 
o f theories o f wage determination in order to create a battery o f tests both at the level of 
the economy as a whole and at the level o f each industry. It then goes on to look at 
changes in income distribution, at wage drift, at the relative paths o f wage growth and the 
growth of per capita national income, and wages growth by industry.
The chapter concludes that, although some effect o f full employment can be seen in male 
wage rates, this is not enough to account for the rise in incomes over the period.
5.1 Measuring the effects o f full employment.
Full employment will certainly have created upward pressure on wages. At the simplest 
level, this is just a question o f supply and demand. If the demand for additional labour 
grew faster than the available supply then, ceteris paribus, the wage rates offered by 
employers would have risen. But things are not perhaps as simple as this. As Lipsey points 
out, the labour market does not behave in straightforward manner, with the supply and 
demand curves continuously shifting. The demand curve can shift, for example, due to 
cyclical variations in income, while the supply curve can shift due to exogenous changes in 
the labour market He argues, however, that if an adjustment mechanism exists, then 
whatever the reason for the shift in the demand curve, a given level o f excess demand 
should cause a given change of price298. In other words, the specific factors bringing about
298 Lipsey (1960) p. 33.
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the change in demand for labour can be safely ignored; the level and the change in the level 
of unemployment are the only factors that need to be considered. This argument seems to 
be bome out by Lipsey’s reconsideration o f Phillips’ work on the relationship between 
wages and unemployment. He calculates that over eighty percent o f the variance in British 
money wage rates between 1862 and 1913 was associated with die percentage o f the 
workforce employed and the rate of change of unemployment299. It follows, therefore, in 
the Dutch case, that if the wage control system was ineffective, or even less than 
completely effective, then the upward pressure on wage rates from full employment would 
likely have been realised in an upward movement of nominal wage rates. Calculating the 
effect on wage rates o f full employment can therefore be seen as a check on the arguments 
in Chapter 3.
Myrdal argues that trade unions also played a part in raising workers’ wages. As was noted 
in Chapter 1 , in Beyond the We fare State, Myrdal suggests that full employment helped raise 
wage rates by strengthening the bargaining power o f the trade unions300. But while it is 
certainly the case that increasing demand for labour would have aided trade union 
bargaining power, it is not clear by how much. Myrdal gives no figures, and his theoretical 
model gives no hint as to how figures might be calculated. In the case o f the Netherlands, 
it might also be presumed that commitment to wage control by the trade unions would 
have meant them not exerting this extra bargaining power to any great extent Evidence 
that they did use the extra bargaining power that full employment gave them, on the other 
hand, would therefore be evidence that their commitment was, as van Hulst suggests, 
merely verbal.
But it is not immediately clear that any upward movement o f nominal wages in this context 
would have caused real wages to rise. Friedman argues that there was a basic defect in 
Philips’ analysis o f the relationship between unemployment and the change in the level of 
wages, in that he failed to distinguish between nominal and real wage rates. He argues that, 
contrary to the impression given by the Philips curve, there is no permanent trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, and that there exists, rather, a “natural level of 
unemployment”, produced when the economy is in equilibrium. A lower level of 
unemployment is an indication that there is excess demand for labour that will produce 
upward pressure on wage rates, while a higher level indicates an excess supply o f labour 
that will produce downward pressure. In the case where the money supply is expanded to 
hold down unemployment there will be an initial expansion o f the economy. Prices will
299 Ibid. p. 12.
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rise, causing real wages to decline. Employees will start to demand higher nominal wages in 
anticipation o f further price rises, and real wages will rise, returning to their former level, 
with the process becoming a continuous cycle301. Phelps has a slightly different story, 
although the end result is the same. He had noted a similar problem to the Phillips curve as 
Friedman at about the same time302, but later came to argue a different mechanism. He now 
suggests that in conditions of full employment firms attempt to outbid one another to 
attract additional labour303. The costs o f this would be passed on to consumers in the form 
of price rises, eroding the real value o f nominal wages, thus ensuring that real wages would 
not rise. This distinction between nominal and real wages is important for this study, since 
we are looking at the real rise in disposable incomes. We therefore need to look at the rises 
in real, not nominal, wage rates. But theory cannot tell us what the natural rate of 
unemployment was in the Netherlands during the 1950s, nor what its effect on the real 
value o f nominal wages was.
Nor is it obvious how to measure the effects of full employment on wage rates. In 
principle, we need to know two figures. We need to know how much real wage rates rose 
under conditions o f full employment and we need to know how much they would have 
risen in the absence o f full employment. The problem is that there exists no theoretical 
model which gives a straightforward method o f calculating the second figure.
There is also a problem o f at what level the measurement should take place. There is no 
straightforward answer as to the whether the entire workforce should be measured or 
whether each industry should be treated separately. The argument for treating each industry 
separately is that the demand for labour develops differently for each industry. This is also 
the case for other factors, such as trade union coverage. On the other hand, the demand 
for labour in one sector will, ceteris paribus, diminish the supply o f labour available for work 
in other sectors, thereby affecting wage levels generally.
Both approaches are used here. That is, the effects o f full employment are sought amongst 
the workforce as a whole and at the level o f each industry. Each approach is investigated in 
two different ways. It is suggested that, at the level o f the workforce as a whole, full 
employment might have had an effect both on income distribution and on the growth of 
wage rates as compared to the growth o f per capita national income. At the level of each 
industry, there might have been different effects on wage rates o f variation in the level of
300 Myrdal (1960) p. 32.
301 Friedman (1968) pp. 8-11.
302 Phelps (1967) p. 255.
303 Phelps (1995) p. 19.
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trade union bargaining power and o f variation in the level o f demand for labour by 
employers. The reasoning behind each o f these is different.
Myrdal’s argument suggests that full employment increased wage earners’ income more 
than those o f other sections of the population. This should be detectable in a changed 
distribution o f income, with the share o f higher-income groups in national income falling 
during periods when the level o f unemployment fell. There are two theoretical ways to 
measure this change. It should be detectable as a change in labour’s share o f national 
income and it should be detectable in changes to the distribution o f individual incomes. O f 
the two, changes to labour’s share o f national income might seem the natural one to use in 
the circumstances. However, Atkinson points out that there is a problem with the concept, 
in that Ricardo’s division o f incomes into wages, profits and rents does not hold in a 
developed capitalist society. For example, a worker may receive profit income via his or her 
rights to a pension304. But, just taking wages as against other incomes, regardless o f whether 
these other incomes are going to the worker or to someone else, is also not adequate. 
Labour’s share of national income is partly dependent on the proportion o f the 
economically-active population who are wage earners. One more worker, if nothing else 
changes, will increase labour’s share, and, as we have seen, the proportion o f wage earners 
grew during this period. Changes in labour’s share o f national income may therefore not 
tell us anything more than we know already from the censuses. On the other hand, changes 
to the distribution of individual incomes may originate from changes to sources o f income 
other than wages. However, if full employment had an effect on wages in the manner that 
Myrdal proposed, then it should show up as changes to the pattern o f income distribution, 
and so the pattern of income distribution will be used as a test o f this. This is done in 
section 5.2.
Wage drift might seem a reasonable measure, but it is less accurate that it appears at first 
sight The earlier discussion o f wage drift and the effect that the demand for labour may 
have had on the effectiveness o f wage control suggests, as a counterfactual, that wage drift 
would have been zero in the absence o f full employment. Measuring wage drift is 
reasonably straightforward, since its extent has been calculated by the CBS, but wage drift 
is not necessarily the same as the effect o f full employment. One o f the factors that were 
taken into account when determining allowable wage rises was the state o f the labour 
market. For example, the 1954 report by the Social-Economic Council on the possibility of 
wage rises was motivated by tensions on the labour market that were leading to increasing
304 Atkinson (1983) pp. 220-222.
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wage drift305. This report concluded, amongst other things, that a condition o f allowing a 
general rise should be a reduction in the amount o f black wages paid306. The use of wage 
drift as a measure might therefore underestimate the effect o f full employment. 
Nonetheless, some effect is likely to be seen, so in section 5.3 an attempt is made to 
measure it.
Comparing the growth o f actual wage rates with the growth of per capita national income 
is likely to give a better picture than wage drift does. There is a clear counterfactual. If 
wages kept their share o f national income, allowing for all other factors, then wage rates 
should grow at the same rate as per capita national income. In this comparison, it is 
necessary to keep in mind that there are other factors involved in determining national 
income than wages, and that changes in these factors could change the relationship. Most 
notably, per capita national income is determined in part by population and will therefore 
be affected by changes in the proportion o f the population that is economically active. 
What is really needed for the comparison is the figure for income per economically active 
person, but this is not available. Nonetheless, even taking possible distortions into account, 
it is possible to test whether wage rates increased faster than per capita national income in 
periods when unemployment fell, and slower in periods when demand for labour 
slackened. This is the subject o f section 5.4.
Calculating the effects by industry is even more problematic, since different theories of 
wage formation predict different growth patterns o f wages by industry. It is necessary to 
sort out what these predicted patterns are in order to create testable hypotheses. Theories 
o f wage determination can be broadly divided into two categories: those that relate 
differences in wage levels to the characteristics o f the workers themselves and those that 
relate differences in wage levels to some structural aspect o f the workforce. Under the 
former can be understood theories that argue wages are determined by a worker’s marginal 
product and those that argue wages are determined by human capital. In the latter category 
can be understood theories that relate variations in wages to variations in levels of trade 
union representation between industries, theories of internal labour markets and the so- 
called “geological theory” that argues wage levels vary between industries as a consequence 
of the order in which the various industries came into existence.
Theories that relate wage differentials to differing characteristics o f workers are not useful 
in this study. There are two reasons for this. Firsdy, a number of studies have queried the
305 SER (1954) p. 5.
306 Ibid. p. 34.
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relationship between marginal product and wages, and between human capital and wages. 
Secondly, the relevant data are not available for the Nethedands in this period. The theory 
that wages are determined by the marginal productivity o f the worker is one often taught to 
undergraduates, and is occasionally to be found in empirical studies. For example, 
Jablonski, Rosenblum and Kunze, investigating the slowdown in the rate o f productivity 
growth in the USA between 1973 and 1986, conclude that this was in part due to a fall of 
one year in the average age of the workforce between 1973 and 1979. They reach this 
conclusion on the basis that the relationship between age and earnings can be used as a 
proxy for the relationship between age and productivity307. However, this relationship has 
been queried. A study by Kodikoff and Gokhale o f the earnings histories o f 300,000 
employees o f a Fortune 1000 company between 1969 and 1983 suggests that there is little 
or no relationship between marginal product and workers’ remuneration. Their results 
show that workers are paid less than their marginal product when young, more when older, 
with the weakest correlation between marginal product and pay to be found among 
managers. The only exception to this pattern was to be found amongst the sales staff, who 
were paid on commission308. Hellerstein and Neumark, using firm-level data from Israeli 
manufacturing firms, claim to find otherwise, but admit their results are not conclusive. In 
this study they find identical age-productivity and age-eamings profiles, but the sample of 
workers contains few skilled workers, and comprises mostly semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers - on average, some 89% of each firm’s workforce - who would be more likely to 
be hired on a spot basis than skilled workers. Furthermore, the authors accept that, because 
their productivity profiles are relatively imprecise, their results are not inconsistent with 
“sizeable divergences” between the age-eamings and the age-productivity profiles, and they 
conclude that, while the data back their conclusions, there is no strong evidence to reject 
other hypotheses309.
Similarly, there are questions surrounding the relationship between human capital and 
earnings. Using figures for the after-tax incomes o f white US males in 1939 and 1949, by 
age and years o f education, Becker argues that these data clearly show that the average 
income in each age-class is strongly related to the length o f education310. He further argues 
that the rate o f increase o f earnings by age varies according to education and that the 1939 
data show increasing slopes as the level o f education increases, from elementary to high
307 Jablonski, e ta l{1988) pp. 34-38.
308 Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) pp. 1215-42.
309 Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) pp. 89-109.
310 Becker (1964) p. 139.
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school to college311. Medoff and Abraham lend some support to this in a study using data 
on managerial and professional employees in two large corporations in the US 
manufacturing sector. They find a positive correlation between human capital and earnings, 
but none between human capital and performance312. But Freeman suggests this association 
between college education and earnings changes over time, arguing that both the real and 
the relative earnings o f college graduates in the USA fell in the eady 1970s. The fall was 
caused by a slackened growth o f demand, due to a reduced rate o f expansion o f those 
industries that employ many college-trained workers, while the supply o f such labour 
continued to increase313.
It is not possible to measure either the effect o f productivity or education on wages in the 
Netherlands in this period because the data are not available. Annual figures are published 
for productivity in industry as a whole, but it is not clear how accurate figures could be 
calculated for each industry, let alone for each group o f workers. The “differentiated wages 
policy” o f the Liberal-Catholic coalition that took office in 1959 was designed to allow 
wage rises in each industry according to rises in the industry's productivity, but this policy 
quickly ran into trouble when it was discovered that no one knew how to calculate such 
productivity increases314. There are no theoretical problems with the association o f 
education and occupation, but no data on this was collected in the Netherlands before the 
1960 census315.
In contrast, some o f the effects o f trade unionism can be measured. Studies in both Britain 
and the USA have found that trade unionism has had an effect on wage rates. Freeman and 
Medoff have found a “union wage effect” in a cross-section of the U.S. workforce, 
showing that unionised labour was substantially higher paid than non-unionised, with a 
sizeable, although smaller, effect for workers who change union status (i.e. union to non­
union or vice versa). The union wage effect does, however, differ between workers - e.g. it 
is greater for younger than older workers, for non-white than white, for men than for 
women, and there is substantial variation across industries316. Lewis argues that this effect 
varies from one period to another317. Pencavel, in a study of the wages o f British manual 
workers in the early 1960s, found that union membership raised hourly earnings by
311 Ibid. p. 143.
312 Medoff and Abraham (1980) pp. 703-36.
313 Freeman (1976) pp. 184-185.
314 Abert (1969) p. 86.
315 Hartog, e ta l{1993) p. 187.
316 Freeman and Medoff (1984) pp. 46-50.
317 Lewis (1963) pp. 4-5.
-105-
between zero and ten percent318. Mulvey and Foster find a greater effect looking at British 
workers covered by collective agreements in 1973. They point out that, whereas about 80% 
of full-time adult manual workers were covered by collective agreements, only about 55% 
were trade union members. Because the data they use refer to all those in receipt of a 
union-negotiated wage, whether they are members o f trade unions or not, then the 
estimated differential is liable to be higher than if membership were used. They find that 
workers covered by collective agreements received wages some 22% to 48% higher than 
those that did not, with the differential increasing to a range o f 36% to 60% for manual 
workers319.
Since Myrdal suggested that full employment strengthened the bargaining power o f trade 
unions, it follows that wages should have risen faster during the 1950s in those industries 
where the influence o f the trade unions was greatest. Both the numbers of trade union 
members by industry and the number o f workers in each industry covered by collective 
agreements are published, so it is possible to test this, which is done in section 5.5.
Structural theories o f wage determination can also be used to measure the effects o f full 
employment. Two theories fall under this heading; the “geological theory” and the theory 
o f internal labour markets. The “geological theory” was so-named by Lutz320 but was first 
proposed by Dunlop. Dunlop argues that wage theory, instead o f reducing the problem of 
wage setting to the problem of the setting o f a single rate which can be regarded as an 
index for all other wage rates, needs to work with the concept o f the wage structure. Wage 
rates do not move together, and the problem is one of setting and variation in a whole 
structure or complex o f rates, the major level o f enquiry, he argues, being the interaction 
between wage level and wage structure321. He proposes the use o f the concepts o f the job 
cluster and the wage contour. The job cluster is defined as a stable group o f job 
classifications or work assignments, linked together by technology, the administrative 
organisation o f the production process and the social custom that their wage rates move 
together. An example o f a job cluster is a tool room in a plant322. A wage contour is a stable 
group o f firms, linked together by the similarity o f their product markets, the need to resort 
to similar sources for a labour force and a common labour market organisation that, by 
custom, has common wage-making characteristics. As an example, the wage rates o f jobs in 
US steel firms move together. A wage contour has three dimensions: particular occupations
318 Pencavel (1974) pp. 194-210.
319 Mulvey and Foster (1976) pp. 258-275.
320 Lutz (1976) pp. 473-491.
321 Dunlop (1957) p. 15.
322 Ibid. p. 16.
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or job dusters, the sector or industry and geographical location323. In periods o f a tight 
labour market, the various contours have to bid for labour, and the differentiated structure 
of wage rates created will reflect product market conditions, while, for a variety o f reasons, 
Dunlop insists, wage differentials are not easily altered in a looser market324. For this 
reason, Dunlop argues that the wage structure o f a country reflects its pattern of 
industrialisation. In an agrarian society, only small differentials are needed to attract labour 
out o f agriculture into industry. As successive industries develop, higher rates are 
continually required to draw labour out o f the older industries325. It is this aspect of the 
theory that has attracted the most interest, and a number of studies claim to have found 
stable industrial wage structures across time and across countries. Hoffmann finds stable 
differentials between industrial wages in Germany across time and across a series o f 
countries326. Papola and Bharadwaj also find a stable ranking of the inter-industry wage 
structure in the short run across seventeen industrialised countries327. Krueger and 
Summers find a stable structure in the USA between 1923 and 1984328, and again find a 
stable structure between countries329.
The “geological theory” can easily be linked conceptually with the theory o f internal labour 
markets. This theory, proposed by Doeringer and Piore, argues that the institutional 
structure o f labour markets is composed o f distinct internal and external labour markets. 
The internal labour market is defined by an enterprise, a part o f an enterprise, a craft or a 
professional community, where entry is limited to particular jobs or ports of entry. The 
pricing of labour and the allocation of labour from ports of entry to other work positions 
are governed by administrative rules and customs330. The external labour market is the 
market outside the enterprise. They also suggest that a “dual labour market” exists, with 
one section o f the labour force being hired from within internal markets, and another 
section where little difference exists between internal and external markets. This latter 
section tends to be the lower-paid sector, associated with women, youth and ethnic
♦ • 331minorities .
It is possible to use the “geological theory” as a basis for a model with which to measure 
the effects on wages o f differential demand for labour between industries. The theory
323 Ibid. p. 17.
324 Ibid. p. 22.
325 Ibid. p. 25.
326 Hoffmann (1966) pp. 25-29.
327 Papola and Bharadwaj (1970) pp. 72-90.
328 Krueger and Summers (1987) p. 22.
329 Ibid. p. 26.
330 Doeringer and Piore (1985) p. x.
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predicts that the inter-industry wage structure should reflect demand for new labour in 
periods o f low unemployment. Therefore, using annual wages surveys, it is possible to see 
if those industries where demand was greatest in the 1950s saw their wage rates increase 
faster than industry as a whole. This hypothesis is tested in section 5.5.
It is not possible to use the theory of internal labour markets as the basis for any testable 
hypothesis, as no appropriate data are available332.
In most cases where a test is made o f the effect o f full employment, this is effectively made 
on real wage rates. This result occurs because, in the majority o f tests, wage rates or 
incomes are compared within a single year. In these cases, both sides of the comparison 
have been subject to the same rate o f inflation, and therefore the results are identical for 
both nominal and real wages. The exception is in section 5.3, where it is not clear to what 
extent the wage drift; identified by the CBS is real. In all other cases, although the original 
data are in nominal values, the comparisons are real.
5.2 The distribution o f income and how it changed.
Income distribution reports published by the CBS, covering a number o f years during the 
period, can be used to measure changes in the distribution o f individual incomes. These 
reports were created by sampling income-tax data, and categorise the number o f individuals 
and their total incomes in a variety o f ways. Data are published for 1946, 1950, 1952 
through 1955 and 1957 through 1960.
The reports do not contain all incomes. Incomes derived from the “black economy” are, 
not surprisingly, not included, but there is no reason to suppose the extent o f this changed 
as a proportion o f total income during the period333. The same goes for the underreporting 
of income. The effect of either o f these on income trends will therefore be slight. Slightly 
more problematic is the absence o f data on married women. Under the 1941 Decree on 
Income Tax, married women were not liable for income tax in themselves unless they were 
permanently separated334. This distorts the data in two ways, in that it boosts husbands’ 
reported incomes and reduces the number o f women reported as receiving income. There
331 Ibid. pp. x-xi.
332 Doeringer and Piore could find no measures o f neo-classical economic variables to use for their original 
study, and used heuristic evidence as the basis o f their argument (ibid. p. 5).
333 The “black economy” is not to be confused with “black wages”, which were paid in respect o f work done 
within the “white economy”. As will be seen below, black wages appear to have been largely reported.
334 Inkomensverdeling 1950, Aanvullendegegevens pp. 5-6.
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is no way around this problem, but the low proportion o f married women in the paid 
workforce suggests that the distortion will not be great.
On the other hand, all other incomes are included, including the lowest. Those whose 
incomes are included in the reports are referred to in this study as the “assessable 
population” - Le. those whose income is assessable for income tax. The equivalent group to 
the paid workforce is referred to as the assessable working population, and excludes those 
receiving their incomes from pensions and from “no occupation”.
The data are not reported in the same way in each year’s report. The categories that are 
reported differ from year to year, and definitions change, making it difficult or impossible 
accurately to compare apparently similar reports. In the case o f the overall distribution of 
income, however, comparable reports are published for 1946, 1950, 1955, 1958 and 1960, 
giving the numbers o f individuals in the assessable population broken down by size of 
income.
Two methods are used to measure changes in income distribution: the Lorenz curve and 
the Atkinson index. The Lorenz curve can be used to demonstrate a broad picture. It is a 
cumulative distribution function o f incomes, created by plotting the percentage o f the 
income-receiving population against the cumulative percentage o f the income they receive. 
Thus, if the lowest-paid ten percent of the population receive five percent o f the total 
income and the lowest-paid eighty percent receive sixty percent o f the total income, then 
the curve joins the points (0,0), (10,5), (80,60) and (100,100) - the first figure denoting the 
x-axis, the second the y-axis. The closer the curve is to a diagonal joining (0 ,0 ) to (1 0 0 ,1 0 0 ) 
then the more equal distribution is. By plotting such curves for a number o f years, the 
movement o f the curve relative to the diagonal shows how the distribution o f income 
changed over time.
The Atkinson index, on the other hand, can be used to check how each section of the 
population (the richest, the poorest, etc) was affected by the changing income distribution. 
This is possible because an Atkinson index is calculated using a parameter (e) which 
indicates how important equality o f incomes is considered to be. It is therefore unlike other 
measures o f inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, where the relative importance of 
income equality is assumed. The Atkinson parameter ranges in size from zero, which 
signifies indifference, to infinity, signifying concern only about the position of the 
poorest335. More specifically, Kaeble and Thomas identify a value of 1.5 with the viewpoint
335 Atkinson (1983) p. 56.
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of Beatrice Webb, only mildly preoccupied with inequality, and a value o f 4 with that of 
Proudhon, obsessed with it336. Atkinson gives, as an illustration of the use o f the index, 
examples o f the measurement of British and West German income distributions using
values of 6  ranging from 0.5 to 2 .
The formula for the index I, when £ 1 , is
1 =  1 -





Yj = the income o f those in the i* income range 
n = the number o f income ranges
f; = the proportion o f the population with incomes in the 1th range 
Y = mean income
and when £ = 1
1 = 1 — exp I f i l o g ,
i=l Y  )
The distribution for the Netherlands was calculated here for each year for which data are 
available with 8  set to values from 0.5 to 4. As the value increases, it gives information 
about the position o f those lower down the income scale.
The Lorenz curves and the Atkinson index both paint roughly the same picture. The 
Lorenz curves for 1946, 1950 and 1960 are shown in Figure 7, and the Atkinson index 
values for all the years for which there are data in Table 19. There are three important 
points that can be made, concerning when the greatest effect on income distribution 
occurred, concerning whether or not full employment had an effect on income distribution 
and concerning the incomes o f the poorest section o f the population.
The post-war recovery seems, for most people, to have had a greater impact on the 
distribution of income than anything that occurred during the 1950s. There was a definite 
move towards greater equality during the period o f post-war recovery, but, while there was 
a further move to equal distribution between 1950 and 1960, this did not happen to
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lnkomensverdt&ng 1950 Aanvullende gegevens, table 4.
Inkamensvtrde&ng 1960 AanvulUndt gegevens, table 4.
Figure 7: Incom e distribution o f  the assessable population.
anything like the same extent. This can clearly be seen in the changing shape o f the Lorenz 
curves, where the movement between 1946 and 1950 is much greater than that between 
1950 and 1960. The curves for 1955,1957 and 1958 have been omitted for clarity, but they 
fit between those for 1950 and 1960. The Atkinson index for all calculated values of 8 , with 
the exception o f 8  = 4, show a big fall in value between 1946 and 1950, with the index 
value never reaching the 1946 level again, but for values o f 8  o f 0.5 and 1, the index is 
lower in 1960 than 1950. This suggests a shift in income distribution from the higher to the 
middle income groups, something that is also visible from a close inspection of the Lorenz 
curves.
Nonetheless, in the recession year of 1958, incomes did briefly become less equal337. This 
can be seen with the Atkinson index, for all values o f 8 , and can also be seen when 
comparing the Lorenz curves for 1955, 1957 and 1958. The curves for 1955 and 1957 lie 
more or less on top o f one another, with the 1958 curve lie slightly to their right. Given 
that these results show income distribution to have got less equal in a year when 
unemployment increased, they are therefore consistent with the hypothesis that some part 
o f the equalisation o f income distribution was due to hill employment.
337 The recession began during 1957, but 1957 does not reveal itself as a recession year with annual data. 
Thus, the recession seems to appear suddenly in 1958.
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8 1946 1950 1955 1957 1958 1960
0.5 All 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16
Younger than 70 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16
Aged 21-69 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.12
1.0 All 0.34 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29
Younger than 70 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29
Aged 21-69 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.22
1.5 All 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40
Younger than 70 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40
Aged 21-69 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.29
2.0 All 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.49
Younger than 70 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.50
Aged 21-69 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.36
4.0 All 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.70
Younger than 70 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.71
Aged 21-69 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.56
Sources: Inkomensverdeling 1946 en vermogensverdeling 1947 Aanvullende gegevens, table 2.
Inkomensverdeling 1950 Aanvullende gegevens, table 4.
Inkomensverdeling 1955, table 3.
Inkomensverdeling 1957 en vermogensverde&ng 1958 > table 2.
Inkomensverdeling 1958 en vermogensverdeling 1959, table 2.
Inkomensverdeling 1960 Aanvullende gegevens, table 4.
Table 19. A tkinson index values for 1946,1950,1955,1958 and 1960.
But it should also be noted that the poorest section o f the population appeared to do 
relatively less well throughout the 1950s. This section o f the population became relatively 
poorer throughout the period. The Atkinson index with 8  = 4 shows that the post-war 
recovery made no difference to income distribution as far as this group were concerned, 
with income distribution becoming less equal during the 1950s. As with other values of 8 , 
the value o f the index rises in 1958 and it falls in 1960, indicating that the level o f 
employment very likely had an effect. Close inspection of the Lorenz curve suggests that 
this group comprised the poorest 1 0 -1 2 % of the population.
There are two possible explanations for this. It might have been that some were left behind 
as incomes rose. There was some awareness in official circles that concentration on wage
income created a number of “forgotten groups” such as widows and pensioners338, and
several laws passed in the post-war period tackled this issue. Under the 1947 Noodwet 
Ouderdomsvoongening payments were made by the state to those aged 65 and above whose
338 SER (1954) p. 36.
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incomes were too low, while, in 1956, the A.lgemene Ouderdomswet was passed, making old- 
age pensions a non-means tested right. Widows and orphans began to receive payments 
under the A.lgemne Weduwe- en We^enwet in 1958339. These will certainly have had an effect 
on income distribution, but how much is another question. Calculation o f the Atkinson 
index excluding those over 70 gives exacdy the same results as the whole population except 
in the case o f 1960, where the distribution o f income is slightly less equal for those 70 and 
under than for the population as a whole. This is consistent with the introduction o f old- 
age pensions beginning to have an effect, albeit a small one.
But a more likely explanation is that widening distribution was a reflection o f the increasing 
participation o f women in the paid workforce. This phenomenon was the result o f the 
combined effect of women’s wages being generally lower than men’s and the income 
distribution data only including those with incomes greater than zero. As women entered 
the paid labour force, their incomes jumped from zero to, usually, a value lying at the lower 
end o f the income distribution. As a consequence, although per capita incomes were rising, 
the proportion o f the assessable population at the lower end o f the income distribution will 
have increased.
It is not possible to test this directly, since no data are available for incomes broken down 
by both size o f incomes and gender. But because the female working population was 
young, some o f the effect of increased participation can be captured by omitting the 
incomes o f those under the age o f 21 from the calculations. In each year for which this is 
possible, the value of the Atkinson index is lower for those aged 21-69 than for the entire 
population. This is what would be expected, since those under 2 1  would be amongst the 
lower paid. But the index for the 21-69 year-olds fell between 1950 and 1957 for all values 
o f 8 , unlike the index for the entire population. This means that it was a feature of the 
incomes o f the under-2 1 s that prevented the index falling as the level of unemployment 
fell.
Most probably, then, this is a consequence of increased numbers of young women entering 
the labour force. These young women will have had low earnings, but previously would 
have earned nothing at all, thereby being omitted from the figures. It seems therefore, 
paradoxically, that the increasing inequality of income was actually a consequence o f 
increasing disposable income.
339 Van Loo (1992) pp. 115-116.
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5.3 Wage drift.
It might seem that any difficulty in calculating wage drift is to be found in establishing the 
rates o f pay that workers actually received. The allowable increases were published, and 
since increases over and above these were illegal, then it might be reasonable to assume 
that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish what was actually paid.
In fact, discovering what workers were actually paid is relatively easy. The CBS conducted 
an annual survey of industrial wages throughout the period under investigation, by asking a 
sample of employers to return declarations listing the wages and hours worked by their 
individual employees. The published results are categorised by industry, gender, age group 
and skill level. Because it was not possible to trace from these results how individual firms 
dealt with wage payments, this survey could not be used as the basis for an investigation 
into who was paying black wages. But it can be used to calculate the increases for workers 
as a whole, in specific industries, at specific skill levels, etc, by comparing the wages paid in 
successive years.
On the other hand, calculating what wages should have been had the regulations been 
followed is not so straightforward. Wage control was not a question o f increasing the 
wages of an individual worker by a decreed amount, although this is the impression one 
sometimes gets from the critics o f the system. It was considerably more flexible than this. 
Every CAO was different, which was why each one had to be individually approved by the 
Board o f Public Mediators. It was not immediately clear in a lot o f cases whether a CAO 
kept to the regulations or not, and it may not have even been clear to an individual firm 
whether or not they were paying black wages.
Firsdy, different groups o f workers had different CAOs applying to them. This is to be 
expected. For example, monthly-paid staff needed to be treated differendy from the 
weekly-paid. So, looking at the metal industry in 1950, we find that office staff have their 
own CAO340. Similarly, conditions varied across an industry, perhaps differing between 
large and small enterprises. So, again in the metal industry in 1950, different CAOs were 
agreed for manual workers in large workplaces341 and for those in small workplaces342. The 
specific wage rates were generally the same, but the CAO for small workplaces covered 
smithies.
340 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 29.
341 Ibid. p. 30.




1952 1) 54 46
1953 1) 50 50
1954 1) 48 52
1955 1) 46 54
1956 1) 47 53
1958 2 ) 58 42
1959 2 ) 45 55
Notes: 1) excludes building and construction 
2) excludes coal mining
Sources: Jaanijfer voor Nederland 1951-1952 table 349 
Jaanijfer voor Nederland 1953-1954 table 340 
Jaanijfer voor Nederland 1955-1956 table 340 
Jaanijfer voor Nederland 1957-1958 table 366 
Jaanijfer voor Nederland 1959-1960 table 372
Table 2 0 . P roportion o f  the industrial workforce (men and women) paid by time
and tariff wages, 1951-59.
CAOs did not all apply for the same period o f time. There were two situations in which a 
new CAO was agreed: when the old CAO expired and when an old CAO was amended343. 
Therefore it was not always the case that a new CAO was introduced at the same time as 
the new regulations. So, for example, when a general pay rise was awarded effective from 
1st January 1950, o f a maximum of five percent, plus a rise in the total wage bill o f two 
percent344, a large number o f industries introduced the rise immediately. But others did n o t 
The new CAO for hairdressers ran from the 16th January345, attendants in bicycle parks got 
their increase on the 1st February346, shop workers on the 1st March347, butchers on the 1st 
April348, workers in the printing ink industry on the 7th June349, and so on and so forth350.
Moreover, a CAO did not just specify one figure for the wage rate. For example, workers* 
earnings can vary with age351. This is, amongst other things, a consequence o f the way that 
a worker could move up the wage scale as he or she got older or gained more experience. 
Moreover, the worker could be paid according to a tariff, rather than a time rate. Tariff
343 Amendments also had to be approved by the Public Mediators.
344 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 15.
345 Ibid. p. 27.
346 Ibid. p. 32.
347 Ibid. p. 48.
348 Ibid. p. 142.
349 Ibid. p. 136.
350 This list is by no means exhaustive.
351 The implications o f this are dealt with in Chapter 6.
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Class of municipality: I II III IV
a b c d a b c d a b c d a b c d
Enterprises in which 
tariff,wagesatepaid 
skilled 89 94 96 119 87 92 94 115 84 89 91 111 81 86 88 107
semi-skilled 83 88 90 111 81 86 88 108 78 83 85 104 75 80 82 100
unskilled 76 80 83 101 74 78 81 98 71 75 77 94 69 73 75 89
Enterprises in which 
tariff wages are not pa d
skilled 99 105 96 102 91 98 88 94
semi-skilled 92 98 88 95 84 90 81 86
unskilled 84 90 81 87 78 84 75 80
Source: StatistUk derlonen (1950) p. 30.
For explanation, see text.
Table 2 1 . Basic wage rates, in cents, according to the CAO for large enterprises in 
the metal industry, effective from 1st January 1950.
wages refer to such methods o f payment as piece rates, an agreed price for a job, bonus 
systems, etc - the term is sometimes translated in Dutch official publications as “payment 
by results”. These systems were introduced as a means of improving productivity352 and 
formed the basis for payment o f an increasing proportion o f the industrial workforce 
during the 1950s, as can be seen from Table 20. Even time rates could vary within a CAO. 
For example, a range of basic hourly rates might be specified, and there could be additional 
rates for shift working. There could also be differences according to the classification of 
the municipality in which the enterprise found itself. As was noted earlier, smaller 
municipalities had lower costs o f living, and therefore wage rates were lower.
As an example o f this, consider the 1950 CAO for large enterprises in the metal industry. 
The hourly rates upon which wages were based are shown in Table 2 1 . The top line shows 
the class o f municipality in which each specific rate applied. There were, in fact, five 
classes, I being the largest and V the smallest, but no wage rate is given for class V in this 
instance353. Under each class o f municipality are four columns o f figures, in cents. Column 
a gives the personal minimum hourly wage (i.e. no worker may earn less than this), and 
column c gives the maximum average hourly wage (i.e. no enterprise may pay an average 
hourly wage greater than this). These two figures give the basis for wages in those 
enterprises where workers were paid by the hour. For enterprises where wages were paid 
according to a tariff, two other figures applied. Column b gives the minimum average 
hourly wage that could be paid, while column d gives the maximum average hourly
352 Windmuller (1969) p. 342.
353 Possibly the possession o f a large metalworking enterprise meant, by that fact alone, that the municipality 
was too large to be in class V.
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earnings. There are conditions attached to these figures. In enterprises where tariff wages 
were paid, the minimum average hourly wage, taken over six months, was to be ten percent 
higher than that reported, for all skill levels, which perhaps put some pressure to move to a 
tariff payment system. In enterprises where workers were paid by the hour, a maximum of 
twenty percent o f the skilled workforce could earn more than ten percent above the 
maximum average hourly wage, further increasing the pressure. Shift workers could earn 
more. Shift workers working 90 hours over two weeks were paid 104 hours’ wages, those 
working 92 hours were paid for 107 hours, 94 hours’ work was paid as 110 and 96 hours as 
113. In addition to all this, a guilder a week was to be taken out of the wages o f those aged 
18 and over as a pension contribution, and, finally, none o f this applied to workers paid 
according to a daily or weekly rate354.
From this, it can be seen that calculating whether a single enterprise was paying black 
wages or not could be an impossible task, since there were a large number o f legitimate 
reasons why wages should rise, in a single case, faster than the legal national average.
The CBS calculated a series of the growth o f regulation wages as part of its own study of 
wage drift. This is the series that will be used. It uses the basic time wages reported in 
CAOs, ignoring bonuses for piece work, shift working, etc, and takes these to create an 
index o f the regulation wages o f adult male industrial workers. The increase in the index 
number is used as a measure of the growth o f regulation wages.355.
By comparing the index o f regulation wages to an index o f earned wages o f adult male 
industrial workers, it was shown that wage drift was at its highest during periods o f full 
employment. Index numbers were used because it was recognised that not all the 
differences between regulation wages and earned wages were due to wage drift. Five 
reasons for differences were identified: they could be due to structural adjustments within 
an industry; they could be due to structural adjustments between industries; they could be 
due to wage rises for workers where wages fell outside the scope of wage control; they 
could be due to wage rises above the CAO; and they could be due to a difference between 
what the effect o f the CAO was calculated to be and its actual effect. The index o f earned 
wages was calculated to keep a fixed relationship between the number o f workers in a 
branch o f industry, between occupational categories, between the genders and between age 
cohorts, thus eliminating the first two problems, while the third, it was stated, was hardly 
ever o f significance in industry. Differences in the index numbers of earned and regulation
354 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 30.








1950-51 6.6% 5.7% 0.9% 2.26%
1951-52 3.0% 2.3% 0.7% 3.48%
1952-53 2.3% 0.9% 1.4% 2.45%
1953-54 15.9% 15.0% 0.9% 1.62%
1954-55 3.2% 0.7% 2.5% 1.00%
1955-56 8.9% 5.6% 3.3% 0.71%
1956-57 11.2% 9.9% 1.3% 0.96%
1957-58 0.5% 3.6% -3.1% 2.01%
1958-59 3.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.41%
1959-60 9.6% 6.9% 2.7% 0.81%
Notes: 1) Percentage increases in earnings are from October to October.
2) The figures for both earnings and regulation wages exclude holiday bonuses and other
special payments.
3) The unemployment rate is that for the second calendar year o f the period - i.e.
for the period 1950-51, the rate for 1951 is given , for 1951-52 the rate for 1952, etc.
4) The unemployment rate is calculated as the number o f registered unemeployed (male and
female) expressed as a percentage of the total number of jobs plus registered 
unemployed.
Sources: CBS (1975) appendix 1.
CBS (1994) pp. 48-49.
Table 2 2 . Differences in the growth o f  regulation wages and earned wages o f  adult
male industrial workers.
wages must therefore have been entirely due to the last two factors356. The differences are 
shown in Table 2 2  along with an estimate o f the unemployment rate (an estimate because 
no official figures for the unemployment rate are published for any year before 1970). The 
largest gap between earnings growth and the growth o f regulation wages are to be found in 
1954-55,1955-56 and 1959-60 - years o f falling unemployment - while the gap closes in the 
recession year o f 1957-58, when unemployment rose357.
This result is not unexpected, but it provides no basis on which to investigate further. It 
gives no indication of where these increases came from, it gives no indication o f how 
important these increases were - particularly since they represent nominal, not real, wage 
drift - and it gives no indication of what impact they had on real incomes.
5.4 Wage growth and the growth o f national income.
Wage drift is important in this context only if it meant that wage earners received higher 
earnings than they would have done in the absence o f full employment. As has earlier been
356 Ibid. p. 7.
357 The pattern o f unemployment over the period is discussed in more details in section 4.2 above.
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noted, the state o f the labour market was taken into account in the recommendations o f 
the Social-Economic Council, while discussions within the Foundation o f Labour also 
played a part in setting the wage norm. Regulation wages were not, therefore, an accurate 
reflection o f the labour market.
An alternative method o f measuring the effects o f full employment is to compare the 
growth of wages per worker and per capita national income. The assumption here is that, 
in the absence o f other factors, then these two figures will keep in step. One o f the factors 
that will affect this relationship is, o f course, the proportion o f the population that is 
economically active. A better measure would be national income per economically active 
individual, but it is not possible to calculate this figure from year to year. Inhabitants of the 
Netherlands have to register at their local town hall, but do not have to declare whether or 
not they are involved in any economic activity. Within certain limits358, therefore, the total 
population o f the Netherlands is known from year to year, but not the economically active 
population. But comparing the growth o f wages per worker with per capita national 
income does get around the main problem with such figures as labour’s share of national 
income, which is that it changes with the proportional size o f the labour force.
Accepting the problems with such a comparison, it is possible to test whether wages rose 
faster than other sources o f income in years when unemployment was lowest In this 
context “wages” means the price o f labour, and this should properly mean wage rates 
actually offered. As we have seen, there is a considerable problem in determining a single 
figure for the regulation wage rate, let alone what the rate was in practice. Hourly wages 
paid are therefore used as a proxy. As with the CBS study, in order to minimise the effect 
of structural changes, the figures for wages are be those o f male industrial workers aged 
over 25 (rather than adults) and they are also separated out by skill level.
The figures for hourly wages are obtained from the annual wages surveys, conducted in the 
autumn of each year throughout the period. The majority of the data came from 
questionnaires submitted to employers. Enterprises employing fewer than ten employees 
were excluded, as with the Algemene industriestatistiek, but, unlike the Algemene 
industriestatistiek, the surveys were not compulsory, depending on the cooperation of 
employers359. They covered about three-quarters of the number o f workers covered by the 
Algemene industriestatistiek360. The surveys asked for data concerning the wages paid in one
358 E.g. illegal immigrants might choose not to register.
359 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 71.
360 Statistiek derlonen (1951) p. 41.
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■ 14.00%
EZ2ZI Semi-4 killed workers 
O  Unskilled workers 
 Regulation wage
Sources: Statistiek der lonen
Statistiek der lonen in de nyverbeid 
CBS (1975) p. 31
Jaarajfers voor Nederland 1959-1960 table 328
Figure 8. Annual rates o f  hourly earnings o f  male industrial workers aged 25 and 
over, com pared with per capita national incom e at m arket prices.
week in September or October361 (later, changed to a week in October362). The employer 
was allowed to determine in which week the survey was taken, with the proviso that the 
week in question could not include holidays or free days. These surveys reported the wages 
actually paid, and they covered manual workers only363. The questionnaire asked for data on 
the individual wages o f each worker, and these data were summarised by the CBS.
The employer had to fill in name or clock number of each worker, his or her occupation or 
job, age, number o f hours worked in the week o f the survey, the complete wage earned, 
and whether or not the worker was on shift work. The figure for the complete wage was to 
include the basic wage, bonuses, shift allowances, overtime payments and the like. The data 
for men and women were entered on different sheets364. The surveys were supplemented 
by data from the wage bureaux o f the employers’ organisations365.
The data are reported summarised by skill level: skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. The skill 
levels are those reported in the surveys. A skilled worker was defined as one who has 
received a trade education, at school, or in the factory or workplace, a semi-skilled worker 
as a routine worker with a simple knowledge o f the trade, and an unskilled worker as one in
361 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 74.
362 Statistiek derlonen in de nijverheid Oktober 1956 p. 6.
363 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 74.
364 For an example o f  the questionnaire, see Statistiek derlonen in de nijverheid Oktober 1956 pp. 61-62.
365 Statistiek der lonen (1954) p. 35.
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Figure 9. Cumulative grow th o f  hourly earnings o f  male industrial workers aged 25 
and over, compared with per capita income at m arket prices.
an occupation where no knowledge of the trade was required366. The annual increase in the 
average wages o f each o f these, compared to the growth of per capita national income is 
shown in Figure 8 . The horizontal line at y = 0.00% represents the annual increase in per 
capita national income. The vertical bars represent the annual growth o f hourly earnings o f 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled male industrial workers, expressed as the difference 
between the actual growth and the growth o f per capita national income. Where the vertical 
bars hang down from the x-axis, houdy earnings grew by less than per capita national 
income, and where they project upwards the hourly earnings grew by more. For reference, 
the annual growth o f the regulation wage, as calculated by the CBS, less the growth in per 
capita national income is also shown. This is represented by the horizontal bars, and its 
path is shown by the line joining them.
In general, while full employment seems to have caused wages to rise, wage control seems 
to have created some downward pressure. It appears from Figure 8  that wages followed 
wage control, at least until 1955. In 1952-53, there was rising demand for labour, but wage 
rises kept below the growth in per capita national income. In 1954-55, demand for labour 
was higher than its supply, but wages growth was well below the growth in per capita 
national income. It should be noted in this context that there was no general rise in
366 Statistiek derlonen (1950) pp. 74-81.
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regulation wages in 1955, despite rises in the price o f milk and in rents367. The picture in the 
first half o f the 1950s, then, was as painted by Pen: black wages existed, but were kept 
under control368. However, this picture begins to break down as unemployment fell to 
unprecedentedly low levels in 1955-56 - although it should be noted that, since the figures 
make no distinction by industry, some o f this apparent wage drift may be due to increasing 
employment in higher-wage industries. But it should also be noted that the apparent wage 
drift becomes negative in the context o f rising unemployment in 1957-58, suggesting that a 
low level o f unemployment had had an effect in the previous two years369.
Taking the decade as a whole, wages did not grow as fast as per capita national income. 
Figure 9 shows the cumulative growth o f hourly wages since 1948, less the cumulative 
growth o f per capita national income, together with the equivalent figure for regulation 
wages. At the beginning of the period, wage control seems to have helped to hold down 
wages, but the gap began to widen from 1952, and sharply widened in 1955-56. However, 
despite the fact that earned wages grew faster than regulation wages, the overall gap 
between the cumulative growth o f earned wages and the cumulative growth o f per capita 
national income had become extremely large by 1960.
5.5 Wages growth by industry.
Full employment will not have had the same effect on wage levels in each industry. Two 
mechanisms for this are proposed here. One is the straightforward effect o f supply and 
demand on prices: when demand for labour was greater than supply, it pushed up its price. 
This mechanism forms part o f the argument o f those who conclude that wage control had 
little or no effect. The other mechanism is the one proposed by Myrdal: the increased 
demand for labour strengthened the bargaining position of trade unions and enabled them 
to extract greater rises than would have been the case had demand for labour been less. 
Each o f these mechanisms would have had different effects on different industries, since 
the demand for labour was different in different industries, as was the influence o f the 
trade unions.
What is important here is the relative movement o f wage rates. To look at the relative 
effects, by industry, o f trade unionism or o f the demand for labour, it is necessary to see
367 Windmuller, et */(1987) p. 182.
368 J. Pen, “Loonpolitiek onmacht?”, Hollands maandblad December 1964, cited in Windmuller (1969) p. 317.
369 It should also be noted that Brander et al found that this was the period was wage control was most 
effective.
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how wage levels in different industries moved in relation to one another. The assumption is 
being made, o f course, that wage rates will move together in the absence o f any differential 
disturbance. In order to test for these effects, first the actual relative movements of wage 
rates are established, then these movements are compared to differences in trade union 
influence and in demand for labour by industry. The use o f relative wage rates also means 
that, although the original data represent nominal wage rates, the results hold true for real 
wages.
The relative movement used is that o f the hourly wages o f male workers aged 25 and over, 
broken down by skill, taken from the annual surveys used above. Any overall figure would 
be affected by the changing gender, age and skill composition of the workforce. In fact, 
more accurate results would be obtained if the data could be broken down further by age, 
but these are not published. There is also a good argument for analysing the figures at a 
lower level than that o f industry. There are wide variations in wages in different branches 
o f each industry, and the changing relative size of these will obviously affect the results. 
However, although figures for hourly wages are available at lower levels, there are few clear 
runs for these across the period. Industry is the lowest level for which a consistent picture 
can be drawn.
The wage rates were converted into index numbers before being compared. A separate set 
was created for each skill level. The mean hourly wages for male workers in manufacturing 
at each skill level in each year was set to 1 0 0 . The index number for a particular industry in 
any given year therefore shows the value o f hourly wages paid at that skill level relative to 
the mean paid in manufacturing in that year. The relative hourly wages of skilled workers 
are shown in Table 23, those o f semi-skilled workers in Table 24 and those o f unskilled 
workers in Table 25.
There are some problems with the data as reported by the CBS, which have to be taken 
into account when interpreting the results. There seem to be sampling problems with the 
wages o f skilled workers in the leather and rubber industries in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. No data was reported at all in this category in 1949, while wages for these workers 
appear to have risen well above average in 1950-51 and well below average in 1951-52. 
While this is o f course possible, the 1951 CAO for the shoe industry - the only one o f 
these industries reporting the wages of skilled workers - gave exactly the same wage rates to 
men as the 1950 CAO370. The number in the sample is rather low in the earlier years. It
370 Statistiek derlonen (1950) p. 139, Statistiek derlonen (1951) p. 30.
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1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1251 1254 1252 I960
Pottery, glass, etc 100 100 98 97 93 92 91 92 93 90 92 93 95
Printing and publishing 104 103 103 101 101 100 97 105 101 103 104 106 105
Building and construction 90 91 91 93 94 98 97 97 98 100 102 99 100
Chemical industries 103 98 100 99 101 103 106 104 107 105 108 106 108
Wood, cork, straw goods 94 87 93 93 91 90 90 92 91 93 95 93 95
Clothing and cleaning 115 119 118 116 106 103 102 103 102 103 102 99 102
Leather and rubber 107 #N/A 91 105 97 96 97 99 99 98 97 100 98
Metal industries 105 104 104 104 105 103 104 102 102 100 98 100 99
Paper industry 96 96 101 99 97 97 101 100 100 100 102 100 105
Textiles 98 100 104 102 101 100 101 99 100 98 101 99 101
Food processing 97 97 95 93 95 95 96 98 97 98 97 98 100
Manufacturing as a whole= 100
Sources: Statistiek der lonen
Statistiek der tontn in de mperbeid
Table 23. Relative hourly wages o f  skilled male workers aged 25 and over.
increases from an unlikely zero in 1949371, to 37 in 1950, to 75 in 1951 to 393 in 1952, and 
it then fluctuates around the 500 mark for the rest o f the decade. The relationship between 
skilled wages in leather and rubber and the overall average remains more or less stable from 
1952, while there is no similar recorded rise for semi-skilled and unskilled leather and 
rubber workers at the beginning o f the 1950s. The numbers o f these latter groups in the 
sample remain more or less constant for the whole o f the period. It would seem therefore 
that the relative movements o f the wage rates o f skilled shoe workers are a consequence of 
the low numbers in the sample in the early years. But, since the leather and rubber 
industries employ so few workers overall, the skilled workforce in the industry can be 
ignored for all practical purposes.
There also exists the mystery o f the declining relative wages o f skilled workers in clothing. 
These fell from about 1 2 0 % of the average skilled wage to just over a hundred percent. 
This fall was driven by the wages of skilled workers in the ready-made clothing industry, 
who form about 60% o f the sample in the sector. Their wages fell from over 140% of the 
average to 105%. This could be a sampling error, but this is less likely than in the case of 
the shoe industry, since the numbers are larger. There were fewer than 2 0 0  skilled workers
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Pottery, glass, etc 101 97 97 97 97 96 96 98 98 98 97 97 99
Printing and publishing 102 100 100 100 99 99 99 103 100 103 104 108 105
Building and construction 94 91 90 93 94 99 96 96 96 97 99 97 97
Chemical industries 103 103 103 104 103 105 107 105 105 105 105 104 105
Wood, cork, straw goods 98 96 95 94 93 94 95 96 96 96 95 96 98
Clothing and cleaning 98 96 97 95 92 93 92 94 95 95 97 96 97
Leather and rubber 99 96 96 95 94 93 94 96 97 97 97 98 97
Metal industries 107 105 104 105 106 104 103 102 101 101 101 103 100
Paper industry 91 94 95 93 94 94 96 98 98 98 99 99 102
Textiles 106 105 106 105 104 105 106 104 105 105 104 102 103
Food processing 87 96 96 95 96 96 98 100 100 100 101 99 101
Manufacturing as a whole = 100
Sources: Statistiek derlontn
Statistiek der lonen in de nijverbeid
Table 24. Relative hourly wages o f  semi-skilled male workers aged 25 and over.
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1248 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Potteiy, gloss, etc 101 98 99 100 100 99 97 101 98 100 98 98 97
Printing and publishing 98 99 102 103 100 99 100 104 98 101 102 105 100
Building and construction 96 95 97 97 94 99 97 96 98 94 95 95 94
Chemical industries 104 104 105 104 104 105 106 103 104 104 105 103 104
Wood, cork, straw goods 92 95 93 94 94 95 95 97 97 97 98 95 95
Clothing and cleaning 97 98 96 97 96 98 97 99 100 100 100 99 99
Leather and rubber 95 94 94 93 92 93 92 96 95 95 98 98 96
Metal industries 103 103 101 102 103 101 101 99 100 99 99 102 98
Paper industry 98 96 97 96 98 97 105 102 102 102 103 102 103
Textiles 104 103 104 103 103 101 101 101 101 100 101 98 98
Food processing 99 99 99 97 99 100 100 101 101 102 102 101 103
Manufacturing as a whole = 100
Sources: Statistiek der lonen
Statistiek der lonen in de nijverbeid
Table 25. Relative hourly wages o f  unskilled male workers aged 25 and over.
in the sample o f workers in ready-made clothing in 1948 and 1949, but this number 
increased to over 300 in 1950 and 1951, and remained between 450 and 600 for the rest o f 
the decade. Furthermore, the relative wage changes gradually over time, rather than 
jumping suddenly from year to year. The most likely explanation would seem to be a 
change in the composition o f the skilled workforce in the ready-made clothing industry, 
but this could only be checked by a closer study of the development o f this industry in the 
post-war period. Again, the numbers employed in this industry are not large enough to 
affect the overall picture.
Skilled wages in printing and publishing also follow a slightly unexpected path. In 1954, 
they fell suddenly from about 3% above the overall average skilled rate to just below it. 
This is probably connected with the timing o f the 1954 CAO for printworkers, which was 
effective from l $t October o f that year. If the survey was conducted during September in a 
number, if not all, printing firms, then it would not have caught the effect o f the rise. A 
similar, though less obvious effect can be seen with semi-skilled wages, while unskilled 
wages were more volatile throughout the period.
Definite patterns can be seen in the relative wage levels. These levels are not static. Static 
levels would mean that the index numbers remained constant over time, as the average 
wage in each industry remained a constant proportion o f the average wage. An increase in 
the index number for a particular industry means that wages in that industry were 
increasing faster than average wages, a decrease means that they were increasing at a slower 
rate.
There are identifiable industries where pay is consistently low. For most o f the period, 
skilled workers employed in the manufacture o f pottery, glass and the suchlike, and in the 
manufacture o f wooden, cork and straw goods were paid at a noticeably lower rate than
371 The wage index for this year is represented in the tables as “not available” (#N /A ).
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other skilled workers. The same was true for semi-skilled workers in these industries. Semi­
skilled wages in leather and rubber were also lower than average in every year, except 1948, 
as were semi-skilled wages in clothing and cleaning, which declined in a pattern similar to 
those o f skilled workers in this industry. Amongst the unskilled, only workers in wooden 
and cork goods, and in leather and rubber were consistendy paid below average, while 
pottery and glass workers saw their relative wage rates decline, and those in clothing and 
cleaning saw them rise to the average.
There are other industries where wage rates rose from below average. Wage rates in the 
paper industry at all skill levels rose from below average to above average, while skilled and 
semi-skilled rates in food processing rose from below to around average.
Some industries, although not necessarily the expected ones, saw their wage rates decline, 
relative to other industries. The metal and textile industries were both relatively high-paying 
at the beginning of the period and generally paid at rates around the average at the end. 
The exception here is the rate for semi-skilled workers in textiles, which declined but was 
still above average in 1960.
There are consistently high-paying industries. Semi-skilled and unskilled workers in 
chemicals were paid well above the average throughout, as were skilled chemical workers 
from 1952. Skilled and semi-skilled workers in printing were consistently paid at high rates, 
although the rates for unskilled workers were more variable. However, numerically, 
printing was dominated by skilled labour, which comprised around three-quarters o f the 
sample in the mid-1950s.
There are two possible ways o f measuring the influence o f trade unions. It is possible to 
measure it as the proportion o f those employed in each industry who are members o f trade 
unions. The possible objection to this is that workers can be members o f trade unions 
without being represented in wage negotiations. Membership o f a trade union does not of 
itself guarantee an effect on a worker’s wages, although it may be that trade union 
membership is larger in those industries where wages are covered by trade union negotiated 
agreements. The consequence o f this is there could be appear to be a loose, or no, 
correlation between the influence o f trade unions and higher wage rates, when there is in 
fact a strong one.
Following this line of argument, a better measure o f the relative strength o f the trade 
unions is the proportion o f workers in an industry covered by trade union negotiated wage 
agreements. Both measures are used, taken from Jaarcijfers voor Nederland. Figures for the 
Communist-led EVC and the syndicalist-influenced OVB are omitted from the published
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1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 125& 1959 1960
Manufacture of earthenware, glass, etc 78 78 78 85 80 83 85 84 84
Print and publishing, and paper industries 174 170 169 171 172 164 158 160 163
Chemicals 94 96 92 95 96 96 89 89 91
M’facture of wooden, cork and straw goods 125 127 124 121 123 120 125 123 121
Clothing and cleaning, textiles 61 55 55 56 57 58 59 59 59
Leather, oilcloth and rubber industries 69 60 67 65 66 70 71 68 59
Metal industries 115 120 118 115 113 114 113 114 113
Food processing 106 112 112 114 114 115 112 113 114
Manufacturing as a whole = 100
Sources: Omvang der vakbewegng in Nederland
Algemene industriestatistiek
Table 26: Relative sizes o f  trade union membership by industry, in manufacturing,
1952-60.
data after 1950, but neither was large enough after this date to influence that story. The 
figures on employment are those published in the Algemene industriestatistiek. Since these are 
quarterly data, the first quarter figures are used to match the trade union figures, which 
refer to the 1st January o f each year. There is a problem in that the Algemene industriestatistiek 
covered only those enterprises employing ten or more workers, while the trade union 
figures include everyone. The proportion o f the workforce in each industry who are trade 
union members or who are covered by GAOs can therefore exceed 100%. However, the 
important point is this discussion is the relative size o f each percentage. Industries are not 
categorised in the same way in the two series, but the Algemene industriestatistiek can be 
summed up at the same level as the trade union figures.
There are two possible ways in which trade unions could have influenced the wage 
structure. It could have been that the industries where trade unions had the most influence 
were the high-wage ones, or it could have been that the industries where the trade unions 
had the most influence were the ones in which workers received higher wage increases than 
average. Again, there are difficulties in making direct comparisons. The industries into 
which the trade union data are divided are not the same as those in the wage surveys. Trade 
union figures are quoted for the diamond industry, for example, but it is not clear under 
which heading this is included in the wage surveys, and there are so few workers in the 
diamond industry that they may not have been surveyed at all. Trade union figures for the 
textile industry are included with those for clothing and cleaning, and the paper industry is 
lumped together with printing and publishing. Nor are the trade union data broken down 
by gender, which may cause some distortions in the comparisons.
A chi-squared test was used to check if the distribution o f industries paying high wages 
were associated with high levels o f trade union membership. A high wage industry in a 
particular year is defined as one that paid, for a particular skill, an hourly wage that was 
greater than the manufacturing mean - in other words, its index number for that year in the
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tables above is greater than 100. An industry with a high level of trade union membership 
is defined as one in which the proportion o f trade union members was higher than that for 
manufacturing as a whole. The levels of trade union membership by industry are shown in
Table 26. Once again, a high level means that its index number is greater than 100.
the trade union data are categorised in a slightly different manner to the wage data, the 
wage data were recalculated. The diamond industry, with fewer than a thousand workers, 
was simply omitted. Additionally, because the data published in the Algemene 
industriestatistiek was obtained on a slightly different basis from 1952 onwards - and the 
Algemene industriestatistiek was used to calculate the proportion o f trade union members in an 
industry - the test was carried out using the years 1952-60 only. In order to calculate the %2 
statistic, a combined attribute table was created - in each of the years 1952-60, each 
industry was coded as high wage/highly unionised, low wage/ highly unionised, etc. Since 
the trade union data are not broken down by skill level, the index number for trade union 
membership for the entire industry was matched against each skill level in turn. The total 
number o f occurrences o f each combined attribute was then counted, and matched against 
the number that would be expected if they were randomly distributed. To do this, the 
numbers were simply put into a table o f two rows (high wage level and low wage level) and 
two columns (high trade union membership and low trade union membership), giving a set 
o f four cells. The probability P- that any industry in any one year was counted in cell (ij) - 
where i is the row and j is the column, and each can have the value “high” or “low” - is
The null hypothesis is that no relationship exists between these two distributions. Because
given by
where
n = the number of observations in the total sample 
n; = the number of observations in row i 
nj = the number o f observations in column j
In order to calculate the expected value in cell (ij) if the distribution is random (E;j), we 
multiply this by the sample size
n ; x n ;
n
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What we are interested in is the difference between the expected value in the cell and the 
actual, observed, value (0 ;j). The test statistic (x2) is given by
x 2 = I E
i - l H
(Oij-E,)2
where
r = the number of rows
c = the number o f columns
High levels o f trade union membership and high wage levels do not appear to have gone 
together. The %2 statistic for the observed combinations o f the two for the years 1952-60 is 
precisely zero, which means that the distribution is completely random. The %2 statistics for 
1952-59 and 1953-60 are reassuringly approximate, above zero but close to i t  Here too, the 
null hypothesis o f no association cannot be rejected.
Similarly, there seems to be no association between high levels of trade union membership 
and high wage growth. The same test was repeated, but this time with high wages defined 
as the mean hourly wage in an industry rising by a higher percentage in the course o f a year 
than did the mean hourly wage in manufacturing as a whole. The results here showed that, 
here too, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Measuring the effect on wage rates o f the number o f workers covered by trade union 
agreements is more difficult because o f the shortage o f data. It is not possible to use a chi- 
squared test in this case because there are too few observations, with numbers only being 
available for 1951, 1954 and 1956. Instead Spearman rank correlation was used. This tests 
if the rankings o f two sets o f observations, X and Y, are related. The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient (r^ is calculated by
i , = l - i= l
where
n = the number o f observations in each o f the samples 
R(Xj) = the ranking o f the i* observation in set X 
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Table 27: Rank correlation o f  trade union coverage and wage levels.
In order to calculate this, industries were ranked according to the proportion o f their 
workforce covered by trade union agreements. This was calculated from the number of 
workers in each industry covered, expressed as a percentage o f the number o f male manual 
workers in the industry reported in the Algemene industriestatistiek. Industries were also 
ranked by the level and growth o f mean hourly wages, and, as previously, the mean wages 
paid to workers at each skill level were kept separate. The null hypothesis here is that the 
ranking of trade union coverage and the ranking of wages are independent
Most o f the possible tests were ruled out because Spearman rank correlation is unreliable 
when the data contain equal rankings. Almost all the wage data does. There are equal 
rankings at all skill levels in the data on wages growth, and in the data for semi-skilled and 
unskilled wage levels. Equal ranking also occurs in the CAO coverage for 1951 and 1956, 
but leaving these out o f the tests would have confined the investigation to just one year. 
The tests were, however, confined to the correlation of the ranking of trade union coverage 
with the ranking o f skilled wage levels, and are shown in Table 27. In all three years, the 
null hypothesis o f independence cannot be rejected.
The hypothesis that the level of CAO coverage had an effect on wage levels cannot, 
however, be simply dismissed. There are obvious outliers in each of the years that 
significantly affect the results. In the data for 1951, the outlier is the leather and rubber 
industry. We have already noted above that the figure for skilled wages in this industry at 
the beginning o f the 1950s is suspect. It was well above average in 1951 and well below 
average in 1952, and this was put down to there being too small a sample in these years. 
Omitting this industry from the rank correlation dramatically transforms the coefficient. 
There is then less than a 2.5 percent chance that the rankings are independent, and we can 
reject the null hypothesis.
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In the data for 1954 and 1956, the outliers are chemicals and the manufacture o f wooden, 
cork and straw goods. Chemicals paid high wages, but had a low rate o f CAO coverage, 
while the manufacture o f wooden, cork and straw goods paid low wages but had a high 
proportion o f its workforce covered by CAOs. Once again, removing these from the 
calculation transforms the coefficient. Without these industries, there is only a one percent 
chance that the rankings are independent, and we can reject the null hypothesis.
There are reasons, again, for supposing that these two industries were different from the 
others. Chemicals was a relatively low-wage industry in 1951 - at least for skilled workers, 
whose hourly wage ranked seventh in Table 27. As we saw in Chapter 4, it was one of the 
industries in which the workforce grew by the most over the period, but we also saw, in 
Table 13, that its workforce was older in 1960 than that o f the other new industries. Its 
different age structure suggests the possibility that its workforce might have been also 
different in some other way, which also affected its wage rates.
The manufacture o f wooden, cork and straw goods was different again. Only a small 
proportion o f its workforce was covered by CAOs in 1951, so its low wages may have been 
a hangover from an earlier period. In fact, the wages o f skilled workers in this industry did 
not, in general, rise more than the mean for manufacturing as a whole. The wages o f semi­
skilled workers, on the other hand, rose by more than the manufacturing average in every 
year from 1953 onwards to the end of the period. The story here may well, therefore, have 
been different to that o f other industries.
All this suggests that trade union coverage may have had an effect on wages - at least, those 
of skilled workers, since the ranking o f the other skills were not the same - but that this 
effect may have been o f secondary importance. It was only apparent when it was not 
overridden by other factors.
Measurement o f the effect o f the demand for labour on wage rates is also problematic. The 
problem here is not that data do not exist, but rather that it is not clear what data should be 
used as a proxy for demand. Demand for labour cannot be measured direcdy. It is only 
possible to measure it indirecdy, by the effect that it has. Two proxies are used here: 
increased employment and registered demand from employers. There are problems with 
each of these, but they are complementary. Increased employment is, o f course, the 
consequence o f increased demand for labour, but only measures satisfied demand. 
Demand that is not satisfied, by definition, will not result in an increase in employment. On 
the other hand, registered demand from employers might not fully reflect demand. There 
might be other sources than labour bureaux, perhaps more efficient, where employers
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1252 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Manufacture o f  earthenware, glass, etc 94 100 98 99 101 96 98 101 97
Printing and publishing 103 99 101 101 113 102 106 100 100
Chemical industries 98 101 104 100 101 102 104 100 101
MTacture o f  wooden, cork, straw goods 94 100 100 99 95 100 97 101 101
Clothing and cleaning 100 98 98 100 98 109 101 100 99
Leather, oilcloth and rubber industries 106 101 100 101 100 99 99 103 98
Metal industries 102 99 102 102 102 99 97 100 101
Paper industry 94 104 100 102 86 104 104 101 101
Textile ind Manufacturing as a whole 97 104 98 96 98 101 97 99 99
Foodstuffs 102 98 96 98 97 102 107 98 99
Share o f each industry in the previous year's manufacturing workforce = 100
Source: Algemene industriestatistiek
Table 28: The changing share o f  each industry in male manufacturing employment,
1952-60.
could seek for labour. However, the difference between demand and those registered as 
seeking work gives an idea o f unsatisfied demand. If  demand for labour had a significant 
effect on wage rates then this will have two consequences. Wage rates in industries whose 
share o f total employment has increased would be expected to have increased greater than 
the average, and vice versa. Higher wage growth than average would also be expected for 
those industries where there was high registered demand for labour compared to the 
number registered as seeking work.
Once again, chi-squared tests are used, this time to compare the distribution o f a high 
demand for labour with that of high wages. A high demand for labour is defined in two 
ways: high growth and a a higher demand for labour than average. High growth is when an 
industry’s share o f the male manual workforce increased over the period o f a year - i.e. 
when its male manual workforce grew at a faster rate than the manual workforce in 
manufacturing as a whole. A higher demand for labour than average is when the ratio o f 
the employers’ registered demand for male labour to the registered labour reserve for an 
industry, in a specific year, is higher than for manufacturing as a whole. High wages are 
defined in the two ways used previously, and the null hypothesis is that high wages are 
independent o f a high demand for labour.
A higher demand for labour than average - at least as measure by registered supply and 
demand - was not associated with high wage industries. The null hypothesis of 
independence from higher than average employers’ demand cannot be rejected for either 
definition o f high wages. This seems surprising, and may be because the registered figures 
did not reflect the true state of affairs. Where an industry was able to rely on informal 
networks to spread news o f job vacancies, for example, then its registered demand for 
labour may well understate its actual demand.
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Skilled Semi-skilled I Jnskilled
Pottery, glass, etc 17.17% 19.87% 18.03%
Printing and publishing 27.71% 29.26% 22.62%
Chemical industries 30.48% 21.88% 17.45%
Wood, cork, straw goods 23.07% 21.02% 20.78%
Clothing and cleaning 2.90% 19.00% 22.86%
Leather and rubber 36.52% 22.93% 23.87%
Metal industries 19.22% 18.44% 19.86%
Paper industry 22.60% 25.41% 25.42%
Textiles 18.03% 16.14% 12.95%
Food processing 27.50% 24.45% 22.10%
Manufacturing 23.56% 20.41% 19.04%
Sources: Statistiek der lonen
Statistiek der lonen in de nijverbeid
Jaarcijfers voorNederland, 1960-1961, table 335.
Table 29. Increase in the real wage rates o f  male industrial workers aged 25 and
over, 1950-59.
In contrast, higher than average employment growth does appear to be associated with 
those industries that paid high wages. Employment growth is measured using the figures 
for male manual workers from the Algemene industriestatistiek. Third quarter data is used in 
order to match the time that the wage surveys were taken, and this is converted into an 
index. The value o f the index is calculated such that an industry’s share o f the 
manufacturing workforce in the previous year is 100. This means that if the index number 
for an industry in a particular year is greater than 1 0 0 , that industry’s share o f the 
manufacturing workforce grew in that year. Table 28 shows the share of the manufacturing 
workforce each industry had changed each year. The null hypothesis o f independence 
between this share growing in any year and the industry paying high wages can be rejected 
for both definitions of high wages - at the 99.5% level for hourly wages being above 
average for manufacturing and at the 97.5% level for hourly wage growth being higher than 
the average for manufacturing. In other words, the probability is that they were associated.
But rising wage rates can account for only around two-thirds o f the rise in male incomes. 
Table 29 shows the real rise in men’s hourly wages between 1950 and 1959 - two years for 
which there are also data on men’s incomes.
The first thing that is noticeable about the data in this table is that there seems to be no 
evidence here o f the effect o f differences between industries in the demand for labour. For 
example, the workforce in chemicals grew by more than the average rate, and here the 
wage rate for skilled workers rose by nearly seven percentage points more than the mean 
for manufacturing as a whole. On the other hand, the size of the workforce in the metal
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industries also rose by more than average, but skilled wage rates rose by less. In food 
processing, the share o f the manufacturing workforce fell, but skilled wage rates rose by 
more than average372.
It is not clear, therefore, how much o f the total rise in wage rates was due to the low level 
o f unemployment. However, in the - extremely unlikely - event that all o f this can be put 
down to the effect o f full employment, it would still leave a third of the rise in real incomes 
unexplained. The rise in wage rates shown in Table 29 is around twenty percent The real 
increase in men’s incomes over the same period was thirty-one percent373, which means 
that the effect o f rising wage rates only accounts for about half the rise in incomes. Since it 
is likely that factors other than full employment were involved in the rise in wage rates, full 
employment must therefore account for less than half the rise in income.
5.6 Conclusion.
It can be concluded, then, that full employment had some effect on wage rates. These 
effects can be seen in the distribution o f income, although they do not seem to be major, 
and wage drift was noted in years o f low unemployment Industries whose workforces 
grew by more than average - implying their demand for labour grew by more than average - 
were the high wage ones. It may be, too, that trade unions had an effect. If we accept the 
argument that the figure for skilled wage rates in leather and rubber in 1951 is suspect, and 
we accept that chemicals and the manufacture o f wooden, cork and straw goods were in 
some ways different to other industries in the mid-1950s, then we can see some effect of 
trade union coverage on the variation in wage rates. But these effects were, at best, 
secondary, only apparent when other factors were absent. In any case, the growth in wage 
rates was not enough to account for the rise in incomes. This is not to say that the rise in 
hourly wages was not substantial, but it was nonetheless only around two-thirds of the 
mean rise in incomes.
But these results are consistent with the argument that structural changes to the workforce 
caused incomes to rise. We have seen that the industries in which the workforce grew by 
more than average were also the ones which paid higher wages than average. Looked at in 
another way, it means that there was a net shift in male labour to the higher-wage
372 The rise in skilled wage rates for clothing and for leather working should be ignored, since there are
reasons to doubt the reported figures for 1950. Data from other years in the 1950s suggests that the growth 
in skilled wage rates over the decade, as with the semi-skilled and unskilled wage rates, was close to the mean 
for manufacturing.
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industries. The next chapter therefore investigates whether this net movement was 
substantial enough to account for the rise in income.
373 See Table 44, below.
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Chapter 6. Structural Change and Income 
Growth.
This chapter looks at the effect on incomes o f structural changes in the workforce. The 
focus here, once again, is on the male workforce, but constraints on data mean that 
sometimes the whole workforce - both male and female - is considered. The chapter begins 
by looking at changes in the male workforce as a single entity. In Chapter 4, three net 
movements o f labour affecting the sectoral structure were identified: the movement of 
labour out o f agriculture, the movement o f labour into manufacturing and the, smaller and 
later, movement o f labour into services. Shift-share analysis is used to attempt to calculate 
the effect o f these movements on incomes. From the interpretation of the results, it is 
concluded that a distinction must be made in investigating the two different ways that the 
sectoral structure o f the workforce changed. On the one hand, employment in 
manufacturing grew because manufacturing recruited a disproportionately large percentage 
o f those who entered the labour force for the first time, and, on the other, it grew by 
recruiting workers from other sectors. New entrants to the workforce are identified in this 
chapter as the younger workforce and those already in work are identified as the older 
workforce.
Most of the chapter is concerned with analysing these structural changes by age. The first 
o f the sections dealing with this looks at the effect age has on earnings, and it is followed 
by a section describing the changes in the age structure o f the Dutch workforce. The 
effects on income o f changes in the younger and older workforces are then investigated 
separately. The chapter demonstrates that the income o f the younger workforce increased 
faster than that o f the older workforce, and that this increase was linked with the increasing 
proportion o f the workforce in manufacturing. It also finds that sizeable increases in 
income were to be had by older workers who changed jobs, but that this concerned only a 
minority o f them.
Finally, the chapter considers the growth o f mean income by birth cohort It establishes 
that extremely large increases in income were received by those birth cohorts bom after 
1920 - those who were in their twenties and younger in the 1950s. These increases were 
large not just in comparison with those received by earlier birth cohorts, but also 
historically. The chapter concludes that structural changes in the younger workforce made 
a major contribution to the growth in disposable income.
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6.1 The net movement o f labour.
It is possible for a worker to increase his or her earnings, independently o f any general 
movement in wage rates, by moving to a higher-paid job. Indeed, if wage levels are held 
stationary, this might be the only method available by which earnings could be increased. 
Such increases will depend on opportunity. In the case where a worker is forced to move 
jobs to one which pays a lower wage rate, earnings will fall - again with no change in overall 
wage rates. Consequently, the earnings history o f an individual worker will not be identical 
to the development o f wage rates.
When the movement between jobs is repeated on a large scale, it would be expected to 
have an effect on the level o f average earnings. The only case in which this would have no 
measurable effect is when the movements are random and cancel each other out. But in a 
case such as that o f the Netherlands in the 1950s, where structural change in the economy 
led to the creation of new jobs paying higher wage rates, workers moving into these jobs 
will have experienced a rise in earnings, and it is to be expected that average earnings will 
have risen without there necessarily having been a change in overall rates of pay.
In the simple case, it is possible to measure by how much incomes rose as a consequence 
o f the net movement o f labour between sectors by the use o f shift-share analysis. This 
involves calculating the effect on overall income o f changes in the relative proportions o f 
the workforce in each sector. It is possible to do this because total income earned in the 
economy as a whole is the sum of the income earned in each sector. This can be expressed 
as
i=n
Y = I Y ;
i= l
where
Y = the total income earned in the economy as a whole, 
n = the number o f sectors.
Y; = the total income earned in the i* sector.
Since the total income earned in any particular sector can be expressed as the product of 
the mean income earned in the sector (y {) and the number o f those working in it (L), then 
Yj = Yi x L,
which, putting these two equations together, gives
Y - Z f o x L . )
i= l
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What this equation states is that, assuming nothing happens to change the mean income in 
each sector, a rise in the number o f people working in a given sector will cause total 
income, in the economy as a whole, to rise. Likewise, a decline in numbers will cause total 
income to fall. Assuming that the total working population remains the same, then a rise in 
the number working in one sector means a fall in the number working in another. The 
result o f this will be a rise in the income earned in the first sector, a fall in the income 
earned in the second. If  the average incomes earned in the two sectors differ, then the total 
income earned in the economy as a whole will rise or fall as a consequence o f the net 
movement o f labour from one to the other.
In the case o f the Netherlands during the 1950s, the total number o f people in the working 
population increased, and the numbers working in most sectors increased. In these sectors, 
therefore, income rose for demographic reasons. In order to eliminate the effect o f this in 
the calculation o f total income, it is necessary to use each sector’s proportion (P^ of the 
total workforce (L) in place of the number working in i t  This recasts the equation as
Y - l f a x P . x L )
i= l
which means that mean income per worker (Y ) can be calculated as 
V - Z f o x P , )
i= l
If the mean income per worker increases by an amount 5Y over a given period o f time, 
then the mean income per worker at the end o f the period can be expressed as
Y + 5Y = ,f [ ( y 1+5y,)x(Pi +8Pi)]
# i= l
where
8yi = the increase in the mean income in the i* sector over the period 
dPj = the increase in the proportion o f the workforce in the i* sector over 
the period.
This equation expands to
Y + 5Y = |f(y j x Pj)
i= l
+ ‘f (S y ,x P ,)
i= l
+ 'i n(y ,*5P ,)
i= l
+ ^(Sy, x 5P,)
i= l
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From this equation, it is possible to calculate the contribution that the changed structure o f 
the workforce made to the increase in mean income. The total increase in mean income 
over the period is given by the sum of the second, third and fourth terms. The second term 
gives what the increase in mean income would have been had there been no change to the 
structure o f the workforce, while the third and fourth terms together give the contribution 
that structural change made to mean income. The proportional contribution of structural 
change is therefore the combined value o f the third and fourth terms as a proportion o f the 
total increase.
Alternatively, this contribution can be calculated using a counterfactual. This involves 
calculating the amount by which total income would have risen over a given period had 
there been no structural change. The difference between this and the amount by which 
incomes actually rose is therefore the amount by which incomes rose due to structural 
change. To do this, total income in the years a and b, at the start and end o f the period in 
question, are specified as
Y ^ I ^ x P ^ x L . )
i= l
and
Yb = ' f ( y blxPblxLb)
i=l
where the subscripts a and b refer to the values o f the variables in each o f these years. 
From these equations, it is therefore possible to calculate what the total income in year b 
would have been had the proportion o f the population in each sector remained as it was in 
year a (Yb*), by
Yb. = ' f ( y b,x P „ x L b)
i= l
The increase in total income due to the net movement of labour between sectors (SY s) can 
then be calculated by
SY (Yb ~ Y b, )
’ " ( Y b - Y . )
Algebraically, the two methods discussed here - decomposing the total income at the end 
of a period into starting value and increments, and creating a counterfactual - are identical. 
This can be shown by decomposing the counterfactual equation. The mean income per 





7bi = y «  +8y«
where
= the increase in mean income in the i* sector over the period 
between year a and year b
then
y . = Z[(y,d +Sy»i)*Pj
b i= l
= ‘f ^ * P j + l ( 8 y i *Pd)
i= l i= l
which is identical to Ya + 5Ya when SP^ is zero for all sectors (where SP^ is the increase in 
the proportion o f the workforce in the i* sector since year a).
There is an advantage in using the counterfactual method in the case under consideration, 
since it can be used to give an approximate figure for how great a rise in income was 
received by those who moved between sectors. The first method discussed tends to be 
used by economists374, and gives a macroeconomic picture, focussing on the values o f the 
variables. It is not necessary to consider what these values may represent in terms o f actual 
human activity. The counterfactual method tends to be used by demographers375, and 
forces attention onto what the numbers represent in terms o f net movements o f people 
between sectors. In particular, it enables a distinction to be made between those who 
moved sectors and those who did not. This is important here, since what we are really 
looking for is the increase in income experienced by those who moved jobs, rather than the 
effect that this increase had an the mean income. A rough idea o f this can be obtained 
from the mean increase in income received by those who moved sectors, which can be 
simply calculated by dividing <5YS by the number of people who made the move.
In practice, things are a little more complex than this. As Mookherjee and Shorrocks point 
out, where several changes occur simultaneously, it becomes difficult to identify, using 
shift-share analysis, the contributions o f the individual factors to the overall movement376. 
In the case under consideration here, if other changes occurred to the structure o f the
374 E.g. Nordhaus (1972) uses this method to decompose aggregate productivity by industry; Jenkins (1995) 
uses it to decompose income inequality by recipient o f income.
375 E.g. Falkingham (1989) uses this method to calculate the effect on the dependency ratio o f changes in the 
age structure o f  the population.
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workforce at the same time as the movement between sectors, this distorts the results. This 
does not, however, invalidate the exercise. If such distortions can be identified, then the 
results give some indication as to the nature o f these other structural changes.
A number o f net movements in the sectoral structure o f the male labour force between 
1947 and 1960 have already been noted. There was a net decline in the number o f men 
working in agriculture, and a net increase in the number o f men working in manufacturing. 
A large proportion of this increase in manufacturing employment occurred in the metal 
and chemical industries. In services, there was a fall in the sectors share o f male 
employment at the beginning o f the period, and a net rise towards the end.
Information on incomes by sector can be obtained from the CBS income distribution 
reports used previously. Figures on numbers o f people and incomes by class of business 
are published for 1946,1950,1954,1955,1957,1958,1959 and 1960. There are, however, a 
number o f provisos. The way that the class of business is categorised is not directly 
comparable with the categorisation of business in the 1960 census, and the method of 
categorisation in the income distribution reports actually changes from 1958 onwards. The 
income distribution data for 1960 is only available at the highest levels of summarisation. 
But the main problem is that income data by class o f business are not divided by gender. 
This is potentially a problem, since, as has been shown, the male and female workforces 
developed differently. There is, however, no way around the problem, and it has to be kept 
in mind when interpreting the results.
The shift-share calculation seems to show - surprisingly, at first sight - that those who left 
agriculture did worse, in terms o f their mean income, than those who remained in the 
sector. The calculation was made by comparing the total number and incomes of those 
working in agriculture with the total number and incomes o f those that were not - a simple 
two-sector model. Data from 1946,1950,1954,1955,1957,1958 and 1959 were used. Data 
from 1960 were not used, since the totals for agriculture in that year are aggregated with 
those for hunting and fishing. The numbers and incomes of those categorised as 
“pensioners” and “without occupation” were subtracted from the total figures for each 
year to give the numbers and income o f the assessable working population. This 
population was then divided into agricultural and non-agricultural workforces, and the 
effect on incomes o f the net movement from the agricultural into the non-agricultural 
workforces was calculated by means o f shift-share analysis.
376 Mookherjee & Shorrocks (1982) p. 886.
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1946-5Q 1,950-54 1954755 1955-57 1957-55 1958-59
Mean income (flOOO) at die start of the period 2.162 3.128 4.026 4.426 5.030 5.285
Increased income (flOOO):
due to exogenous factors
due to the movement out of agriculture



















Total 0.966 0.738 0.401 0.604 0.255 0.172
Percentage o f the increase in mean income
due to the movement out of agriculture -1.07% -0.61% -0.21% 0.04% -0.44% -4.51%
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1946 en vermogensverdtBng 1947Aanvulkndtgtgevtns, table 2.
InkomensverdeBng 1950 Aanvulkndt gtgevtns, table 3.
InkomensverdeBng 1954 tn vermogensverdtBng 1955, table 6.
InkomensverdeBng 1955, table 4.
InkomensverdeBng 1957 tn vermogensverdtBng 1958, table 7.
InkomensverdeBng 1958 en vermogensverdtBng 1959, table 10.
InkomensvtrdtBng 1959 tn vermogensverdtBng 1960, table 9.
InkomensverdeBng 1960Aanvulkndtgegevens, table 3.
Table 30: The effect o f  the decline in the num bers working in agricutulture on
mean incomes, 1946-59.
The effect on the mean income o f the assessable working population is shown in Table 30. 
This show the changes in mean nominal incomes between 1946 and 1959, broken down 
according the periods for which data are available. The increase in mean income due to the 
net movement o f labour out o f agriculture is calculated by decomposing the total increase 
into component parts. It shows that the contribution o f this movement to the increase in 
nominal mean income was negative. This is, however, not necessarily a very helpful result, 
since we are not interested here in the mean income o f the entire assessable working 
population but in the incomes o f those who made the move between sectors. For this we 
need to use the counterfactual method o f shift-share analysis.
The effects on the incomes of those who moved out o f agriculture are shown in Table 31. 
Row A of this table shows the estimated number o f those who left agriculture in each of 
the periods. This estimate is the number that needs to be added to the agricultural 
population at the end o f the period in order for agriculture’s share of the assessable 
working population to be identical to its share at the beginning o f the period. Thus, the 
agricultural sector’s share in 1946 was 18.54%. In order for its share o f the 1950 assessable 
workforce to be 18.54%, there would have to have been 89819 more people working in the 
sector in that year. The decline in the agricultural workforce is defined this way, rather than 
using the actual difference in the numbers working in the sector at the two dates, in order 
to cope with the changing size o f the assessable working population. The estimated 
decrease is the same figure as is used in the shift-share calculation.
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1946-50 1950-54 125435 1955-37 1957-58 1958-59
A) 89819 24497 40072 6286 15133 42355
B) 17.76% 5.26% 8.58% 1.44% 3.34% 9.67%
Q 2.50% 0.65% 1.04% 0.15% 0.37% 1.03%
D) 3.486 4.214 4.497 4.874 5.557 6.140
E) 1.733 3.271 4.134 4.673 4.570 4.802
Key: A) The estimated number who left agriculture during the period.
B) The proportional decrease in the number of the assessable working population 
in agriculture.
Q  The proportion of the assessable working population who left agriculture.
D) The mean nominal income of the assessable population in agriculture at the end
of the period (flOOO a year).
E) The approxiamte mean income of those who left agriculture (flOOO a year).
Sources: Inkomensverdeling 1946 en vemogensverdeling 1947 Aanvulkndegtgevens, table 2.
Inkomensverdeling 1950 Aanvulknde gegevens, table 3. 
lnkomensverdeling 1954 en vemogensverdeling 1955, table 6.
Inkomensverdeling 1955, table 4.
lnkomensverdeling 1957 en vemogensverdeling 1958, table 7.
Inkomensverdeling 1958 en vemogensverdeling 1959, table 10.
Inkomensverdeling 1959 en vemogensverdeling 1960, table 9.
Inkomensverdeling 1960 Aanvulknde gegevens, table 3.
Table 31: The effect o f  the decline in  the num bers working in agriculture on
incomes, 1946-59.
Row B shows the estimated number who left the sector as a percentage o f the number in 
the sector at the beginning of the period, demonstrating the decline o f the sector over the 
period. Row C shows the estimated number who left agriculture as a percentage o f the 
assessable working population at the end o f the period. This is an estimate o f the 
proportion o f the working population involved in the move.
Rows D and E show the effect o f the move on income. Row D shows the mean income of 
those who remained in agriculture at the end o f the period. Row E shows the approximate 
mean income of those who moved out o f agriculture. This is calculated by adding the mean 
income o f those in agriculture at the beginning o f the period to the mean increase in 
income received by those who moved out o f agriculture, calculated from the shift-share 
analysis. This is intended to give an impression of how much was gained by those who left 
agriculture. It is only approximate because the sum of these means is not the same thing as 
the mean income o f those who left agriculture at the end o f the period. It is therefore not 
likely to be the same amount, but it is meant to give a general idea o f the effect o f the move 
out o f the sector.
The effect, as with the effect on mean incomes generally, seems to have been negative. In 
every case, the approximate mean income o f those who left agriculture was less than the
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mean income o f those who remained, and except in one case - that o f the period between 
1955 and 1957 - it was less than the (nominal) mean income o f those in agriculture at the 
beginning o f each period. Taken at face value, this suggests that people moved jobs for 
lower incomes - an unlikely occurrence in conditions o f full employment.
The problem with this calculation is that it makes no distinction between employer and 
employee (i.e. between farmer and agricultural worker). We have already seen that the 
decline in numbers in each o f these occupations differed, with the number o f manual 
workers in agriculture falling by more than forty percent between 1947 and 1960, while the 
number o f farmers fell by only eight. The decline in agriculture was therefore not constant 
across the sector as a whole. It was, in fact, largely a decline in the numbers o f those 
employed as agricultural workers, whose mean income was less than half that o f farmers377. 
Comparing rows D and E in Table 31 does not, therefore, compare like with like.
It is possible to repeat the shift-share calculation, restricting it to the net decline in the 
number o f agricultural workers. CBS income distribution data are published by 
occupational category for 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958 and 1959. The occupational 
categories used are, once again, not directly comparable with the census data, but, unlike 
the data by business category, they are broken down by gender for some years: 1952,1953, 
1958 and 1959. The male data for these years were therefore used for the calculation, 
whose results are shown in Table 32. This shows that the approximate mean income of 
those who moved out o f agriculture was considerably higher, by more than fifty percent, 
than the mean income o f those who stayed. But it should not be thought that these results 
suggest that those who left agricultural employment received high earnings by other 
standards. “Higher” is, o f course, a comparative adjective. The approximate mean income 
calculated here, in each period, was well below the mean income o f the assessable working 
population as a whole. It was also the case that a minute proportion o f the male working 
population took part in the move - less than two percent in the five years 1953-58.
The rate o f decline was not constant. From 1952 to 1953, indeed, there was a rise in the 
number o f agricultural workers, presumably a consequence o f the fall in agricultural 
unemployment in 1953378. But between 1953 and 1958, the number o f agricultural workers 
fell by more than a quarter379, and, in 1958-59, the exodus became more rapid, with the
377 Calculated from the same sources as used in Table 32.
378 CBS (1964) p. 79.
379 Comparing the percentage o f die assessable workforce that this represented with the percentage o f the 
assessable workforce that moved out of agriculture generally, as shown in Table 31, it seems that nearly all o f  
the decline in the agricultural workforce during the boom o f the mid-1950s was due to workers, rather than 
farmers, leaving the sector.
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1252=52 1252=53 1958-59
A) -28250 52265 28298
B) 27.51% 18.38%
Q 1.75% 0.87%
D) 2.168 3.097 3.422
E) 5.247 5.998
Key: A) The estimated number who left employment in agricultural work during the period.
B) The proportional decrease in the number of agricultural workers.
Q The percentage of the male assessable working population who left agricultural employment.
D) The mean income of agricultural workers at the end of the period (flOOO a year):
E) The approximate man income of those who left agricultural employment (flOOO a year).
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1952 en vermogensverdehng 1953, table 1.
InkomensverdeBng 1953 en vermogensverdeBng 1954, table 1.
InkomensverdeBng 1958 en vermogensverdeBng 1959, table 9.
InkomensverdeBng 1959 en vermogensverdeBng 1960, table 16.
Table 32: The effect on incomes o f  the decline in the num ber o f  m en employed as
agricultural workers, 1952-59.
number leaving in this one-year period amounting to more than half the net decline in the 
previous five years. In this year, the exodus seems to have made a disproportionately large 
effect on male incomes, with a net movement out o f manual work in agriculture of less 
than one percent o f the workforce making a contribution o f more than nine percent o f the 
that year’s increase in the income o f the male working population.
We cannot make similar calculations to measure the effect on incomes o f the net 
movement o f labour into manufacturing. The problem flows from the fact that what we 
want to measure in this case is net movement into a sector and not out of it. It is possible to 
calculate the mean increase in income o f those who began work in manufacturing, just as 
was done for the mean increase in income o f those who left agriculture. But, unlike in the 
case o f those who left agriculture, we have no figure for the mean previous income of 
those who entered manufacturing. We cannot, therefore, estimate what proportion o f their 
previous incomes the mean increase represents, and there is therefore no way o f knowing if 
this was a large increase or a small one.
However, the figures do suggest that the growth o f employment in manufacturing may 
have contributed to the rise in incomes. This is implied by the way that both the share of 
the workforce in the sector and the mean income in the sector, relative to mean incomes as 
a whole, rose at various points in the period, never falling to their original level. Table 33 
and Table 34 show three phases o f growth for the manufacturing workforce as whole - 
from 1946 to 1955, from 1955 to 1957 and from 1957 to 1960. Table 33 shows the state of 
the manufacturing workforce - its size and mean income in relation to the rest o f the 
assessable working population - in each year for which there are data, while Table 34 shows
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1946 1950 1954 1955 1957 1958 1959 1960
Manufacturing
A) 29.06% 33.24% 33.50% 33.94% 32.62% 29.73% 30.17% 30.69%
B) 24.53% 28.65% 29.03% 29.28% 29.56% 27.05% 27.36% 28.04%
Q 84.40% 86.18% 86.67% 86.26% 90.62% 91.00% 90.68% 91.34%
Metal industries
A) 9.05% 11.02% 12.32% 13.18% 13.09% 11.38% 11.22% #N/A
B) 8.04% 10.28% 11.35% 12.05% 12.67% 11.01% 10.89% #N/A
Q 88.90% 93.25% 92.18% 91.41% 96.79% 96.78% 97.06% #N/A
Chemicals
A) 1.24% 1.52% 1.62% 1.79% 1.76% 2.08% 1.96% #N/A
B) 1.22% 1.59% 1.79% 1.87% 1.95% 2.22% 2.10% #N/A
Q 98.16% 104.89% 110.27% 104.57% 110.94% 106.88% 107.00% #N/A
Key; A) The percentage o f the assessable working population in the sector.
B) The percentage o f die total income of the assessable workforce earned in the sector.
C) Mean income in the sector as a percentage of the mean income of the assessable workforce.
# N /A  = "Data not available"
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1946 en vermogensverdeBng 1947Aanvulknde gegevens, table 2.
InkomensverdeBng 1950 AanvuBende gegevens, table 3.
InkomensverdeBng 1954 en vermogensverdeBng 1955, table 6.
InkomensverdeBng 1955, table 4.
InkomensverdeBng 1957 en vermogensverdeBng 1958, table 7.
InkomensverdeBng 1958 en vermogensverdeBng 1959, table 10.
InkomensverdeBng 1959 en vermogensverdeBng 1960, table 9.
InkomensverdeBng 1960 AanmUende gegevens, table 3.
Table 33: Manufacturing’s share o f  the workforce and income, 1946-60.
how the manufacturing workforce380 changed in size between each o f these years. Between 
1946 and 1955, the proportion o f the assessable workforce in the sector rose. In the first 
part o f this period, between 1946 and 1950, manufacturing’s mean income (expressed as a 
percentage o f the mean income of the entire assessable working population) rose, and then 
from 1950 until 1955 it remained roughly the same. Between 1955 and 1957, there was a 
small fall in the percentage o f the workforce in manufacturing, although the actual number 
o f people working in the sector rose quite sharply. However, their relative mean income 
rose. Between 1957 and 1960, the mean income remained at a higher level than in the first 
half o f the decade, while the proportion o f the workforce in the sector varied in the same 
manner as the number o f people working in it. In 1957-58, the number o f people and the 
proportion o f the assessable workforce in manufacturing fell, both rising in 1958-59 and 
remaining about the same level in 1959-60.
Throughout the whole period, from 1946 to 1960, the changing pattern o f employment 
and relative income in the metal industries was similar to manufacturing as a whole, with
380 Manufacturing here is defined as those businesses classed in the income distribution data as “industrial”, 
but omitting the figures for mining, building and construction, and the utilities (gas, water and electricity).
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1,94.6.-50 1950-54 1954-55 1955-57 1957-58 1958-59 1959-60
Manufacturing
A) 244022 75512 40500 17800 -117400 32900 57839
B) 25.67% 6.32% 3.19% 1.36% -8.84% 2.72% 4.65%
Q 6.79% 1.99% 1.05% 0.44% -2.88% 0.80% 1.36%
Metal industries
A) 100125 70931 42000 24000 -69500 -1000 #N/A
B) 33.83% 17.91% 8.99% 4.72% -13.04% -0.22% #N/A
Q 2.79% 1.87% 1.09% 0.59% -1.71% -0.02% #N/A
Chemicals
A) 14129 6862 7700 2300 13100 -3600 #N/A
B) 34.88% 12.56% 12.52% 3.32% 18.32% -4.26% #N/A
Q 0.39% 0.18% 0.20% 0.06% 0.32% -0.09% #N/A
Key: A) The increase in the number of people in the sector over the period.
B) The proportional increase in the number of the assessable working population in the sector.
C) The proportion of the assessable working population who moved into the sector.
#N /A  = "Data not available"
Sources: lnkomensverdeling 1946 en vemogensverdeling 1947 Aanvulknde gegevens, table 2.
Inkomensverdeling 1950 Aanvulknde gegevens, table 3.
Inkomensverdeling 1954 en vemogensverdeling 1955, table 6.
Inkomensverdeling 1955, table 4.
Inkomensverdedng 1957 en vemogensverdeling 1958, table 7.
Inkomensverdeling 1958 en vemogensverdeling 1959, table 10.
Inkomensverdeling 1959 en vemogensverdeling 1960, table 9.
Inkomensverdeling 1960 Aanvulknde gegevens, table 3.
Table 34: The growth o f  the manufacturing workforce, 1946-60.
the difference that the industries’ share o f the assessable workforce kept on rising during 
the mid-1950s boom. In chemicals, the mean income was generally higher - as might be 
expected from relative wage levels in the industry - with the number employed growing 
until 1958-59381.
What we have is a sector whose share of the workforce grew and whose mean income rose 
as fast or faster than the mean income generally. This seems to suggest that it must have 
made a contribution to the overall increase in income. This would, however, only have 
been the case if the increased share of the workforce was at the expanse of categories of 
business whose workers earned lower incomes. This is likely in conditions of full
381 The metal industries, for the purposes o f  the shift-share analysis, are those defined in die reports for 1946- 
57 as “the metal industry, shipbuilding, and aircraft and vehicle manufacture”; those defined in the 1958 
report as “the metallurgical industry”, “the manufacture o f metal products and machine building”, “the 
manufacture o f  electrical machinery”, “vehicle manufacture” and “other craft businesses in the metal 
industry”; and those defined in the 1959 report as “the metal industries”, “the manufacture o f iron, steel and 
metal products”, “machine building”, “manufacture o f electrical machinery” and “vehicle manufacture”. The 
chemical industries are simply those defined as “the chemical industry” in the data for 1946-57, but data for 
the petrochemical industry is listed separately in the 1958 and 1959 reports. These data were re-aggregated for 
the shift-share analysis.
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employment, but there is no way o f testing with these data if this was what actually 
happened.
Furthermore, the figures suggest that there was more than one movement o f labour. The 
most important indication o f this is the way that the sign o f the growth o f manufacturing 
employment differs in the period 1955-57, depending on whether growth is defined as 
growth of numbers employed or growth in share o f the working population. The growth in 
numbers is positive, the growth in share is negative. The growth in share is used here to 
factor out the increase in the size of the workforce that occurred as the result o f population 
growth, but using it as a measure o f structural change inevitably builds in the assumption 
that the expansion o f the workforce would, ceteris paribus, have affected all sectors equally. 
In reality, this was not the case.
It has already been noted that the female workforce expanded during the 1950s, and that it 
grew in different branches o f the economy than the male workforce. As will be shown in 
Chapter 7, the female workforce expanded particulady rapidly during the mid-1950s boom, 
and this is the likely reason for the absolute expansion o f employment in manufacturing 
appearing as a fall in share. There is, however, no way o f testing whether this was the case, 
owing to the absence o f income distribution data for category o f business broken down by 
gender.
But there were also two movements within the male workforce, which need to be 
distinguished. It was noted in Chapter 4 that the male workforce in manufacturing in 1960 
was younger than the male workforce overall. The implication here is that the 
manufacturing  workforce expanded more as a consequence of employing new entrants 
than it did from the movement o f workers from other sectors. The conclusion is that the 
structural changes in the younger male workforce - those who entered the workforce after 
the war - and the structural changes in the older male workforce - already employed - need 
to be analysed separately.
In addition, there were movements o f labour within the manufacturing sector. This is 
particulady noticeable in the periods 1954-55 and 1955-57, when, according to Table 34, 
the proportion o f the workforce that entered the metal industries was greater than the 
proportion o f the workforce that entered manufacturing as a whole, one possible 
explanation o f this is that workers moved into the metal industries from other areas of 
manufacturing. In principle, it would be possible to investigate this movement, since 
figures for manufacturing are broken down by industry, but this would still leave the other 
movements affecting the results needing to be factored out. In any case, the proportions o f
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the assessable working population involved seem, as with the movement o f manual 
workers out o f agriculture, extremely small - apparently in contradiction to what the census 
data show.
Similar conclusions about multiple movements of labour can be drawn from looking at the 
service sector. Again, just as in manufacturing, there is a difference, in some periods, in the 
sign for the growth in numbers in the sector and the growth in its share o f the assessable 
working population382. The major difference with manufacturing is that, as the percentage 
o f the workforce in the service sector grew, its relative mean income fell. This is consistent 
with a disproportionate number o f women entering the sector, but, once again, lack of data 
means that the effect of this cannot be calculated.
It must be concluded, then, that a simple story o f incomes rising because workers moved 
between sectors cannot be sustained. The analysis of the movement o f labour out o f 
manual work in agriculture shows that this process had some impact, with the effect in 
1959 being disproportionately large given the numbers involved, but, in general, the 
numbers involved were too small to account for a general rise in incomes.
The analysis o f the growth of manufacturing suggests that it is necessary to distinguish 
between the entry o f younger workers, taking up their first jobs in the sector, and the 
movement from other sectors o f older workers, already established in the labour force. 
These two groups of workers are therefore investigated separately. But this has a further 
implication on the argument, since age and earnings are associated. So first, we have to 
look at what this association is, and how it will have affected Dutch income levels.
6.2 Age and earnings growth.
Earnings tend to vary by age. This is a phenomenon that is found in all countries in the 
twentieth century. A cross-sectional survey o f age and earnings across the workforce will 
show that, up to a certain age, earnings rise then level off or even fall. Plotting earnings 
against age for a given population therefore produces a hump-shaped curve. These curves 
vary by occupation, the age at which the rise in earnings comes to an end differing as well 
as the general level o f earnings383.
382 Services are defined as everything that does not come under the heading o f agriculture (including hunting 
and fishing) or industry (including building and construction, mining and the utilities, as well as 
manufacturing. The service sector is defined in this way because the data are categorised differently before 
1958 than from 1958 onwards, and a match at a lower level o f summarisation is, for this reason, impossible.













Source: Helps Brown (1977; p. 263.
Figure 10: Age-eamings profiles o f  French employees, 1966.
As an example o f this, Figure 10 shows the age earnings profiles o f various categories of 
French employees in 1966. Here, the curves for manual workers and the lower grades of 
white-collar staff rise little and flatten before the age o f 30, suggesting that there was little 
variation in mean earnings by age for these sorts o f occupation. For higher management, 
on the other hand, the age-eamings curve only stops rising at the age o f 60.
Age-eamings curves also vary by gender, as can be seen from Figure 11, which shows the 
different curves for the male and female workforces in Britain in 1974. The curves for 
female workers in this case show some similarity to those belonging to the lower-paid 
occupations o f French employees, flattening out before the age o f 30. In contrast, the 
curve for male manual workers rises much more sharply, but actually begins to fall from 
about the age o f 35, while the curve for non-manual males continues rising, beginning to 
fall around the age of 45. It is also generally true that the curves for non-manual 
occupations reach higher than the curves for manual occupations.
The age-eamings curve is a snapshot, frozen at one point in time. It does not represent the 
growth of earnings o f any given individual or even the average o f an entire birth cohort. 
These are more complex and more varied in their paths. The growth pattern o f average 
earnings by birth cohort changes over time. The historical circumstances under which 
people earn their livings change, and these circumstances affect those of different ages in 
different ways. Phelps Brown suggests the example o f British children bom in 1935, who - 
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Source: Phelps Brown (1977) p.264.
Figure 11: Age-eamings profiles o f  British employees, April 1974.
World War - had a very different experience to those bom ten years later384. Figure 12 
follows those aged 20,30 and 40 in 1963 for a period o f ten years and gives a picture o f the 
relationship between the mean income o f birth cohorts and the age-eamings curve at 
different points in time. The age-eamings curve here is moving upwards, so the mean 
incomes of each birth cohort do not move along the curve but rise at a more vertical angle. 
The curve also changes shape over time, with the path between mean income at age 30 and 
mean income at age 40 in 1973 (represented by the dotted line between point A and point 
B) rising more sharply than the equivalent path for 1963 (represented by the dotted line 
between point C and point D).
In the context o f this study, a comparable, or even greater, contrast can be made between 
Dutch children bom in 1935, who experienced occupation and the “hunger winter” o f 
1944-45, and those bom after the liberation. As far as working experience is concerned, 
those who entered the workforce in 1952, just as the demand for industrial labour began to 
increase substantially, started their working lives very differently than those fifteen years 
older who reached working age in a period o f mass unemployment, or those ten years 
older, who began work under the threat o f forced labour in Germany. Those who entered 
the workforce at the end o f the 1950s, when the demand for service sector employment










Source: Phelps Brown (1977) p. 264
Figure 12: Earnings growth o f  birth cohorts in Britain, 1963-73.
began to increase, had yet a different experience. And this latter group will have 
experienced the boom o f 1959 onwards differendy from those already in the middle o f 
their working lives. These different experiences will have had an effect on the income each 
worker received.
Demographic factors, and how they interact with other economic developments, therefore 
play a role in the growth o f mean earnings. There are two major processes involved: those 
associated with changes in the age structure o f the entire workforce and those associated 
with changes in the occupational structure o f each age group. Changes in the age structure 
o f the entire workforce affect the growth o f mean earnings because younger workers have 
lower mean earnings than older ones. If  the mean age o f the workforce gets younger - say 
as the consequence o f increased numbers of young workers entering it - then, ceteris paribus, 
mean earnings will fall. Conversely, if the number o f young workers entering the workforce 
declines, then the mean age o f the workforce will rise, and along with it mean earnings.
But, since the age-eamings curve for each occupation tends to differ, then the level o f 
mean earnings o f each age group is itself dependent on the mix o f occupations followed by 
those within it. If  this mix changes, the mean earnings received by the age group changes. 
This in turn affects how changes to the age structure o f the workforce alter the level of 
mean earnings. So, for example, if the workforce expands by taking on a larger number o f
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young workers than in previous years, but in higher-paid jobs, then, from an analytical 
viewpoint, the level o f mean earnings will move in opposing directions. On the one hand, 
the decline in the mean age of the workforce reduces mean earnings. On the other, the rise 
in the level o f mean earnings o f the youngest age group or groups has the reverse effect. 
The actually observed movement will be, ceteris paribus, the resultant o f these two 
movements.
6.3 The changing age structure o f the workforce.
It is possible to use census data to investigate the changes in the age structure o f the 
workforce. Table 35 shows that the proportion o f the population in the workforce fell 
between 1947 and 1960. For men, this fall is almost completely accounted for by a drop in 
the participation rate o f the youngest and oldest age groups. The female workforce saw a 
slight increase in the participation rate o f the 14-24 year-old age group, but the 
participation rate o f those aged 25 and over declined, reflecting the lower participation rate 
of married women. There were two reasons for this decline. Firstly, as we have already 
seen, the number of wives working in the family business fell Secondly, the age at which 
women married also felL The average age o f women at the time of their marriage declined 
during the period from 27.2 years in 1947385 to 25.6 years in I960386.
The usefulness o f the census data is, however, limited. It is not possible to direcdy compare 
changes in the age structure o f the workforce at the level o f occupations, since occupations 






14-19 66.00% 48.74% 57.52% 55.14% 51.78% 53.49%
20-24 92.15% 50.71% 71.42% 91.15% 52.79% 72.30%
25-39 97.80% 23.62% 60.17% 98.12% 17.76% 57.75%
40-49 97.72% 20.68% 58.19% 98.31% 16.45% 56.56%
50-64 89.50% 16.89% 52.30% 91.15% 13.53% 50.78%
65-69 51.70% 9.18% 29.82% 33.19% 4.31% 17.91%
70+ 23.86% 4.41% 13.57% 11.62% 1.58% 6.25%
Total 14+ 85.13% 26.66% 55.45% 80.98% 22.46% 51.25%
Source: 13eAlgetnene Volkstelling, Deel 10A, page 17.
Table 35: The working population as a percentage o f  the population by age, 1947
and 1960.
385 Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, 1951-1952, table 34.




14-19 20-24 25-39 40-49 50-64 61 Total
and over
Agriculture 25.31% 14.71% 16.16% 18.61% 22.33% 44.12% 19.72%
Mining and quarrying 1.53% 1.86% 2.03% 1.96% 1.29% 0.40% 1.74%
Manufacturing 38.83% 26.13% 29.85% 27.37% 24.14% 18.07% 28.40%
Building & construction 6.01% 5.12% 8.87% 9.49% 10.41% 8.02% 8.44%
Public utilities 0.35% 0.50% 0.93% 1.37% 1.61% 0.17% 0.99%
Trade, b a n k in g  and insurance 10.06% 8.75% 13.72% 15.24% 14.62% 15.32% 13.20%
Transport & associated industries 5.70% 6.65% 9.07% 10.69% 11.25% 5.47% 8.95%
Services 3.44% 7.68% 12.88% 11.85% 11.43% 6.66% 10.45%
Unknown 0.06% 0.08% 0.06% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05%
Temporarily unemployed 8.71% 28.52% 6.44% 3.38% 2.87% 1.73% 8.05%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: 12e volkstelling 31 mai 1947, SerieA Deel2, table 3.
1960
Ags;
14-19 20-24 25-39 40-49 50-64 61 Total
and over
Agriculture 12.19% 10.04% 10.37% 11.75% 15.72% 30.04% 12.51%
M in in g  a n d  q u a r r y in g 1.95% 1.79% 2.29% 2.00% 1.16% 0.07% 1.83%
Manufacturing 34.90% 31.84% 34.82% 31.31% 29.66% 19.59% 32.24%
Building and construction 13.32% 13.20% 11.47% 12.29% 13.09% 9.76% 12.31%
Public utilities 0.38% 0.76% 1.46% 1.65% 1.81% 0.35% 1.36%
Trade, b a n k in g  and insurance 11.00% 11.95% 13.81% 14.89% 15.01% 22.60% 14.05%
Transport & associated industries 7.00% 9.11% 9.37% 8.06% 7.36% 3.00% 8.24%
Services 18.95% 20.77% 16.01% 17.59% 15.47% 14.56% 16.98%
Unknown 0.31% 0.54% 0.41% 0.47% 0.70% 0.02% 0.48%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: 13e AJjgemene volkstelling Deel 1QA., table 4.
Table 36: The sectoral structure o f  the male workforce by age, 1947 and 1960.
overall figures for occupations, the 1947 data were not recalculated on the 1960 basis. It is, 
however, possible, to look at broad categories. Table 36 shows the proportion o f the male 
population working in each sector, by age, in 1947 and 1960, and some conclusions can be 
drawn from these figures.
Male manufacturing employment expanded at all ages388. The expansion o f technical 
education for the young may have supplied new, skilled workers to the workforce, but 
there also seems to have been movement into manufacturing by older workers. In both 
years, there was a higher proportion o f the younger age groups in manufacturing than of 
older ones. The most striking feature is the rise in the proportion of the 25-39 year-old age 
group working in manufacturing, from just under thirty percent in 1947 to nearly thirty-five 
percent in 1960. O f those industries that made the biggest contributions to the net increase 
in jobs, most had, in 1960, younger workforces than the average for manufacturing as a
387/i '  Algmene volkstelling Deel 10B, pp. 7-8.
388 With the exception o f those under the age o f 20. The most likely explanation for this is that a large 
proportion o f those training for industrial work did so full-time, and so did not appear in the employment 
statistics.
-154-
whole. The manufacture o f metal products, the manufacture o f machinery, the 
manufacture o f electrical machinery and vehicle manufacture together account for about 
forty percent o f the manufacturing workforce under the age o f forty. Chemicals show a 
slightly older workforce, as in 1947389.
Men working in agriculture tended to be older, in both years, than the workforce as a 
whole. With the exception o f those under the age of 20, the proportion o f the population 
working in agriculture rose along with age. The pattern, however, changed over time. 
Between 1947 and 1960, the proportion o f the entire male workforce taking part in 
agriculture fell at all age levels, but the fall was greatest amongst the younger age groups. 
The fall in the proportion o f those aged 65 and above working in the sector was also larger 
than average. This seems to have been associated with the introduction of old-age 
pensions, and is discussed further in Chapter 7. The result o f these above average falls in 
numbers amongst the youngest and oldest was a distinct narrowing o f the age range o f the 
male agricultural population. This had the consequence that, while those aged between 50 
and 64 formed just over a quarter of the male agricultural population in 1947, by 1960 they 
formed almost thirty percent.
Changes in the age structure o f the male workforce in the service sector can also be seen. 
There was a higher proportion o f those working in commerce, banking and insurance in 
the older age groups than the younger, in both years, but the proportion working in jobs 
categorised as belonging to the “service sector” was higher at the younger end of the age 
range in 1960, the reverse (ignoring those aged 65 and over) of the situation in 1947. This 
rise is consistent with the growth of the service sector from 1958, but the figures should 
also be treated with caution. “Services” tended to be a general bucket into which jobs were 
put that could not be categorised elsewhere, and the category is not exacdy the same in 
both years. For example, the 1960 figure includes conscripts, while the 1947 figure does 
n o t
The female workforce differed from the male in age as well as occupational structure. It 
has previously been noted that around half the female working population was under the 
age o f 25, that the proportion o f women in manufacturing was lower than that of men and 
that the proportion in services was higher. As can be seen by comparing Table 36 with 
Table 37, the differences between the occupational structures o f men and women were to 
be found in all age groups.




14-19 20-24 25-39 40-49 50-64 65 Total
and over
Agriculture 13.34% 11.51% 18.13% 23.53% 28.09% 41.02% 17.90%
Milling and quarrying 0.17% 0.18% 0.13% 0.08% 0.04% 0.02% 0.13%
Manufacturing 29.47% 23.34% 14.35% 9.59% 7.58% 5.14% 18.43%
Building and construction 0.32% 0.41% 0.49% 0.70% 0.63% 0.35% 0.47%
Public utilities 0.09% 0.16% 1.07% 0.78% 0.57% 0.47% 0.52%
Retail in shops 10.74% 10.18% 14.99% 19.15% 17.74% 15.38% 13.76%
Other trade, banking & insurance 5.30% 5.45% 4.11% 3.96% 3.19% 2.70% 4.54%
Transport & associated industries 3.97% 5.33% 5.68% 7.38% 9.23% 9.84% 5.90%
Household services 25.75% 22.89% 15.13% 12.46% 13.57% 13.55% 18.88%
Other services 8.41% 18.12% 23.83% 21.02% 18.24% 11.26% 17.45%
Unknown 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02%
Temporarily unemployed 2.41% 2.41% 2.09% 1.34% 1.11% 0.25% 1.98%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: 12e volkste&ng, 31 med 1947, SerieA Deel 2 , table 3.
im
Agsi
14-19 20-24 25-39 40-49 50-64 65 Total
and over
Agriculture 2.59% 3.15% 5.35% 6.87% 6.51% 7.52% 4.40%
Mining and quarrying 0.12% 0.16% 0.11% 0.09% 0.02% 0.00% 0.11%
Manufacturing 30.08% 26.49% 18.30% 12.32% 10.70% 7.24% 21.81%
Building and construction 0.53% 0.80% 0.68% 0.47% 0.42% 0.28% 0.60%
Public utilities 0.19% 0.23% 0.21% 0.22% 0.24% 0.00% 0.21%
Retail in shops 18.66% 14.48% 15.04% 19.37% 19.25% 21.73% 17.13%
Other trade, banking and insurance 7.97% 8.09% 6.68% 5.31% 4.96% 3.76% 6.96%
Transport & associated industries 1.62% 2.49% 3.14% 2.36% 209% 0.97% 229%
Household services 17.65% 10.89% 7.03% 8.59% 14.09% 26.18% 12.40%
Other services 20.41% 32.89% 43.13% 44.24% 41.51% 32.17% 33.85%
Unknown 0.17% 0.33% 0.32% 0.16% 0.21% 0.14% 0.24%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: / 3e Algernon volkstelBng, Deel 10A , table 4.
Table 37: The sectoral structure o f  the female workforce, by age, 1947 and 1960.
What all this confirms is that, in order to calculate the effect on earnings o f changes in the 
age structure o f the workforce, it is necessary to have earnings data summarised not only by 
age but also by occupation and gender. This is because the census data show that structural 
change to the workforce was neither simply a question of workers of all ages moving 
between jobs, nor a question o f new entrants to the workforce taking up new jobs, but a 
combination o f the two. Furthermore, the male and female workforces differed radically in 
both their age and occupational structures.
These criteria are partly met by the CBS income distribution reports. As with earlier 
calculations, relevant data are not available for every year. Income data are summarised by 
age only for the years 1950, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960, and the age 
ranges by which they are summarised are inconvenient and inconsistent. Data are 
summarised in the age ranges 30-39, 40-49, 50-59 and 60-65 in all cases, but those in their 
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Source: InkomeiuvtrdtRng 1959 tn vermogensverdtRng 1960, table 15.
Figure 13: The relationship between age and income, 1959.
earlier years only. The data are summarised by age and occupation in only six out o f the 
eight years - 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958 and 1959 - and the occupational categories are 
also inconsistent over time, making it impossible, for example, to follow the mean incomes 
of private-sector white-collar workers or o f industrial workers by age group over the whole 
period. There are no data summarised by age and business sector.
A major problem is that, for most years, data are not summarised by both age and gender. 
Separate reports for men and women by age are only available for 1950 and 1959, which 
means that the only data summarised by age, gender and occupation are those for 1959. 
Because of the different structures o f the male and female workforces, this is a potentially 
serious problem. The only solution to this is to be aware o f the distortions that are 
produced in calculations that do not differentiate between the male and female workforces. 
The extent o f this distortion varies. Men formed such a large proportion o f the workforce 
that, in some circumstances, the female workforce has little effect on the figures. This is the 
case, for example, when considering the older sections o f the workforce. On the other 
hand, the high proportion o f working women in the younger age groups means that using 
figures for the total workforce as a proxy for the male workforce when considering those 
aged under 30 - and even more so when considering those under 25 - might seriously 
misrepresent what happened.
The income distribution reports can be used to draw age-income curves for the Dutch
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Source: Inkomensverdeling 1959 en veomogensverdeling I960, table 15
Figure 14: Age-incomes curves for selected occupational categories in the male
workforce, 1959.
the assessable population as a whole, not just those who received most of their income 
from their occupation. The numerically dominating influence o f the male workforce on the 
total workforce can be seen by the way the line for the total assessable population closely 
follows that o f the male population, while the fall in the participation rate o f women on 
marriage, combined with the inclusion of married women’s incomes with their husbands’, 
reveals itself by the way that the line for the total population moves closer to the male line 
in the 30-39 age range.
There are considerable differences in the curves for different categories o f occupation. 
Figure 14 shows the curves associated with selected occupational categories, covering the 
majority of the male workforce, in 1959. White-collar workers in both the private and 
public sectors390 have curves that rose more sharply than those o f the manual occupations, 
and that rose to considerably higher incomes. This is partly due to the inclusion of 
managerial grades in white-collar categories. Managers generally receive higher earnings 
than those they manage, and their numbers tend to be greater in the older age ranges. But 
not all white-collar workers had relatively high earnings. For example, male shop personnel 
have an age-eamings curve with values not much greater than that o f male industrial
390 “Public sector employees” are those defined as “teaching personnel” (all levels), “general civil servants”, 
and “police and military personnel”; “private sector white-collar workers” are those defined as 
“administrative personnel”, “shop personnel”, “travelling salesmen, representatives, etc.” and “other white- 
collar workers”.
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workers. In the case o f male shop personnel, the figures will almost certainly contain a high 
proportion o f managerial and supervisory staff, since the retail sector’s workforce tends to 
be one in which men manage women.
The curves reveal differences within the male manual workforce. The mean income of 
agricultural workers in their twenties was just over two-thirds that o f industrial workers o f 
the same age group, while the mean income o f industrial and other non-agricultural manual 
workers in their twenties was little different from that o f white-collar workers. The shapes 
o f the curves are also different, with the curve for agricultural workers rising for longer 
than that o f industrial workers. On the face o f it, this is peculiar, since the opposite would 
be expected. The grading system for industrial workers’ wage rates would be expected to 
cause industrial workers’ earnings to rise continuously as they became more experienced, at 
least up to some moderately late peak; piece-rate systems would be expected to produce the 
same results. There were no such systems in operation in the agricultural workforce. Two 
explanations, not exclusive, suggest themselves. The first is that what is being measured 
here are incomes, not earnings, and it may be that older agricultural workers were more 
likely than younger ones to own or rent a piece o f land with which they could supplement 
their earnings. This is speculation, since there do not appear to be data for land ownership 
or rental by age. The second explanation is that, as was noted above, a larger percentage o f 
industrial workers in their twenties and thirties were to be found in jobs with relatively 
sharp, high-paying curves than was the case with industrial workers in older age groups. 
Conceptually, the curve for industrial workers should be regarded as two curves welded 
together: one for the older industrial workforce, to be found mostly in traditional 
industries, the other for the younger workforce, a greater proportion of whom worked in 
the industries that expanded during the 1950s.
There are also major differences between the male and female curves for the same 
occupation, with the female age-income curves tending to be flatter.
The consequence of all this is that, in order to calculate the effect on earnings o f increased 
employment in manufacturing, it is necessary to deal with younger and older workers 
separately. It has already been noted that the movement o f those already in the labour force 
into higher-paid jobs in manufacturing tends to raise the level o f mean earnings. On the 
other hand, the entry of large numbers o f new workers, who have previously been too 
young to be in the labour force, tends to reduce it. The census data shows that both 
movements o f labour occurred, and that therefore contradictory effects on the level of 
mean earnings are to be expected.
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6.4 Employment growth o f younger workers in 
manufacturing.
In principle, shift-share analysis could be used to calculate the contribution that increased 
levels o f employment in manufacturing made to the rise in earnings. This could mean both 
its contribution to the rise in earnings o f the young and its contribution to the overall rise 
in earnings. To do this, it would be necessary to break down the workforce, not just by 
business sector, but also by age group and, because o f the differing structures o f the male 
and female workforces, by gender. Data from at least two years, preferably one year 
somewhere around the beginning and one year around the end o f the 1950s would be 
needed, in order to have both starting values and increments for incomes and for 
proportions o f the workforce in each business sector/age/gender element of the 
calculation.
In practice, however, the appropriate data are not available. As was noted above, no 
income distribution data by age and business sector are available. The nearest equivalent to 
this are reports broken down by age and occupation, which are available for some years - 
1952,1953, 1954, 1957,1958 and 1959. O f these, only the data for 1959 are broken down 
by age, occupation and gender, meaning that any attempt to use these data will involve 
mixing the male and female labour markets. It is questionable whether occupation can be 
used as a proxy for sector, but in the case o f manufacturing, manual workers in industry 
will tend to dominate the numbers employed. Unfortunately, while this may therefore be 
possible in principle, the data are not available to do this in the case o f the Netherlands 
during the 1950s. Figures for the number o f industrial workers in 1959 are published, as 
was shown in Figure 14, but their numbers are not separated out in the reports for the 
years in the first half o f the decade, being included in “other (i.e. non-agricultural) 
workers”.
The hypothesis can, however, be tested in a less formal manner by means o f a two-stage 
process. This does not give a figure - even a rough one - for the contribution to growth in 
mean income that the increased employment o f the young in manufacturing made, but it 
does enable the hypothesis to be falsified. What we have to do is to calculate by how much 
the mean income o f the 21-29 year-old age group, expressed as a proportion o f the mean 
income o f those aged 30 and above, changed over the period. If this rose, it means that the 
mean income o f those aged in their twenties increased by more than the mean income of 
the older age group. If it fell, then the mean income of those aged 30 and above rose faster 




40-49 50-59 30 and above
Total assessable population 83.12% 75.92% 71.20% 70.24% 72.02%
Assessable male population 84.05% 74.94% 70.85% 71.54% 70.86%
Assessable female population 75.57% 74.77% 69.11% 63.05% 73.23%
Sources: InkomensverdeUng 1950, AammUtndegegevens, table 4.
InkomensverdeUng 1959 ert vermognsverdeling 1960, table 15.
Table 38: Percentage increase in nominal income, by age, 1950-59.
fell together with the growth o f manufacturing employment. A positive association 
between the movements o f the two would be consistent with the hypothesis.
The mean income o f the 21-29 year-old group grew faster than the mean income o f those 
in the older age groups. Table 38 shows the increases in the nominal mean incomes of the 
21-29 year-old age group - men, women and both together - between 1950 and 1959. The 
increases shown do not refer to the growth in incomes o f some group or groups o f 
individuals, but rather the differences between the mean nominal income o f those aged 
between 21 and 29 in 1950 and the mean nominal income o f those aged between 21 and 29 
in 1959.1959 is used here, rather than 1960, because the 1960 figures are not broken down 
by gender. The table also shows the increase in the nominal mean incomes o f older age 
groups. What it demonstrates is that the increase in the mean income o f men aged 21-29 
rose by more than the mean income o f men in older age groups. In other words, men in 
their twenties received higher incomes in 1959, relative to the incomes o f those in older age 
groups, than they did in 1950. On the other, hand, women’s mean incomes were less 
different across the age groups.
This faster growth appears to be connected with the growth in employment in 
manufacturing. The relative growths o f both are shown in Figure 15. The figures for 
manufacturing are those taken from the Algemene industriestatistiek. As these figures are from 
quarterly reports but are being used to compare annual income figures, the maximum 
quarterly number o f people employed in manufacturing in a specific year is used as the 
annual figure. Once again, the figures include mining and, since annualised data are used, 
the numbers employed in food processing have been left in. Since male income data by age 
are only available for 1950 and 1959, the relative mean income o f the 21-29 year-old age 
cohort was calculated from the whole assessable population. Both sets o f figures were 
converted to an index, with 1950 = 100.
-161-
120 t • Manufacturing workforce








1950 19541951 1952 1953 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
Year
Sources: Algemene industriestatistiek
InkomensverdeUng 1950, Aanvullende gegevens, table 4 
InkomensverdeUng 1952 en vermogensverdeUng 1953, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1953 en vermogensverdeUng 1954, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1954 en vermogensverdeUng 1955, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1957 en vermogensverdeUng 1958, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1958 en vermogensverdeUng 1959, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogensverdeUng 1960, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1960, A.anvuUende gegevens, table 4
Figure 15: Em ploym ent in mining and manufacturing, and the mean income o f  21-29
year-olds, 1950-59.
The curves are similar in shape, although the curve representing relative mean income does 
not rise as sharply as the one representing manufacturing employment. There are two 
reasons why the mean incomes o f those in their twenties might be expected to show a 
slower rate o f growth than manufacturing employment, even if manufacturing employment 
did contribute to mean income growth in the manner suggested. Firstly, the income figures 
used in Figure 15 cover the entire population, not just the male workforce. This means that 
they include the effects o f the rapid increase in female workforce participation that 
occurred during the mid-1950s boom. Since women were paid less than men, the increase 
in the proportion of women receiving their own incomes would have tended to exert 
downward pressure on the value o f mean income - particularly, as we have seen, on the 
mean income o f the under-25s. This effect can be seen in Table 38. It can also be seen 
from the data used in Figure 15. Calculation of the index number for the relative mean 
income of men in 1959 gives a value o f 108. The equivalent value for men and women 
together, actually used in Figure 15, is 106.
-162-
Secondly, those in their twenties at the beginning of the 1950s will have reached their 
thirties by the end. Those in higher-paid manufacturing jobs will have tended to raise the 
relative mean income o f the 21-29 year-old age group at the beginning o f the decade, but 
these same people will have tended to reduce it at the end, since their incomes will have 
contributed to the mean income of the over-29s. This effect, too, may be visible in Table 
38. The mean income o f the 30-39 year-old age group also rose by be more than the mean 
income o f the thirty-plus age group. Thirty is a somewhat arbitrary dividing line, defined as 
much by the available data as anything else, and it was previously suggested that the age- 
income curve for male industrial workers in 1959, shown in Figure 14, is consistent with 
the new higher-paying industries employing those in their thirties as well as those in their 
twenties.
These reasons notwithstanding, the two curves in Figure 15 begin to move more or less 
together from the point where the expansion in manufacturing employment took off. The 
mean income o f those in their twenties remained fairly static, relative to the mean income 
of those aged 30 and above, for the first few years of the 1950s. But it began to rise in 
1953-54, through the mid-1950s boom, briefly falling during the 1957-58 recession391, rising 
again in 1958-59. Only after 1959 did it fall when manufacturing income rose. This strongly 
suggests, therefore, that for most o f the decade, increased employment in manufacturing by 
the young pushed up mean incomes.
6.5 Occupational change in the older workforce.
There were also substantial changes in the structure o f the older male workforce. As can be 
seen from Table 36, no age group escaped the relative industrialisation o f the male 
workforce, with the proportion of men working in manufacturing and construction 
increasing in all age groups. Likewise, the percentage of men working in agriculture fell in 
all age groups. But the changes were not the same in all age groups. For example, the 
proportion o f men aged between 40 and 65 who worked in the trade, banking and 
insurance sector remained more or less constant across the period. Only in the 20-24 year- 
old age group did the proportion o f men working in this sector rise.
This section looks at the effect on incomes of occupational changes to the older workforce. 
The difference with the younger workforce is that, while the structure of the younger
391 Because the figures represent the amounts earned during the year as a whole, the 1957 figure reflects the 
boom conditions at the beginning o f the year.
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workforce changed as the structure o f initial entry into the workforce changed, the 
structure o f the older workforce changed as (for the most part) men moved jobs.
The manual and white-collar workforces are investigated separately. Changes in the manual 
workforce are used as a proxy for the growth of employment in manufacturing and the 
decline o f employment in agriculture. The older workforce, in this case, is defined as those 
in their forties and fifties. Those in their thirties are excluded because, by the end of the 
1950s, the earliest new entrants to the workforce at the beginning o f the 1950s will - as was 
pointed out at the end o f the previous section - have passed their thirtieth birthdays. 
Including the group aged between 30 and 39 would therefore pick up some o f the effects 
o f the younger workforce. Three net movements of manual workers are considered: 
movement out o f agricultural employment, movement out o f self-employed industrial 
work, and movement into non-agricultural manual employment392.
The growth o f white-collar employment is used as a proxy for the growth o f service sector 
employment, and is also intended to capture the effects o f the growth o f white-collar 
employment in manufacturing. The older workforce in this case includes those in their 
thirties. These are included here because o f the possibility that some manual workers who 
joined the workforce at the beginning o f the 1950s may have moved into white-collar work 
at the end o f the decade as employment in this sort of occupation increased. A likely move 
might have been from a manual supervisory role on the factory floor into a related office 
job.
The scope o f the investigation is, once again, restricted by the availability of data. It looks 
at occupational, rather than sectoral, changes because income data by age are not available 
by business sector. It looks at the whole labour force, not just male workers, because 
income data by occupation, age and gender is only available for 1959. However, as has 
been pointed out previously, the low rate o f female participation amongst the over-25s 
means that these data can be used as a proxy for the male workforce.
The incomes of those who left agricultural work rose by considerably more than the 
incomes o f those who remained. Table 39 shows how many workers left and what 
happened to their mean incomes. The number o f those estimated to have left the 
agricultural workforce is given in row A of this table. This figure is what is needed be 
added to the number o f those that remained as agricultural workers, in order that the 
proportion o f the age group is constant across the period. For example, in 1954, some
392 As in Chapter 4, “employment” in this chapter is used in the strict sense o f working for wages or a salary - 
i.e. employed by someone else - rather than the looser sense o f merely working.
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Age-group 125.2r.53 1953-54 1254-57 1957-58 1958-59
40-49 years old
A) -6561 1420 8513 307 3076
B) 4.37% 26.60% 1.23% 12.56%
Q 0.21% 1.18% 0.04% 0.43%
D) 2.831 3.250 4.080 4.286 4.577
E) 5.361 6.317 7.265 7.378
50-59 years old
A) -5575 -70 6496 1325 6100
B) 22.40% 5.20% 24.90%
Q 1.06% 0.21% 0.96%
D) 2.604 2.883 3.780 3.759 4.132
E) 6.263 7.617 7.455
Key: A) The estimated number who left manual work in agriculture during die period.
B) The proportional decline in the agricultural manual workforce during the period.
Q The proportion of the assessable workforce at the end of die period who left manual 
work in agriculture during the period.
D) The mean nominal income of manual workers in agriculture at the end of the period (flOOO a year).
E) The aproximate mean income of those who left agricultural work (flOOO a year).
Sources: InkomensverdeUng 1952 en vermogensverdeUng 1953, table 2
InkomensverdeUng 1953 en vermogensverdeUng 1954, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1954 en vermogensverdeUng 1955, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1957 en vermogensverdeUng 1958, table 8 
InkomensverdeUng 1958 en vermogensverdeUng 1959, table 8 
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogensverdeUng 1960, table 15
Table 39: The effects on the income o f  those aged 40-59 who left agricultural
employment, 1952-59.
4.66% of the 40-49 year-old age group were employed as agricultural workers. In order for 
the proportion in 1957 to have been the same, there would have to have been 8513 more 
agricultural workers, and so this is given as the estimated number who left agricultural 
employment over the period 1954-57. This estimate is equivalent, as noted in row B, to 
more than a quarter o f the 40-49 year-old employed agricultural workforce in 1954. Row C 
shows the proportion of the assessable working population in the age group who moved 
out of agriculture. Thus, the 8513 people estimated to have left employment as agricultural 
workers between 1954 and 1957 amounted to slightly more than one percent o f the 
assessable working population in 1957.
The decline shows some variation over time. For those in their forties, the agricultural 
unemployment o f 1952 did not recover until 1953, with the period 1952-53 showing an 
expansion in the number o f agricultural workers. For those in their fifties, recovery took 
longer, with numbers in the occupation increasing until 1954. But, once recovery had 
occurred, numbers declined, from nearly five percent o f the assessable workforce in the 40- 
49 year-old age group to about three percent between 1953 and 1959, and from over five 
percent of the assessable workforce in the 50-59 year-old age group to, again, about three 
percent, between 1954 and 1959. In both cases, the largest annual fall was in 1958-59.
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We can use shift-share analysis to look at the effects of these changes on income. Because 
the data are now categorised by age group, this minimises the possibility o f other trends 
affecting the answers. Rows D and E in Table 39 show the results. Row D contains the 
mean income o f those employed as agricultural workers at the end o f each period, and row 
E contains an estimate o f the mean income of those who left agricultural work. This is 
calculated as the sum of the mean income o f agricultural workers at the beginning o f the 
period and the mean increase in income received by those who moved out o f the job.
For those in their forties, the approximate mean income o f those who left agricultural work 
was more than fifty percent higher than the mean income of agricultural workers. For 
those in their fifties, it was higher still, although this may reflect a slightly different income 
structure in this age group. While the mean income of all those in their fifties was 
consistently higher than that o f those in their forties, the mean income o f agricultural 
workers alone was consistently lower. The greater rise may therefore simply reflect the 
scope for larger increases in earnings amongst the older age group. However, in both cases, 
the approximate mean income of those who made the move out o f agriculture was less 
than the mean income o f the age group. They just moved up the ranks o f the lower-paid.
The effect on incomes o f the decline in the numbers o f self-employed industrial workers 
was more complex. It is possible to identify several different movements. It is clear that the 
lower-paid moved out, presumably into employment for wages or a salary, and also, again 
presumably, for higher earnings. But it is also possible to identify, within the space of a few 
years, both the higher-paid self-employed industrial workers doing well in terms o f rising 
incomes by remaining in this area o f work and then doing badly, compared to others in 
their age group.
This group o f workers is important, because the decline in their numbers accounts for half 
the decline in the numbers of the self-employed (excluding the professions) in the 40-49 
and 50-59 year-old age groups between 1952 and 1959. On the other hand, the share o f the 
assessable working population that these workers held together with employed manual 
workers, both agricultural and non-agricultural, remained fairly stable over time - around 
fifty percent o f the assessable workforce in their fifties, slightly more for those in their 
forties - raising the possibility that there could have been net movement between these 
occupational groups. As can be seen from Table 40, at the same time that the share of self- 
employed manual workers in the assessable workforce fell, their mean income, expressed as 
a percentage o f the mean income of the assessable workforce in the age group, rose. This 







1952 7.39% 122.83% 7.36% 117.36%
1953 7.04% 130.91% 6.93% 129.76%
1954 6.77% 132.18% 6.41% 136.07%
1957 6.33% 146.40% 6.30% 141.34%
1958 6.17% 143.26% 6.46% 138.36%
1959 4.71% 158.35% 5.62% 140.83%
Key: A) The number of self-employed industrial workers, as a proportion of the assessable
working population in the age group.
B) The mean income of self-employed industrial workers, as a percentage of the mean 
income of the assessable working population in the age group.
Sources: InkomensverdeUng 1952 en vermogensverdeUng 1953, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1953 en vermogensverdeUng 1954, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1954 en vermogensverdeUng 1955, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1957 en vermogensverdeUng 1958, table 8 
InkomensverdeUng 1958 en vermogensverdeUng 1959, table 8 
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogensverdeUng 1960, table 15
Table 40: The num bers and incomes o f  self-employed industrial workers, 1952-59.
paid that were staying. The rising mean income therefore says nothing about the growth of 
actual incomes.
The income growth of self-employed industrial workers changed dramatically over time. 
This can be shown by attempting to estimate the minimum mean income of those who left 
the area. The assumption used here, once again, is that, in conditions o f full employment, 
workers moved jobs for equal or higher incomes. We know the mean income o f everyone 
together - those who left self-employed industrial work and those who remained - at the 
beginning o f the period. For example, if we are looking at the period 1952-53, we know 
that the mean income for self-employed industrial workers in the 40-49 year-old age group 
was 122.83% of the mean income of the assessable workforce in this age group. We can 
estimate the number who left, this being the number necessary to make the 1953 share o f 
the workforce 7.39%. And we know that the mean income of those who stayed was 
130.91% of the mean income of the age group. From this, we can calculate what the mean 
income of those who left would have to have been, in order for the mean income o f all 
those who were self-employed industrial workers in 1952 - both those who left and those 
who remained - to be 122.83% o f the mean income o f the assessable workforce in 1953. 
This process can be repeated for all periods and both age groups. Each estimate derived in 
this way should also be expressed as a percentage of the mean income of the assessable 
workforce in the age group.
The size of the estimated mean income gives information about the growth o f incomes o f
those who remained as self-employed industrial workers. If it is negative, it means - since it
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is clearly not possible for those who left to have received negative earnings - that the mean 
income o f those who remained rose faster than the mean income o f the rest o f the 
assessable workforce in the age group. If, on the other hand, the estimate is greater than 
the mean income of those who remained, this is likely to mean that the incomes of those 
who remained rose less than the incomes o f other workers in the age group.
On the basis o f these estimates, it appears that self-employed industrial workers did both 
better and worse, at different points in time, than other workers in the same age group. 
During the mid-1950s boom, the estimates for both age groups are negative, implying that 
earnings o f self-employed industrial workers did better than the average. However, for 
those in their forties, the estimate in 1958 was greater than the mean income o f those still 
working in the area. This was followed, the next year, by a sharp fall in the number of self- 
employed industrial workers. This pattern suggests that, in general, self-employed industrial 
workers did not do well in the 1958 recession, and large numbers took advantage o f the 
renewed demand for labour in 1959 to move into employed work.
In general, the numbers involved in the movement between manual occupations does not 
seem to have been great As was the case with agricultural workers, the numbers that left 
self-employed industrial work were not large. For both o f these groups, the year in which 
the decline was greatest was 1958-59, when the number that left agricultural work 
amounted to less than one percent of workers in their forties and the number that left self- 
employed industrial work, while greater, was still less than one and a half percent Looking 
at the movement into non-agricultural manual employment, shown in Table 41, it seems 
that the total movement into this occupational group between 1952 and 1959 amounted to 
three percentage points for those in their forties and some four and a half percentage 
points for those in the fifties. The biggest growth was in 1953-54, when the increase in the 
area amounted to neady three percent o f the 40-49 year-old assessable working population 
and almost four percent o f the 50-59 year-olds. After this sudden surge - part o f which may 
have been due to the decline in unemployment that year - the proportions o f the two age 
groups involved in the growth o f this area o f employment were smaller. But those who 
worked in non-agricultural manual occupations seem to have done better than the average 
for their age group. Mean incomes, as a proportion of the mean income of the assessable 
workforce in the age group, rose until 1957, although they subsequently fell to around their 
1952 levels by 1959.
The growth in the number employed as white-collar workers seems to have been slightly 
greater than the growth o f non-agricultural work. The term “white-collar worked5 here is 
meant to refer to routine white-collar work - i.e. it does not include such people as teachers
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Agc-gmup 1252 1255 1251 125Z 1255 1252
40-49 yean old
A) 40.84% 39.25% 41.96% 43.54% 43.04% 43.87%
B) 27.17% 26.22% 28.38% 29.80% 28.36% 29.20%
Q 66.53% 66.81% 67.64% 68.43% 65.89% 66.56%
50-59 yeats old
A) 38.13% 35.50% 39.34% 41.38% 41.82% 42.72%
B) 23.08% 21.48% 24.42% 25.65% 25.03% 25.58%
q  60.54% 60.52% 62.09% 61.99% 59.85% 59.87%
Key: A) The proportion of the assessable workforce in the age group who were non-agricultural manual workers.
B) The proportion of the total income of the age group from non-agncultural manual work,
q  The mean income of non-agricultural manual workers as a percentage of the mean income of the age group.
Sources: InkomensverdeUng 1952 en vermogensverdeUng 1953, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1953 en vermogensverdeUng 1954, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1954 en vermogensverdeUng 1955, table 2 
InkomensverdeUng 1957 en vermogensverdeUng 1958, table 8 
InkomensverdeUng 1958 en vermogensverdeUng 1959, table 8 
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogensverdeUng 1960, table 15
Table 41: The growth o f  the older non-agricultural manual workforce, 1952-59.
or those in the professions - and is intended cover occupations that manual workers might 
have moved into393. Table 42 shows the growth in numbers as being between three to five 
percentage points of the assessable working population in each of the age groups defined 
as “older”. The main part o f this increase occurred in the years 1954-57, with the figures 
only changing slightly outside this period.
But white-collar income seems to have fallen relative to other incomes during the mid- 
1950s boom. Between 1952 and 1954, while the proportion of the workforce in white- 
collar work remained steady, there was a sharp rise in the mean white-collar income. But, in 
the mid-1950s boom, when the white-collar share o f the workforce expanded, the mean 
income of the white-collar workforce fell, relative to the mean income o f the assessable 
workforce in all three age groups. From then to the end o f the decade, there was a steady 
further decline in relative mean incomes. This fall is almost certainly due to the increase in 
white-collar employment having been in relatively lower-paid jobs. One possibility is that 
this was a consequence o f the expansion o f female employment in these years. But this is 
unlikely to be the entire explanation, since the proportion of men in the white-collar 
workforce was extremely high in all three age groups - around eighty-five percent. It would 
seem, therefore, that the growth of the service sector and the increase in white-collar 
employment in manufacturing led to an increase in the number of male jobs at the lower- 
paid end o f white-collar incomes. There is, however, no way of telling what effect these
393 For the years 1952 and 1953, “white-collar worker” is defined as those in the categories “general civil 
servants”, “administrative personnel”, “sales personnel”, and “other white-collar workers”. The figures for 
1954-59 also include those categorised as “police and military personnel” and the figures for 1957-59
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Key: A) The proportion of the assessable workforce in the age group who were white-collar workers.
B) The proportion o f the total income o f die age group from white-collar work.
C) The mean income o f white-collar workers as a percentage o f the mean income of the age group.
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1952 en vermogensverdeBng 1953, table 2 
InkomensverdeBng 1953 en vermogensverdeUng 1954, table 2 
InkomtnsvtrdtBng 1954 en vermogensverdeBng 1955, table 2 
InkomensverdeBng 1957 en vermogensverdeBng 1958, table 8 
InkomensverdeSng 1958 en vermogensverdeBng 1959, table 8 
InkomensverdeBng 1959 en vermogensverdeBng 1960, table 15
Table 42: The effects on income o f  the growth in the num ber o f  older white-collar
workers, 1952-59.
had on the incomes o f those that moved into them, since, once again, we do not have any 
indication o f what was earned by those who moved into these jobs before they made the 
move.
In general, then, there is little evidence that the incomes o f most of the older age groups 
rose as a consequence o f the changing structure o f the workforce. In this respect, these 
results are consistent with the conclusions drawn from looking at the younger workforce. It 
was amongst the younger workers where the highest income growth was to be found. It is 
not clear how the figures reported in the tables in this section should be aggregated, but it 
seems that perhaps less than ten percent o f the older workforce was involved in movement 
between categories. There may well have been, o f course, movements within the various 
occupational categories that had an effect on incomes, but it is not possible to calculate the 
extent, or effect, o f this. It is clear, however, that, at least in some cases, those who moved 
between occupational categories were able to increase their incomes considerably.
additionally include “shop personnel”. It is assumed that these last two groups are included in “other white- 
collar workers” in the data for 1952 and 1953.
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6.6 The growth o f individual incomes over time.
Changes in the mean incomes o f age groups give an incomplete picture o f income growth. 
They do not represent the income growth actually experienced by those who received the 
incomes. An age group consists o f a continually changing population. So, just to emphasise 
the point again, those who were 21 in 1950 were 30 in 1959, and thus out o f the 21-29 
year-old age group. The age groups used in this chapter continually changed their 
composition every ten years.
A better picture can be gained by following mean incomes by birth cohort. As was noted in 
section 6.2, the income growth of two birth cohorts can be radically different. In this 
chapter, it has been argued that changes to the structure o f employment pushed up 
incomes, and it was shown that this was the case for men who entered the workforce 
during the 1950s, less so for those who were already in the labour force. What the story 
really concerns, therefore, is the income growth of different birth cohorts.
The rise in mean income experienced by each ten-year birth cohort over the period can be 
approximated using the 1950 and 1959 data. While 1960 would give a more accurate 
answer to the calculations as the last year o f the period than 1959,1959 has to be used for 
the simple reason that 1950 and 1959 are the only two years for which male data by age are 
tabulated separately. The assumption that has to be made when tracing the income growth 
o f cohorts across the period is that the individuals composing the cohorts remained the 
same throughout - i.e. they remained in the workforce throughout the entire period. This is 
not, as we have seen, generally true of women, who tended to leave employment in their 
mid-twenties. Older women in the workforce, such as there are, may well have previously 
left on marriage or the birth of their first child and then returned to work later. Some men 
experienced unemployment during the 1950s, breaking their continuity within the 
workforce, but the numbers involved were small enough for their effect to be ignored.
The cohorts are approximated by identifying each age group in 1950 with the next oldest 
one in 1959. The rise in income of each is then the percentage increase in real income 
between these. Figure 16 shows this in graphical terms. The two curves show the mean 
incomes o f the various age ranges, expressed in 1950 guilders: the 1959 figures were, as 
with the wage data in Chapter 5, converted to 1950 values by use of the index used in the 
national accounting statistics
The difference in magnitude between the increase in the mean incomes o f age groups and 
the mean incomes o f birth cohorts can be clearly seen. For example, the mean incomes of 
the 30-39 year-old age group in 1950 and 1959 respectively are marked by points B and C.
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  1959 »t 1950 n lues
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20 and under 21-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69
Age range
Sources: Inhmeuunle&iig 1950 Aantmllatd* gtgeutts, table 4
InkomautmUS^ 1959 at urmtganerdelmg 1960, table 2 
Jaamjfm worNaUrlanJ, 1961-1962, table 335.
Figure 16: The relationship between age and income in the male workforce in
1950 and 1959.
Since those who were in this age group in 1959 were, for the most part, in the 21-29 year- 
old age group in 1950, the approximate path that the mean income o f these people 
followed is therefore represented by the dotted line between points A and C. Its value 
increased, not by the amount along the y-axis B’-C’, but by the much greater amount A’-C’. 
This is only an approximation for two reasons. Firstly, it is not possible to take into 
account the tremendous variation in the shape of the curves of different occupations, since 
the data necessary for this are not available for 1950. Secondly, while those aged 21 in 1950 
were actually aged 30 - i.e. were nine years older - in 1959, the other age ranges do not 
match up so neatly, and there is a one year discrepancy in all other cases. Nonetheless, 
there is no reason to suppose the results o f the calculations are misleadingly inaccurate.
The magnitude o f the rises o f the younger cohorts was to a large part a consequence o f the 
shape o f the age-income curves at both dates. This magnified the effect o f the overall rise 
in incomes. This can be shown using the numerical values o f the mean incomes 
represented by the points A’, B’ and C* in Figure 16. The mean income o f the 30-39 year- 
old age group in 1950 is the income at point B* (YJ, the mean income o f this group in 
1959 is the income at point C  (YJ. The percentage increase in the mean income o f this age 
group is therefore calculated as:
(Ye - Y b) = (f4935- f 3772) = M%
Yb f3772
Age group Mean income (1950 values^
1950 1959 Increase
20 and under 0.905 0.997 10%
21 - 29 inc 2.279 3.138 38%
30 - 39 inc 3.772 4.935 31%
40 - 49 inc 4.627 5.912 28%
50 - 59 inc 4.687 6.013 28%
60 - 64 inc 4.289 5.259 23%
65 - 69 inc 3.647 4.773 31%
70 and over 2.981 3.970 33%
Total male assessable population 3.457 4.517 31%
Sources: InkomensverdeUng 1950, Aanvullende gegevens
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogensverdeUng 1960
Table 43: Real increases in m en’s mean incomes by age group, 1950-59.
The rises in mean income by age group are shown in Table 43. But these figures are
misleading, since, as noted previously, the cohort who were in the 30-39 year-old age group
in 1959 were in the earlier age group in 1950, and were receiving the income at point A*
(YJ. This means that the rise in mean income experienced by the cohort aged 30-39 in
1959 should be calculated as
- Y . )  = (f4935- f 2279) = m %
Y ft f2279
giving over three times the rise.
It should be noted that the age-income curve can also reduce the experienced rise in 
income. The mean income o f the 60-64 year-old age group rose twenty-three percent 
between 1950 and 1959, yet those who moved into their sixties by 1959 only experienced 
an eight percent increase.
These calculations confirm that it was the youngest section o f the population that
experienced the largest rises in income. Table 43 shows that the nominal mean income of
the 21-29 year-old age group rose by considerably more than that of older age groups.
Table 44 shows even sharper differences between birth cohorts. The later a man was bom,
the higher the mean rise in his income across the 1950s was likely to have been. The
magnitudes o f the rises experienced by the youngest were much greater than might be
inferred from the rises in mean income by age group. Furthermore, demographic growth
meant that the youngest were a substantial section of the working population. Almost half
the male working population in 1959 was bom after 1920 - i.e. were under the age o f forty
in 1959. O f these, a good number of those bom after 1930 may not have been in the
workforce in 1950, and so are likely to have experienced the rapid rise in incomes
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Bom % of assessable d o d  in 1959 Mefln nominal income CflOOOl Mean income fflOOOl Real incieast
( f w o ) 1950 1959 1959 at 1950 values
1939 and after 9.90% 1.333 0.997
1930-1938 18.29% 28.20% 0.905 4.195 3.138 247%
1920/21-1929 20.77% 48.97% 2.279 6.599 4.935 117%
1910/11-1919/20 17.88% 66.85% 3.772 7.905 5.912 57%
1900/01-1909/10 15.98% 82.83% 4.627 8.040 6.013 30%
1890/91-1899/1900 11.09% 93.92% 4.687 6.744 5.044 8%
Before 1890/91 6.08% 100.00% 3.692 5.308 3.970 8%
Total assessable male population 3.457 6.039 4.517 31%
Sources: Inkotmnsvtrde&ng 1950, Aanvulltndegtgevtns, table 4.
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogtnsvtrdehng 1960, table 2.
Jaanijfm voor Nederland 1959-1960, table 328.
Table 44: The rise in men's mean income by birth  cohort, 1950-59..
associated with the first years of work394. Those men bom  between 1920 and 1930 saw 
their real incomes rise by more than a hundred percent in less than ten years. This can 
perhaps be summed up by saying that the mean incomes o f the younger half o f the male 
working population at the end o f the 1950s had doubled in real terms since the beginning 
of the decade. In contrast, those who were fifty or more in 1950 experienced little in the 
way of a real increase in income.
To put these figures into historical context, it is perhaps useful to compare them to a recent 
study of male earnings in Britain between 1978/9 and 1992/3, which shows much smaller 
rises. This used the Lifetime Labour Market Database - which holds details o f a one 
percent sample o f the British workforce by National Insurance number395 - to follow the 
earnings o f men aged between 25 and 44 on 1 January 1978396. Distinct trends were noted: 
earnings o f those aged 25 in 1978 were 57% higher in real terms in 1992/3 than 1978/9, 
earnings o f the 1978 35 year-olds were 27% higher, whilst those aged 44 at the beginning 
o f the period saw their earnings first rise and then fall back to the level o f 1978397.
6.7 Conclusion.
In general, then, the largest rises in income were received as the result o f structural changes 
within the younger part o f the workforce. Employment in the new manufacturing 
industries expanded more as the consequence of recruiting new entrants into its labour
394 The fact that some o f those in this birth cohort may not have been in work in 1950 makes the calculated
rise o f this birth cohort problematic, in that it does not compare the same population at two points in time.
However, there is no reason to doubt that the mean rise experienced by these men would have been greater
than that experienced by earlier birth cohorts.
395 Ball and Marland (1996) p. 33.
396 Ibid. p. 6.
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force, than by recruiting workers from other sectors. This appears to be the reason that 
each successive birth cohort entered into higher-paid occupations than previously, and the 
mean income o f the youngest age group rose more quickly than that of older ones.
These rises in income were boosted by the tendency o f earnings to rise with age. Because 
earnings tend to rise with age, the increased earnings o f young workers in the new 
manufacturing industries increased further with time. The combination of these two factors 
meant that those in the younger half o f the population in 1959 - roughly those bom in 
1920 and after - experienced rises in real income o f over a hundred percent during the 
1950s.
But it should be noted that full employment also played a role. If the demand for labour in 
the new manufacturing industries had been less, then the number o f those who received 
higher incomes from working in them would have been fewer. Mean incomes of the 
youngest birth cohorts would therefore have risen by less, and the rises would have been 
distributed amongst a smaller proportion o f their members. Independendy o f the effect 
that full employment had on the level o f incomes, therefore, it made sure that the rises in 
income from increased industrialisation were spread to the maximum extent amongst the 
male working population.
However, as was noted previously, earnings are not the same as disposable income. 
Disposable income is mediated through the household, and so the next chapter looks at the 
growth o f household income.
397 Ibid. p. 22.
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Chapter 7. The Growth o f Household Income.
Up to this point, this study has looked solely at the growth o f male incomes. It has shown 
that the majority o f male incomes in the post-war period came from wages and, to a lesser 
extent, salaries. The previous chapter showed that the median rise in men’s real incomes 
across the 1950s was greater than 100%, and that it seems probable that a large part of this 
growth was due to the changes in the structure o f the labour force brought about by 
industrialisation.
But the growth o f male incomes will not necessarily have been identical to the growth of 
what people had to spend. It may not even have been identical to what men who received 
incomes had to spend. Society is not composed only of male recipients o f income. There 
are also female recipients o f income, as well as those who do not receive money incomes: 
children, full-time housewives, etc. Income gets redistributed amongst these, and the 
growth o f personal disposable income is the growth o f this redistributed income.
The growth o f household income is perhaps a better proxy for the growth in disposable 
income. For the most part, wage and salary earners live in multi-person households. What 
the proportion is at any given point in time will vary according to circumstances, but in the 
period under discussion this proportion formed the overwhelming majority. The 
household is where the redistribution o f income takes place. The redistribution involves 
both accounting for common household costs and the distribution between the household 
members o f income brought in by some of them. This income is not composed merely of 
wages and salaries, but can come from self-employment, profits and the like, as well as 
from sources not directiy consequential on economic activity, such as pensions or charity.
It is probably not possible to get a closer estimate o f personal income than household 
income. Atkinson notes that very little is known about the degree of income-sharing within 
the family398. The household is an area in which non-market exchange predominates, what 
Offer refers to as the “economy of regard”. Exchange in this form of economy is not 
direct in the way that buying and selling is. It begins with a gift for which reciprocity is 
expected, but this reciprocity is usually delayed, its value and timing left to discretion, 
although often tightly regulated by custom and convention. The reciprocity can also be 
indirect, taking the form of a contribution to the community. The community in question 
could, o f course, be a household399. In the case of successive generations in the household,
398 Atkinson (1983) pp. 47-48.
399 Offer (1997) p. 451.
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sociological studies have shown that - at least in the case o f North America - reciprocity is 
asymmetrical, with offspring getting more in financial, household and emotional resources 
than they return400. Offer notes that the gift economy is difficult to model401. In the case of 
this study, it would be impossible to make even a beginning with the data to hand402.
It will be assumed, therefore, that personal disposable income grew broadly at the same 
rate as household income. But although this assumption is dictated by the data, it should 
also be noted that it is probably not true. The rules by which income-sharing in the 
household is carried out almost certainly change with circumstances. For example, Goldin 
suggests that when a woman works for pay outside the home it alters the power 
relationship between husband and wife, and therefore alters the distribution o f goods 
within the family403.
However, even merely estimating the growth of household incomes is itself not 
straightforward, since household income data for the period do not exist. The CBS income 
distribution data are largely individual. The only exception is in the case o f married 
women’s incomes, which are, with a few exceptions, included with their husbands’404.
Furthermore, calculation o f household income involves defining the terms ‘‘household” 
and “income”. Both are contentious. Does a household comprise all those living under one 
roof? Or do they have to be related? And if so, in what way? Is an income just the money 
brought into the household, or can it also refer to goods and services provided directly by 
household members? A study of household income needs, at the very least, to use 
definitions o f these terms that are not only consistent throughout the discussion but also 
consistent with the available data.
The calculation also involves looking at individual incomes in terms o f household structure. 
Which categories o f household members got what, and how did the their rates o f income 
growth differ? For example, it has previously been established that men and women had 
different patterns to their working lives. Women tended to drop out o f the labour market 
after marriage, leaving their husbands to become the family breadwinners. Gender division 
therefore provides one aspect o f this household structure. But other aspects need to be 
considered, such as the contribution to household income of those who had not yet 
married and remained living in their parents’ homes, and the effect o f changes to the
400 Ibid. p. 461.
401 Ibid. p. 456.
402 Although it should be noted that some o f the evidence considered here does support the idea that 
intergenerational transfers are asymmetric
403 Goldin (1990) p. 11.
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pensions system, both on how long people continued working into old age and on 
household incomes generally. All this then needs to be related to the structure of the 
income-receiving population.
So, before attempting to measure how household income grew and why, this chapter first 
tries to build a theoretical model relating household structure and the labour force. It 
begins by attempting a definition o f the household and looks at how, theoretically, changes 
in household structure can alter the level o f household income, before looking at how 
women’s and men’s household roles affect the income they bring in, including a discussion 
of non-monetary income. It then looks at the structure o f the Dutch household, as 
represented in the 1947 and 1960 censuses, and attempts to relate this structure to the 
structure o f the assessable population - particularly the assessable working population.
The chapter then attempts to measure, using CBS income distribution data, the effect o f 
individual income growth on the growth of household income. It measures the effect o f 
changes to the pensions system, in order to clarify what happened independently of 
changes in the labour market. It goes on to measure the effect on household income o f 
changes to the incomes o f unmarried sons, testing the hypothesis that the incomes o f 
households containing working sons will have risen faster than those o f households purely 
dependent on a male head o f household. It ends by attempting to measure the effect o f 
changes in the participation rate of women. It explains why the increased participation o f 
wives in the paid workforce was perhaps more important than the raw figures suggest, 
before noting that it is impossible to test this, owing to the lack o f data on wives’ monetary 
incomes. It then looks at the increased participation o f daughters, and attempts to measure 
what proportion o f households were affected by this and by how much their income rose.
7.1 Households and household income.
This section attempts to define the terms “household” and “household income”. What we 
need is a definition of these that will enable us to use the census and income distribution 
data in such a way as to give some sense - preferable a measurable sense - of how 
household income grew. The section looks at the various forms that households can take, 
and how these can change, before investigating the way the structure o f the household, and 
the way this changes, can affect household income. The section concludes by looking at the 
various components of household income, both monetary and non-monetary.
404 This exception, as will seen below, makes the problem worse rather than alleviating it.
-178-
A household is essentially a living arrangement. This is the definition used by the UK 
census405, although precise agreement as to what this means is perhaps not possible. As 
Schwarz notes, a uniform definition for the household has not yet been found for Europe, 
let alone the rest o f the world406. living together is certainly a minimum part of the 
definition. The 1960 US census defined a household as merely being those persons 
occupying a housing unit407, but arguably income-sharing in some form should also be an 
integral part o f the definition. The former West German census seems to satisfy this, 
defining a household as a unit aimed at making arrangements to secure the satisfaction o f 
the common needs of a group o f people408. Schmid suggests several important components 
in the definition: the use o f a dwelling as a household, as indicated by, for example, the 
presence o f cooking equipment; the privacy of a household, usually meaning a separate 
entrance; and the presence o f a number o f related and non-related persons409.
Households can take a variety o f forms - this is one of the reasons why a single definition is 
so difficult - and the form a household takes should always be considered in its historical 
context As de Haan suggests, households should be regarded as being composed of social, 
cultural, economic and demographic elements410. Each o f these elements will have a 
different relative effect depending on the context, thereby affecting the form. But, in 
general, it is possible to recognise a distinction between “family” and “non-family” 
households. This distinction uses the UN definition o f a family as “members of a 
household related by blood, adoption or marriage”. A “family household” is one composed 
of a married couple, with or without a child or children, a man or a woman with a child or 
children, or any other combination of relatives. A “non-family household” consists o f an 
individual living alone or sharing quarters with one or more non-related persons411. Pott- 
Buter notes various sorts of family households. A nuclear family is composed o f a married 
couple, with or without children, living under the same roof, while an extended family 
consists of a nuclear family living either with relatives other than offspring or with servants. 
Additionally, she identifies the multiple family household412.
The form o f the household is continually changing. It can change in two ways. Firsdy, each 
individual household changes over time. Its personnel changes, the source of its means o f
405 Schmid (1988) pp. 14-15.
406 Schwarz (1988) p. 67.
407 Schmid (1988) pp. 14-15.
408 Ibid. pp. 14-15.
409 Ibid. pp. 14-15.
410 De Haan (1980) p. 61.
411 Schmid (1988) p. 15.
412 Pott-Buter (1993) p. 168.
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existence changes, etc. Because of this, as de Haan notes, dated documents are always 
therefore a frozen record o f a single moment in a far-from-fixed situation413. Thus, for 
example, the family history that would have been regarded as typical in the Nethedands 
during the post-war period was: first the family would consist o f a young married couple, 
both working for a monetary income; they would have children and only the 
father/husband would bring in an income; as the children grew up, these would go out to 
work, so that both the father/husband and some or all o f the children would bring in 
incomes; finally, the children would leave to set up their own homes, leaving the couple 
once again to live on a single male income.
The typical form of the household can also change over time. For example, an extended 
family form, consisting o f a married couple, their brothers and sisters, their children, one or 
both parents, and uncles and aunts, was identified in a number of communities in 1956. 
Hofstee argues that this was the dominant family pattern throughout the Netherlands 
during the eighteenth century414. In other words, he posits a historical development over 
the course o f two centuries in the form o f the typical family, from extended to nuclear415.
The first type o f change can be confused with the second. For example, if the number o f 
young married couples increases for demographic reasons, it can appear from the figures 
that the number o f children per family is declining. Care needs to be taken, therefore, when 
attempting to interpret what the data actually mean.
The form o f the household can also have appeared to change because its definition has 
changed over time. As Schmid puts it: “A household is... always what a census is able or 
willing to record... Even slight differences in definitions o f a household will yield different 
data”416. At various times and places, these differences have involved changes in the criteria 
for classifying people with more than one house or dwelling, for classifying lodgers such as 
sub-tenants or employees, and for determining the heads o f households417. But the 
historian is dependent on the record, and, as de Haan points out, has to work with the 
definitions used by the religious or secular authorities o f the period being studied418. This 
means that, in comparing censuses across time, it is essential to establish whether or not, or 
in what ways, the definitions have changed, before interpreting changes apparently revealed
413 De Haan (1980) p. 52.
414 Van der Woude (1972) pp. 300-301.
415 As is discussed below, he is wrong. But the example is too striking not to use as an illustration.
416 Schmid (1988) p. 14.
417 Schwarz (1988) p. 67.
418 De Haan (1980) p. 52.
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by the data. As will be seen below, this is particularly important when comparing the Dutch 
1947 and 1960 censuses.
Change in the structure o f the household can affect the level o f household income. This 
can occur at the level o f the individual family. For example, in the case o f the “typical” 
family described earlier, when the wife ceases work, household income will fall (assuming 
the husband’s income remains constant), while when a child begins work, gross family 
income will rise. When a working child leaves the parental household to set up his or her 
own home, then household income will fall again. Therefore, across the population as a 
whole, demographic changes will have an effect on household incomes, as the proportion 
of, for example, children of working age in the population rises and falls. Household 
incomes are also affected by changes in the proportion o f each type o f household within 
the population as a whole. For example, a fall in the number o f multiple-family households 
(assuming no change in the number o f people earning incomes) will cause average 
household income to fall.
All this is, o f course, dependent on the availability o f employment, and its nature. The 
situation will, for example, be changed by an increase in the availability o f employment for 
women. It will be changed as the jobs offered to new entrants into the workforce change, 
and it will also be affected by changing levels o f unemployment. These changes will affect 
the various members o f the household in different ways. The level o f women’s 
employment affects, o f course, women, while changes in youth employment affect the 
young.
Women’s employment is closely connected with their role in the household. This is a 
consequence o f how women are socially defined. Tilly and Scott argue that the word 
“woman” takes in a whole series o f social and biological categories. The “biological given” 
of the female sex is transformed into a set o f social categories by women’s associations 
with men. This becomes clear by looking at women’s life cycles. They begin as daughters 
and virgins, become sexually mature, leave the family for husbands or lovers, and become 
mothers of children. If they live long enough, they see their own children leave and marry, 
and they become mothers-in-law and grandmothers. The deaths o f their husbands make 
them widows419. But, as Tilly and Scott point out, not every woman has lived a “normative” 
life. Some girls are orphans, and have never lived with their own parents. Some women 
never married because they died young, while others live an unmarried life because of 
choice or circumstances. The fact that these latter women are single has an important
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influence on their economic position420. It follows from this that the history o f women’s 
work must be the history o f the family. The age at which a women marries, the number o f 
children she bears, the size o f the household in which she lives, the value of the children to 
the family all directly influence a woman’s working life. The time spent on the household 
and on child-bearing affect the amount o f time available for economically productive 
work421. Tilly and Scott’s study deals with French and British women, but, as will be seen, 
their model helps make sense o f the Dutch data. Their model also shows, conversely, that, 
because a woman’s economic activity is closely connected with her position in the 
household, a woman’s position in the household has a direct impact on the monetary 
income she brings into the household at any point in time.
Less obviously, men’s contributions to household income are also associated with their 
household positions. A man’s lifetime career is not so intertwined with the family as a 
woman’s, since typically, in most if not all historical periods, he would have few or no 
responsibilities internal to the family. But nonetheless there is a family pattern to his life. 
For example, using once again the “typical” Dutch family mentioned earlier: the man 
begins life as a child, completely dependent on his parents and on his father’s income; he 
starts to work for his living and brings income into the parental household; he then 
marries, sets up his own home and becomes a breadwinner, the only source of income for 
the family when his children are young, the main source later; later still, he retires, 
becoming dependent on savings or a pension; he may become a widower, with no 
dependants. Again, as with women, not every man follows the “normative” life cycle. For 
example, he may not marry. A man’s working life is not associated, therefore, with child- 
raising responsibilities, but with his role in bringing income into the household. There are 
three basic roles. As a young, unmarried man, he brings additional income into the family; 
as a married man, he is the main breadwinner o f the family as it goes through its life cycle; 
and as a retired man, possibly still living with his wife, he is dependent on his savings or a 
pension. In each o f these roles, he contributes to household income in a different manner.
The construction o f household income has therefore to take the structure o f the household 
into account in a number o f different ways. It is necessary to establish the extent o f the 
different types of household, the proportion o f single person household, the proportion of 
households containing children o f working age, and the proportion o f households
419 Tilly & Scott (1978) p. 4.
420 Ibid. p. 5.
421 Ibid. p. 7.
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containing working wives. It is also necessary to establish by how much all these things 
changed.
Contributions to household income do not, o f course, come exclusively from the labour 
market. It should be remembered that, in the majority o f cases, individuals earned their 
incomes from wages or salaries. But not every household will have received incomes from 
these sources. There existed households without wage or salary earners. And even 
households containing wage or salary earners may have included members who had other 
sources o f income. Incomes can come from self-employment or the ownership o f 
businesses, or they can come from interest earned from savings. A household income can, 
theoretically, be made up o f contributions from any combination o f any source o f income.
Nor do contributions to household income have to be monetary. This is particularly 
important to note when discussing women’s contribution to household incomes. So far the 
discussion has implicitly assumed that all income is monetary, but this may not cover every 
economic contribution that a particular woman makes to the household. It has already 
been noted that a woman’s main role within the household may be child care, along with 
such things as meal preparation - activities which, if performed outside the household, 
would generate an income. It is a problem noted by Pigou in the 1920s. Goods and 
services bought for money, he points out, do not differ fundamentally in their nature from 
those that are not bought. However, national income - the sum total of activities regarded 
as “economic” - only includes those goods and services that are bought. A man may 
therefore reduce the national income by marrying his cook422. The problem of calculating a 
woman’s economic contribution to the household, as Tilly and Scott point out, is most 
important when looking at those times and places where work does not mean wage 
earning. In these circumstances, the jobs that were performed to help support a family did 
not always bring in money. These included such things as growing vegetables, raising 
animals, making clothes, and helping with the farm or with craft work. This kind o f work 
merged imperceptibly with women’s household chores. In the Netherlands o f the 1950s, 
this is specifically a problem when attempting to define the changing contribution to 
household income o f wives working in the family business.
Ignoring the non-monetary contribution o f housework in this study may not, however, give 
an inaccurate picture. This study is investigating the change in income. In the absence o f
422 Pigou (1929) pp. 32-33. Newland points out that child care and meal preparation have an opportunity cost, 
suggesting that this go into national accounts [Newland (1980) p. 9.]. Offer attempts to calculate the 
economic contribution o f unpaid carers to the British economy. Using local authority pay scales as a basis, he
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evidence that there was significant change in the effective income resulting from child care, 
meal preparation, etc, it must be assumed that, although the level o f this income was non­
zero, it did not rise or fall by any substantial amount. Housework is therefore considered to 
have made no contribution to the changed level o f household income.
Ignoring women’s non-monetary contribution to economic activity, traditionally defined, 
may be more problematic, although no more problematic than the question o f married 
women’s income overall. In the case o f a woman helping her husband on the farm, her 
labour would have resulted in income for her husband. But if she had had received an 
income for her effort, this would have appeared aggregated with her husband’s in the 
income distribution data anyway. The two cases are therefore identical, and the problem of 
non-monetary contributions o f wives to monetary household income is part o f the general 
problem of the lack o f data on wives’ incomes.
On the other hand, changes to the level and extent o f pensions are measurable, and may 
have had important effects in two ways. Firstly, if pensions had had their intended effect o f 
reducing poverty, then they would certainly have raised the overall income figures. In order 
to investigate the effects o f changes in the labour market on incomes, it is therefore 
necessary to calculate how big this rise was. Secondly, increased numbers o f people 
receiving pensions and increased sizes o f pensions may have had a knock-on effect on 
household incomes. This will have depended on the extent to which those who received 
pensions lived in households with others.
7.2 Measuring Dutch household income.
This section looks at how changes in Dutch household income during  the 1950s can be 
measured. The theoretical insights discussed in the previous section can be used to 
interpret the census data, but what is really needed is a means by which these insights can 
be applied to the income distribution data. That is, we need to relate figures on income 
received by individuals to their position in the household structure - e.g. breadwinner, 
member o f a single-person household, etc - and we need to be able to do this in a 
consistent manner across the period.
What is wanted from the census data, then, is some means o f relating the CBS income 
distribution data to household structure. There are no income data by position in the
suggests that, in 1985, unpaid care had a market value equivalent to around 7.5% o f national income [Offer 
(1997) p. 462].
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household, but there are data for income by marital status for the years 1952, 1953, 1957, 
1958,1959 and 1960 - all but 1957 and 1960 broken down by gender. These data are usable 
if marital status was strongly correlated with position in the household in the Netherlands 
during the 1950s.
The 1960 census suggests that marital status is a good proxy for position in the household 
in that year. It is obvious that marital status is a good proxy for position in a nuclear family 
- a married man is the head of the family, a married woman his wife, and the never-married 
are their children - and it can be established, using the census data, that the nuclear family 
was the most common form of household.
The 1960 census was the first Dutch census to make a distinction between the household 
and the family. Previous censuses had treated the two words as referring to the same thing, 
and, as a consequence, a number o f important studies o f the Dutch household do not go 
back any further than I960423. The 1960 census uses three distinct terms: the multi-person 
household, the single-person household424 and the family. A multi-person household is 
defined as a group of two or more people living together in a domestic relationship and 
carrying on a common domestic life, as shown by common living rooms, and by cooking 
and eating together. Single-person households comprise not just those living alone, but also 
include those who live in the same dwelling as others if they do not have a common 
domestic life. A family either is a married couple living together, without children or with 
unmarried children, in a domestic relationship, or is a father or mother living with 
unmarried children in a domestic relationship. Parents living with married children are not 
considered a single family425. From the context, it is inferred that “unmarried” here refers 
to those who had never married, as opposed to those who were widowed or divorced.
Several types of multi-person household are distinguished. There existed, under these 
definitions, two forms o f one-family household. The simple one-family household was one 
where the head o f the household was the head of the only family, as for example in the 
cases o f a married couple and o f a married couple with children. The compound one-family 
household was one where the head o f the household was not the head o f the only family, 
such as in the case o f a mother with her married son and his family living in her household. 
Two forms o f multiple-family households are also identified. The first is where the head of 
the household is also head of one of the families, as when a married couple live with their
423 Faessen (1987) pp. 17-18.
424 In fact, the census uses the Dutch words huishouden, meaning household, and alleenstaande, meaning 
someone living alone. But the terms used above are more in line with English-language usage than the literal 
translations.
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Marital status Male-headed households
af.head
Primary unit; Family One person Other
never-married 0.01% 0.08% 0.96%
married 89.39% 0.04% 0.12%
widowed 1.18% 0.19% 0.40%
divorced 0.09% 0.04% 0.11%
Total 90.66% 0.36% 1.59%
Female-headed households
Primary, unit; Family One person Other
never-married 0.10% 0.02% 1.00%
married 0.51% 0.01% 0.05%
widowed 3.88% 0.23% 0.82%
divorced 0.64% 0.02% 0.13%
Total 5.12% 0.27% 2.00%
Source: 13eAJgemenevolkstelhngDeel5A  tablet.
Table 45: Households in 1960 (1960 definition) by gender o f  head and type o f
primary unit.
married daughter and her husband. The second form is where the head o f the household is 
not head o f one of the families, as for example a widowed mother with the families o f two 
of her children living in her house. There also existed non-family households, such as a 
widow with a lodger, two friends sharing a house, or two brothers living together426. (In all 
these cases, “children” refers to the relationship to the parents, not to age: the census 
recorded 126 male and 151 female “children” over the age of 70427.)
The census also makes a distinction between the “primary” and “secondary” units in the 
household. The primary unit is the unit containing the head o f the household. Examples 
are the nuclear family in a simple one-family household, a single person living alone and 
elderly parents in a multiple-family household. The secondary units were the others, such as 
the family o f a married son living in his widowed mother’s house, a man living in his 
married brother’s house or a lodger428.
Despite this varied and thorough typology, the overwhelming majority of households were 
one-family households headed by a married man. This can be shown by establishing that
425 13e Algemene volkstelling Deel 5 A . p. 9.
426 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
427 Ibid. table 1.
428 Ibid. p. 10.
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Source: 13eAJgmene volkstelling Deel 5A  table 1.
Table 46: Families in 1960, by gender o f  head and relationship to the rest o f  the
household.
most primary units were nuclear families headed by married man429 and that most families 
were primary units. That these were the case can be clearly seen from Table 45 and Table 
46. Table 45 shows the distribution o f forms o f household, categorised by type o f primary 
unit and gender of household head. Some ninety percent o f primary units were male­
headed families, all but one percent headed by married men. The next most common 
category consisted o f households in which the primary unit was a family headed by a 
widow - what would have been families headed by a married man had he not died. Table 46 
shows how families were distributed among the units that formed households. Around 
ninety percent o f families were primary units headed by married men. The next most 
common category, once again, consisted o f primary units headed by widows. Fewer than 
three percent o f families were secondary units, and only about two percent were secondary 
units headed by married men.
It was also the case that virtually all married adults lived in single-family households. This 
is, of course, not the same thing as the majority o f multi-family households being headed 
by married men, since it could possibly have been the case that substantial numbers of 
married men lived apart from their families430. In fact, fewer than two percent o f married 
men were not head o f a family, and more than ninety-six percent were both head o f a 
family and head of household. More than ninety-eight percent of married women were
429 The way the data are presented, it is not possible for a married woman to be recorded as the head o f  
household if she was living with her husband.
430 Such as, for example, may have been the case in Britain during the final quarter o f the eighteenth and the 
first half o f the nineteenth centuries. See Humphries (1998) pp. 31-65.
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Male (aged 15 and over)
Living in Living Ia.mstitutions
private households alone. and homes
15-24 94.47% 2.14% 3.39%
25-34 96.29% 2.48% 1.23%
35-44 97.49% 1.48% 1.03%
45-54 96.88% 2.03% 1.09%
55-64 95.26% 3.46% 1.28%
65-69 92.35% 5.64% 2.01%
70 and older 81.85% 10.36% 7.79%
94.83% 3.00% 2.17%
Female (aged 15 and over)
Livilig.in Living In institutions
private households alone and homes
15-24 93.93% 1.85% 4.22%
25-34 95.86% 2.34% 1.80%
35-44 95.92% 2.26% 1.82%
45-54 93.43% 4.19% 2.37%
55-64 86.55% 10.81% 2.64%
65-69 76.26% 19.72% 4.02%
70 and older 62.38% 24.98% 12.64%
90.15% 6.35% 3.50%
Source: 13c AJgemene volkstelkng Deel 5A  table 1.
Table 47: Distribution o f  the population by age in 1960 am ongst the different 
sorts o f  household (1960 definition).
classified as “spouses”, that is, as living with their husband431. It is therefore concluded that 
married status, for men, is a good proxy for head o f household.
In most cases, those who had never married lived as members of other people’s 
households. Some three-quarters of never-married males and two-thirds of never-married 
females lived with their parents, with a handful living with relatives. The other large groups 
of never-marrieds were those classified as “other household members”, those living alone 
and those in institutions432. “Other household members” should be left out of 
consideration, since they include domestic servants, who will have taken income out o f the 
household, rather than brought it in.
The greatest proportion o f those living outside the family were to be found amongst the 
oldest age groups. The figures in Table 47 show that the young did not generally leave 
home to live alone. Only in the older age groups did the proportion of the population 
living inside the multi-person household fall below ninety-five percent. Living alone was
431 / 3e Algemene volkstelling Deel 5A ., table 1.
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something that the old did. All this is consistent with the high proportion o f the widowed 
and divorced living alone. About thirty percent o f divorced men and women lived alone, 
and about a quarter of widowed men and three-eighths of all widowed women. A large 
proportion o f those in institutions and homes were aged between 15 and 24, but these 
formed only about four percent o f this age group. More than a quarter o f those who lived 
in institutions were aged 70 and above. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the 
never-married working young would be living in their parents’ household, and contributing 
a secondary income, rather than contributing the main income in their own household.
It seems likely that the structure o f the household in 1960 had remained more or less 
unchanged throughout the 1950s. The suspicion that this might not have been the case was 
raised by the discovery o f extended family households in the eastern part of the country, 
referred to above. The evidence was uncovered in 1956 in a survey of ten thousand 
farming households in twenty-three eastern communities. The results of this survey 
showed that nearly twenty-six percent o f these households were formed out o f extended 
families, and that in some communities the proportion o f such households was as high as 
sixty percent o f the total433. Hofstee argued that this was a remnant of a pattern of 
reproduction that had dominated the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, and his 
argument became strongly rooted in the Dutch sociology o f the family434. This viewpoint 
was reproduced in a number o f works, not necessarily consciously. For example, in a work 
cited earlier, by de Liagre Bohl et al> looking at the post-war adoption o f the 
industrialisation policy, the authors refer, without argument, to the disappearance of the 
three-generation family after the Second World War435. Ho fstee’s argument, however, has 
come under strong criticism. Van der Woude’s investigation, using data from the 
eighteenth century, concludes that the theory is untenable436.
But just because it can be shown that the extended family was not dominant in the 
eighteenth century does not mean that it was not previously more widespread than in 1960. 
The twentieth century has seen a decline in the size of the multi-person household in the 
Netherlands437. While this would be consistent with a fall in the number o f children in the 
average nuclear family, for example, it would also be consistent with a decline in the extent 
o f the extended family. It is not possible to distinguish between these two possibilities by
432 Ibid. table 1.
433 Van der Woude (1972) p. 300.
434 Ibid. p. 301.
435 De Liagre Bohl etal (1981) p. 270.
436 Van der Woude (1972) p. 317.
437 Faessen (1987) p. 26.
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comparing the household data in the 1947 and 1960 censuses, since the 1947 census treated 
the family and the household as being synonymous. It is further not possible to use data 
from any earlier census since the 1947 census contained the first complete household 
survey of the Netherlands438. What can be compared using data from the 1947 and 1960 
censuses are the number of families sharing dwellings and the stability o f the family 
structure. Multiple family households will have been recorded in 1947 as multiple 
occupancies, and so changes in the extent o f multiple occupancy may reveal changes in the 
household structure. The extended family household included unmarried brothers and 
sisters. These will have been recorded in 1947 either as children, if the dwelling belonged to 
their parents, or as living alone if they lived with their married brothers or sisters. 
Comparing the family structures revealed by the 1947 and 1960 censuses will bring out any 
major change here.
It is possible to compare households in 1947 and 1960 using the 1947 definition The 
relationship between the two definitions is well-defined, and, although it is not possible to 
convert 1947 household data into 1960-definition households, it is possible to convert data 
from the 1960 census into 1947-definition households. In fact, this is done in the 1960 
census in a number o f tables that make comparisons between the two years. The difference 
in the definitions affect both multi-person and single-person households. The relationship 
is defined as
h 47 = h 60 + s - p .
and
^ 4 7  =  +  P#
where
H 47 = the number o f multi-person households, according to the 1947 definition 
H60 = the number o f multi-person households, according to the 1960 definition 
A47 = the number o f single-person households, according to the 1947 definition 
A60 = the number o f single-person households, according to the 1960 definition 
S = the number o f secondary families, according to the 1960 definition 
Pa = the number o f primary units o f one person, according to the 1960 definition.
438 12e VolksteUing, annex mningsteUing, SerieA Deel3 p. 11.
-190-
1947 1956 1960
Single household in a dwelling
Number 1639407 2092607 2339072
Percentage 84.95% 90.04% 92.05%
Shared dwellings
Number 290417 231508 202124
Percentage 15.05% 9.96% 7.95%
Total number 1929824 2324115 2541196
Sources: 12e Volkstelling, annex woningstelUngSerieA Deel 3 table 17.
AJgemene womngteUing, 1956 Serie B deel 1 , pp. 166-167.
13e Algemene volkstelling Deel 5A  table 12.
Table 48: The decline in the num ber o f  shared dwellings, 1947-60.
These formulae therefore enable households at the broadest level o f categorisation - multi­
person or single-person households - to by re-categorised by re-aggregating data at the 
second-highest level of category. So, to calculate the number o f 1947-definition multi­
person households in 1960, the number o f secondary families must be added to the 
number o f 1960-definition households. This is because the 1947 definition o f the multi­
person household regards secondary families as households in their own right But it 
regards primary units of one person as single-person households, so their number must be 
subtracted to get the final 1947-definition figure. And to calculate the number of 1947- 
definition single-person households, the number o f single-person primary units are added 
to the number of 1960-definition single-person households.
These formulae enable the number o f 1947-definition households - both single- and multi­
person - in 1960 to be calculated. This calculation need not be restricted to the total 
number, and can be used on any well-defined subset o f the population, such as, for 
example, households headed by women.
There was a decline over the period in the proportion o f families sharing dwellings. Table 
48 shows the decline. “Dwelling” (woning) here means a house or flat, but does not include 
caravans, houseboats, etc. These latter accounted for about two percent o f all households 
(1947 definition) at all points in the period. The numbers o f single households in a dwelling 
in the table are taken from the numbers, in the sources cited, o f households living alone. 
The numbers of shared dwellings are not specifically given, so the numbers used are the 
numbers o f main households within shared dwellings. The number o f families sharing 
dwellings fell not only relatively but also absolutely. This might indicate a fall in the number 
and proportion o f multiple-family households, but is more likely the result o f intensive
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Percentage of households (1947 definition)
im .  12M
Sole household in the dwelling 80.35% 83.36%
Main household in shared dwelling 8.89% 7.20%
Living in same dwelling;
As separate household, because of:
housing shortage 6.59% 3.72%
other reasons 2.30% 1.24%
As secondary family 2.60%
In other inhabited space 1.87% 1.88%
100.00% 100.00%
Sources: Algemene woningteUing 1956 Serie B deel 1, pp. 166-167.
13e Algemene volkstelling Deel 5A  table 12.
Table 49: Households and dwellings, 1956 and 1960.
house building. More than twenty percent o f inhabited dwellings in 1956 had been built 
since 1946439. Even so, as can be seen from Table 49, the majority o f families sharing 
dwellings reported that they did so as a consequence o f a shortage o f housing, even as late 
as 1960. While the two columns440 in the table are not strictly comparable, since the 1956 
housing survey did not recognise the concept o f “secondary family"’, the trend is clear. The 
proportion o f families that lived alone increased as the housing shortage eased, not because 
of structural change to the household.
It is even possible that the number o f secondary families in 1960 is overstated. The census 
data show that the proportion o f heads o f secondary families in 1960 were overwhelmingly 
to be found among those below the age of 45, with the largest concentration in the 25-34 
year-old age group. Only after the age o f 70 does the proportion rise again441. This is 
consistent with younger families not being able to afford to live in their own home and 
thereby living as “secondary families”, and with eldedy parents moving into their children’s 
households as “secondary families”. Comparison of the two columns in Table 49 also 
provides evidence that secondary families might not have been all they were made out to 
be. Although the category o f the secondary family was not used in 1956, such families 
would have been noted as sharing dwellings, and it would be expected that they would be 
included in the category o f “sharing dwellings for other reasons”. However, adding the 
proportions for “other reasons” and “secondary family” in 1960 gives a higher figure than 
for “other reasons” in 1956. This suggests that some who would have been categorised as 
secondary families in 1960 were, in fact, categorised in 1956 as sharing because o f the
439 Algemene woningtelling 30jurti 1956 Serie B. Deel 1 pp. 166-167.
440 The 1947 census did not report any data along these lines.
441 13e Algemene volkstelling Deel 5A , table 1.
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Family households with married couples 
without children 
without children, but with others 
with children 
with children and others
Total
Family households without married couples 
with male head
with children 




with children and others 
Total
Non-family households





Note: Excluding the travelling population.
Source: 13e Algemene volkstelling Deel 5A  p. 32.
Table 50: H ousehold composition (1947 definition) per 1000 households, 1947,
1956 and 1960.
housing shortage. This in turn suggests that the line between living in a dwelling as a 
secondary family and sharing because o f the housing shortage was not as clear-cut as the 
literature might make us believe, and that some o f those classified as secondary families in 
1960 may have moved out to live on their own had housing been available. The alternative 
is to take the columns in Table 49 literally, and conclude that there was a small increase in 
the number o f three-generation households at the end o f the 1950s. Either way, the 
numbers involved are small enough to ignore.
In other respects as well, the household structure seems to have remained stable 
throughout the period. Table 50 shows comparisons of family structure in 1947, 1956 and 
1960. Most households were headed by a married couple, with a rise in the proportion of 
these in 1947-56. This was matched by a fall in the number of single-parent families over 
the same period442. Both these figures remained constant between 1956 and 1960. There 
was a fall in the proportion of households with children, which may not have been entirely
442 The relatively high number o f single-parent families in 1947 was probably a consequence o f the war, since, 
according to Pott-Buter, the level o f illegitimate births in the Netherlands was low until the 1980s [Pott-Buter 
(1993) p. 176].
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due to a fall in fertility, since the age of marriage also fell over the period. Earlier marriage 
meant that children remained in the home for a shorter period, which meant that, in the 
population as a whole, the number o f children living in their parents> households would 
decline. Otherwise, the overall picture is one o f very litde change.
In conclusion, then, marital status seems to be a reliable proxy for position in the 
household, not just for 1960 but for the whole period. The vast majority o f households 
were composed solely of nuclear families with a married man at the head of the household. 
Secondary incomes were potentially brought into the household by married women, never- 
married men and never-married women. The elderly largely lived apart from their 
offspring, either as married couples or as the widowed and divorced living alone. There 
existed a large number o f exceptions, but this model encapsulates the broad picture.
7.3 Changes in incomes from pensions.
This section looks at the effects on household incomes o f changes in pension provisions. It 
does not just consider the effect on die incomes o f households containing those who 
received pensions, but also any possible knock-on effects on households o f children o f the 
elderly, etc. It begins by describing the changes that were made to pension provisions, and 
looks at the effect o f these on working patterns, before considering the effect on incomes.
There were three changes to pension provisions during the post-war period. The first 
change occurred in 1947 with the Noodwet Ouderdomsvoongening, a temporary measure under 
which everyone aged 65 and above with an income that was deemed too low received a 
state pension443. Prior to this, there had existed a contributory old-age pensions system that 
covered only a part o f the population. Under the 1913 Invalidity Law, all workmen and 
labourers aged 70 or over who contributed to the scheme were awarded an old-age 
pension. The minimum age at which a pension could be awarded was lowered to 65 in 
1919. That same year, the Voluntary Old-age Insurance Law allowed all those o f “working 
class status” aged 65 or over to receive a pension after making a required number o f 
contributions444. Public relief also existed, but was only available to those who could not 
depend on certain specified relatives or on charity445. A full old-age pension system was 
introduced on 1st January 1957 under the General Old-age Act, the Algemene Ouderdomswet, a
443 Van Loo (1992) pp. 115-166. The name o f the law is not easily translatable into English, but is best 
rendered as “Emergency law for the provision o f the elderly”.
444 Bulder (c. 1993) pp. 88-90.
445 Ibid. p. 176.
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law intended to guarantee the old a basic standard of living446. The Dutch refer to the old- 
age pension as the “AOW”, from this law’s initials. The following year, 1958, the Widows 
and Orphans Act came into operation, giving widows a pension447.
The growth in the number receiving pensions in the late 1950s is captured in the CBS 
income distribution data. These data are broken down by occupation for the years 1952 to 
1959 inclusive, with the exception of 1955 and 1956. ‘Tensioners” count as an occupation, 
although it seems, from the context, that their number includes those receiving such things 
as disability pensions, as well as old-age and widows’ pensions. Those with “no 
occupation” are also categorised as an occupation if they received an income, although 
there is no indication in the data as to what the origin of the income might have been. This 
group does, however, play a part in this story.
Although an individual can in practice carry on more than one occupation, he or she is 
categorised under a single occupation in the data. The category given is the one from which 
the major part o f an individual’s income is derived, and individuals can receive incomes 
from more than one source. For example, a farmer over the age o f 65 will have received a 
pension from the beginning o f 1957. Whether he is categorised as a farmer or a pensioner 
depends on whether he received more from farming than he did from his pension, or vice 
versa. This is not a serious problem when discussing employment as a whole. Very few 
farmers would also have had jobs as metalworkers. But it is entirely feasible that people 
continued farming while actually receiving a pension. The data will have to be interpreted 
in this context
There are also a couple o f restrictions in how the data are categorised. Firstly, since there 
are data by occupation, gender and age only for 1959, it is not possible to create a series for 
women’s pensions by age. This in turn makes it impossible accurately to differentiate the 
effects o f the AOW and of widow’s pensions, except by inference. There exist, however, 
data by occupation and gender, and by occupation and age for several years, thus making 
inference easier than it might have been.
Secondly, the numbers o f those with no occupation and no income are not included in the 
data. This has implications for creating a series reflecting the changed income o f those who 
began receiving pensions, since there is no indication of where these people came from. 
They could have received income from some other source, from working or from charity,
446 Rossem eta l{1993) p. 46.
447 Van Loo (1992) p. 116.
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Year Total Pensioners No occupation Pensioners plus
assessable no occupation
population Number % of Number % of Number %9f„
total total total
1952 814700 117000 14.36% 58500 7.18% 175500 21.54%
1953 843700 122000 14.46% 64000 7.59% 186000 22.05%
1958 1039350 195000 18.76% 25000 2.41% 220000 21.17%
1959 1053350 208000 19.75% 20000 1.90% 228000 21.65%
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1952 en vermogensverdeBng 1953, table 1.
InkomensverdeBng 1953 en vermo^  
InkomensverdeBng 1958 en vermo± 




Table 51: The growth in the num ber o f  female pensioners, 1952-59.
for example, or they might have been regarded as having had no income. Both might be 
expected.
The figures suggest that slighdy more than half the number of women who received 
pensions for the first time in the late 1950s had previously received incomes from outside 
the labour force. Table 51 shows the growth in the proportion of pensioners amongst the 
assessable female population. There is a cleady-noticeable jump in the proportion o f 
women receiving pensions between 1953 and 1958, but this is matched by a fall in the 
proportion o f those receiving income from no occupation44*. The combined proportion o f 
the two categories remained constant. At first sight this suggests that there was a 
straightforward substitution. However, the size o f the female assessable population rose 
over the same period, and the fall in the absolute number of those with no occupation 
accounts for litde more than fifty percent o f the rise in the number o f pensioners
A substantial number o f men, on the other hand, may have left the labour force as a 
consequence o f the introduction of old-age pensions. As Table 52 shows, the proportion
Year Total Pensioners No. occupation Pensioners plus
assessable no occupation
population Number % of Number % of Number % of
total total total
1952 3175100 163000 5.13% 50500 1.59% 213500 6.72%
1953 3210400 152000 4.73% 64000 1.99% 216000 6.73%
1958 3562800 301000 8.45% 11500 0.32% 312500 8.77%
1959 3634300 324000 8.92% 11500 0.32% 335500 9.23%
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1952 en vermogensverdeBng 1953, table 1.
InkomensverdeBng 1953 en vermogensverdeBng 1954, table 1. 
InkomensverdeBng 1958 en vermogensverdeBng 1959, table 9. 
InkomensverdeBng 1959 en vermogensverdeBng 1960, table 16.
Table 52: The growth in the num ber o f  male pensioners, 1952-59.
448 There are, unfortunately, no data for income by occupation and gender for 1957, which would have made 
it easier to distinguish between the effects of the AOW and the widows’ pension.
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1952 1953 1954 1957 1958 1959
Self-employed in:
Agriculture 11.02% 11.05% 10.69% 7.43% 6.87% 6.24%
Trade and transport 6.51% 6.53% 7.14% 5.20% 4.56% 4.32%
Other 5.08% 5.16% 4.40% 3.20% 3.48% 3.34%
Total self-employed 22.61% 22.74% 22.22% 15.83% 14.91% 13.91%
Company directors, etc 0.52% 0.66% 0.58% 0.57% 0.62% 0.57%
Public sector employees 0.41% 0.59% 1.21% 0.66% 0.64% 0.65%
Private sector white-collar workers 2.64% 2.83% 2.64% 2.43% 2.62% 2.20%
Agricultural workers 1.64% 1.70% 1.38% 0.79% 0.72% 0.72%
Other manual workers 6.68% 6.73% 6.87% 4.73% 5.11% 5.02%
Unknown occupation/vacation workers 1.04% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Assessable working population 35.54% 35.40% 34.91% 25.01% 24.62% 23.07%
Pensioners 46.11% 47.13% 48.94% 74.49% 75.29% 76.93%
No occupation 18.35% 17.47% 16.15% 0.50% 0.10% 0.00%
Assessable population 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Sources: InkomensverdeBng 1952 en vermogensverdeBng 1953, table 2
InkomensverdeBng 1953 en vermogensverdeBng 1954, table 2 
InkomensverdeBng 1954 en vermogensverdeBng 1955, table 2 
InkomensverdeBng 1957 en vermogensverdeBng 1958, table 8 
InkomensverdeBng 1958 en vermogensverdeBng 1959, table 8 
InkomensverdeBng 1959 en vermogensverdeBng 1960, table 15
Table 53: The assessable population aged 65 and over, by occupation, 1952-59.
o f pensioners and those without occupations rose in the period 1953-58, but the fall in the 
number o f those without occupations was only about a third o f the increase in the number 
of pensioners. But there was also a considerable fall in the number o f over-65s in the 
workforce, and it seems likely that the introduction o f the pension was a cause of this. 
Table 53 shows how the occupational structure o f the over-65 assessable population 
changed between 1952 and 1959449. The proportion o f the population classified as 
pensioners rose from just under a half in the first part o f the decade to around three- 
quarters from 1957, with a huge fall in the proportion o f those classed as having no 
occupation, from one in six o f the over-65 population in 1952 to zero in 1959450. But there 
was also a large fall in the percentage o f those who were working, from over thirty-five 
percent to less than a quarter.
The sharpest drop is to be seen between 1954 and 1957, but there are also further declines 
in the proportion working in 1958 and 1959. It is not clear why this should have been the 
case, but the fall did not occur across all occupations in the same way. The underlying data 
for Table 53 also shows that the proportions of each occupation in the assessable working 
population were fairly similar in 1954 and 1957. This means that the fall in working
449 The data in Table 53 cover both men and women.
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Those age 65 and over who were
Year Working Pensioners Without
pscupatip.n
Total
1952 145 69 83 98
1953 146 64 83 96
1954 146 69 88 99
1957 175 81 124 105
1958 178 81 113 105
1959 162 77 97
Mean income o f the whole assessable population for the year =100
Sources: Inkomensverdeling 1952 en vermogensverdeling 1953, table 2
Inkomensverdeling 1953 en vermogensverdeling 1954, table 2 
Inkomensverdeling 1954 en vermogensverdeling 1955, table 2 
Inkomensverdeling 1957 en vermogensverdeling 1958, table 8 
Inkomensverdeling 1958 en vermogensverdeling 1959, table 8 
Inkomensverdeling 1959 en vermogensverdeling 1960, table 15
Table 54: The growth in mean incom e o f  those aged 65 and over, 1952-59.
numbers when the AOW was first introduced was fairly evenly spread across all sectors. 
But between 1957 and 1958 the proportions o f those working as self-employed in 
agriculture, and those working in trade and transport (most likely in retail, since this formed 
the biggest proportion of the sector as regards self-employment) both fell. In other words, 
taken over two years, the introduction o f old-age pensions caused a larger fall in the self- 
employed working population than in the workforce as a whole. These figures are 
consistent with Bulder’s findings that, in the period before 1947, paid labour was important 
for men as an element in maintaining income until the age of 70451, and that self-employed 
people stayed in work longer than others452.
The data confirm that the introduction o f the general old-age pension raised the incomes 
of the over-65s. Table 54 shows the growth in the relative average income o f those o f 
pensionable age. The income o f the average pensioner rose from around seventy percent of 
average income to around eighty percent. The income o f the average working over-65 and 
the average over-65 with no occupation also rose453. This is consistent with the lowest paid 
in these groups having their incomes boosted by pensions. This could have occurred in two 
ways. People could either have given up their previous source o f income and become
450 This figure is different from the ones cited above for men and for women, since the proportions quoted 
by gender cover all ages.
451 Bulder (c. 1993) p. 79.
452 Ibid. p. 88.
453 Except in 1959, when there was no one aged 65 or above deriving an income from “no occupation”.
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entirely dependent on pensions, or it could have been that, from 1957, they received more 
than fifty percent of their income from pensions.
It seems unlikely, however, that changes in pension provisions had much effect on the 
incomes o f others, with the exception o f pensioners’ direct dependants. The introduction 
of widows’ pensions would have had an effect on orphans as well as widows, and where 
pensions are recorded as being given to married men, this will have included pensions 
received by their wives. But pensions - or at least old-age pensions - are not likely to have 
affected others. It has already been shown that a large proportion o f the elderly lived 
outside the context of the family household at the end o f the 1950s. Earlier studies have 
shown that there was not much in the way o f inter-generational transfers between the 
elderly and their children. A study by Milland in 1898 into the conditions o f the elderly in 
the Netherlands argued that only unmarried employed children had sufficient income to 
make substantial transfers to their parents. However, unmarried children sharing their 
parents’ household often consumed their entire contribution to the family income 
themselves, and married children took elderly parents into their household only when the 
parents made direct or indirect contributions to the family economy454. This picture is 
partly confirmed by two enquiries carried out in Zaandam in 1947 at the time o f the 
introduction o f the Noodwet Ouderdomsvoor^ening. These showed that, prior to the 
introduction o f emergency pensions, in eady old age, the majority o f incomes came from 
the person’s own resources - generally from paid labour or from capital. The more elderly 
were dependent on charitable and poor relief institutions. Following the introduction of 
emergency pensions, income from pensions replaced income from labour and from poor 
relief, while income from capital remained at the same level455. There is no talk o f monetary 
transfers from children, and Bulder can find none in any o f the other data she uses456. If 
these transfers did not exist, then the introduction of general old-age pensions would not 
have affected children’s household income.
7.4 The income growth o f working sons.
In Chapter 6, it was established that the average income o f the 21-29 year-old age group 
rose faster than incomes as a whole. This section tests the hypothesis that, because o f this, 
the average income of households containing working sons will have risen at a faster rate
454 Bulder (c. 1993) pp. 62-63.
455 Ibid. pp. 132-133.
456 Ibid. p. 135.
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than the average income of households without working sons. Clearly, ceteris paribus, a 
household containing working sons will have had an income higher than one without, but 
what is important here is the comparative rate of increase. The question under 
consideration is whether the average income o f working sons rose faster than the average 
income o f men in general. If this was the case, then it would mean that the presence of 
working sons in a household would, on average, cause its total household income to rise at 
a faster rate than if they were not present. This in turn would mean that - subject to the 
provisos made earlier concerning income distribution within the family - rising income 
from industrialisation affected more people than just the individuals working in industry 
and their direct dependants. It might, for example, have affected their parents.
Around a quarter or so o f households contained sons o f working age. The 1960 census 
data show that the number of sons of working age still living with their parents in 1960 
amounted to about thirty-four percent o f the number o f heads o f household, both male 
and female457. The proportion o f households that contained a son o f working age would, 
however, have been less than this, since it would have been the case that a number o f 
households would have contained two or more of them. There are no data for the 
distribution o f children across households for 1960, but they do exist for 1947. These show 
that over half (58%) of all families containing children aged 14 or over had only one of 
these, slightly more than a quarter (27%) contained two, and ten percent contained three.
Working on the assumption, argued above, that the structure o f the family remained more 
or less constant between 1947 and 1960, these figures can be used in combination with the 
1960 data to calculate the proportion o f families with one or more sons o f working age. 
The data are not broken down by gender, so an assumption will be made that the numbers 
of sons and daughters were approximately equal458. This means that half the number o f 
families with one child aged 14 or over will have had one son (the other half will have had 
one daughter). A quarter o f the families with two children will have had two sons, while a 
half o f  them will have had one son (and one daughter). O f the families with three children, 
three out o f eight will have had one son, an equal number will have had two sons, and one 
out o f eight will have had three sons. The percentage o f families with more than three 
children aged 14 or over is so small that they are ignored.
457 /3e Aigemene volkstelUng Deel 5A , table 1.
458 This is probably incorrect, since the average age o f  marriage for men was higher than the average age o f  
marriage for women. Since children stayed in the home until marriage, this means that there would have been 
more sons than daughters in the later age groups. But the intention here is only to get a rough approximation.
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Rise in mean income






Sources: Inkomensmdeling 1952 en vemogensverdeUng 1953, table 1.
InkomensverdeUng 1953 en vermogensverdeling 1954, table 1.
Inkomensverdeling 1957 en vemogensverdeling 1958, table 3.
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vermogensverdeUng 1960, table 16.
InkomensverdeUng 1960 Aanvulldegegevens, table IB.
Table 55: The growth in mean nominal income o f  never-married and married men,
1952-60
Using these proportions to divide up the thirty-four percent of households in 1960 that 
contained sons of working age, gives, in approximate terms, sixteen percent o f households 
with one son aged 14 or above, eight percent with two sons and two percent with three or 
more sons459. This adds up to twenty-six percent o f households containing at least one son 
of working age. Not all o f these will have been working. Forty-three percent o f males aged 
between fourteen and nineteen, and neady eight percent o f those between twenty and 
twenty-four were in full-time education at the time o f the 1960 census460, but the 
calculation gives a rough idea o f the number of households concerned.
The hypothesis is tested by comparing the growth in the average income o f never-married 
men with the growth in mean married male incomes. “Married” here means those who 
have been married at one point - i.e. it includes those classified as ‘‘widowed” and 
“divorced”. The figures for income by marital status and gender can be obtained from the 
CBS income distribution data for 1952, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960. The results are 
shown in Table 55.
In fact, the figures do not support the hypothesis - at first sight in contradiction to the 
earlier results. In general, the mean income o f married men rose by slightly more than the 
mean income o f never-married men. The exception is that the mean income o f never- 
married men rose very slightly more than that of married men during the four year period 
1953-57. But, over the period as a whole, the relative mean income of never-married men 
fell from forty percent o f that o f married men in 1952 to thirty-eight percent in 1960.
459 These figures add up to thirty-eight percent not thirty-four: (16*1) + (8*2) + (2*3) = 38. But, to 
emphasise, what is being calculated here is a ballpark estimate.
460 13e Algemene volksteUing Deel 10A p. 18.
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The explanation seems to be that, as incomes rose, men got married at an earlier age. 
Between 1947 and 1960, the average age at which men married fell by nearly two years461. 
This is partly apparent from the data behind Table 55. This shows that the proportion of 
the never-married in the assessable male population fell, from over twenty-eight percent in 
1952 to twenty-six percent in 1959, with a slight rise in 1959-60. Because mean income rose 
with age, a falling average age o f marriage reduced the mean income of the never-married.
It seems, therefore, that, while household incomes did not rise faster than male incomes as 
a result o f the increase in young male incomes, the disposable incomes o f household 
members did. This apparent contradiction was a consequence o f the earlier formation of 
new households, itself the result o f the higher earnings than previously o f young males. But 
the earlier formation o f these new households may have boosted the disposable income of 
parents, because it reduced amount of income transferred to their children. The extremely 
rapid fall in the age o f marriage suggests that young men in 1950 could not afford to set up 
their own households as early as they would have like to. The higher earnings available to 
the later birth cohorts removed or reduced the economic barrier. But this in turn implies 
that rises in the incomes o f young men were not redistributed amongst their parents’ 
households, but were largely retained by the sons themselves. This goes some way to back 
up the idea that children with their own incomes did not share these with their parents, and 
that intergenerational transfers were largely one-way - from the older to the younger 
generation. If this was the case, then the earlier age o f marriage would have meant that 
parents ceased to make these transfers, on average, nearly two years earlier. To put this 
another way, their disposable income would have risen by the amount involved some two 
years earlier than was the case at the end o f the 1940s.
7.5 Increased women’s participation and household income.
This section investigates the effects on household income of the increase in women’s 
participation in the paid workforce. It confines itself to the effects on monetary incomes, 
for the reasons stated earlier in the chapter. The section begins by reviewing the pattern of 
increased participation, before looking at the effects o f increased participation by married 
and never-married women separately.
The absolute number o f economically-active women declined between 1947 and 1960 as a 
consequence o f two conflicting trends. On the one hand, the number o f women working
461 Jaarcijfers voor Nederland, table 34; Jaarcijfers voorNederland, table 35; Jaarcijfers voorNederland, table 40.
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1947 1960
Working Economically-active Working Economically-active
family members outside the family family members outside the family
Agriculture, fishing & hunting 15.05% 2.85% 3.31% 1.06%
Mining and quarrying 0.01% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12%
Manufacturing 0.45% 16.49% 0.32% 21.78%
Building & construction 0.06% 0.21% 0.03% 0.56%
Public utilities 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.23%
Retailing in shops
Commerce (excluding retail in shops),
7.12% 7.07% 4.64% 12.41%
banking & insurance 0.39% 3.62% 0.23% 6.45%
Transport & communications 0.15% 1.73% 0.23% 2.04%
Domestic service 0.00% 18.88% 0.00% 12.29%
Services (excluding domestic service) 1.95% 23.18% 1.35% 32.70%
Unknown type of business 0.00% 0.54% 0.00% 0.24%
Total 25.18% 74.82% 10.11% 89.89%
Source: 13eAlgemene volkstdSnfy Deel 10 A , table 2.
Table 56: Changes in the num ber o f  economically-active women, by sector, 1947-
60.
in the family business fell by over sixty percent, while, on the other, there was an eighteen 
percent increase in the number o f women working outside the home462. As a consequence 
of these trends, as can be seen from Table 56, the number o f women working in the family 
business fell from a quarter to a tenth o f the economically-active female population. The 
pattern o f occupations followed by women changed. O f the working family members, 
about three-quarters o f the fall in numbers took place in agriculture and about a sixth in 
retail work in shops. Together, these sectors made up ninety-five percent o f the fall in 
numbers.
The rise in numbers o f those who worked outside the family was, again, the result o f two 
contradictory trends, with a fall in some sectors and a rise in others. There was a fall in the 
numbers working in agriculture and in domestic service. The number working in 
agriculture fell by sixty percent - although the size o f the fall was not large in absolute terms 
and certainly not to compare with the fall amongst those working on the family farm. The 
thirty-five percent fall in the number working in domestic service, on the other hand, did 
form a significant proportion of the employed female workforce, amounting to the 
equivalent o f nine percent o f the number of women working outside the home in 1947.
Other sectors experienced a rise in the numbers o f women working in them. 
Manufacturing received a thirty percent rise in numbers, retail work in shops seventy-three 
percent, and a similar rise in other forms of commerce, banking and insurance. The largest 
component in the total rise was in services, which experienced nearly a forty percent rise in
462 The male workforce increased in number by about eleven percent over the same period.
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numbers. This change in the pattern o f employment left the same sectors important - 
manufacturing, retail work, other forms o f commerce together with banking and insurance, 
and domestic services and other forms o f service - but changed the order o f their 
importance.
As with the male workforce, the majority o f the increase in numbers occurred amongst 
wage and salary earners. The proportion o f women who were heads o f businesses and self- 
employed fell from just under ten percent of those working outside the home to around six 
percent, while their absolute number fell by over a quarter463.
The changed pattern o f employment is pardy reflected in the pattern o f the supply and 
demand for female labour. Table 16 shows the total numbers at the end o f September each 
year o f women registered as looking for work and o f employers’ registered demand, along 
with the figures for the major sectors. In general, the overall pattern was the same as the 
male one. There was a fall in demand for labour in the early 1950s, a rise in the mid-1950s, 
a fall in 1957-58, and a rise thereafter. However, unlike the demand for male labour, the 
demand for female labour did not fall below its registered supply in 1958.
The pattern varied between sectors. This, it seems, was at least in part a reflection o f 
preference for working in certain sectors over others. For example, as Table 16 suggests, 
the decline in numbers o f women working as domestic servants does not seem to have 
been driven by a decline in demand. Once there was full employment, from 1953, the 
number o f women registered as wanting such work plunged dramatically, while demand for 
domestic servants rose in equal measure. The reverse pattern can be seen with office work 
and with commercial work. In each case, registered supply exceeded demand at the 
beginning o f the 1950s, and only after 1954 did demand exceed supply. In the case o f 
manufacturing, the cycle o f demand shows the same pattern as for male work in 
manufacturing, but hardly any women registered as looking for industrial work. Apparently 
manufacturing could have made a stronger contribution to the growth o f the female labour 
force, but this was limited by reluctance o f women to look for work in the sector.
These changes still left married women as a very small proportion o f the workforce. The 
overall participation of married women declined because, once again, the proportion o f 
women working in the family business fell while the proportion o f those working outside 
the home rose. This is shown in Table 57. The number o f wives working in the family 
business fell from just under eight percent o f all married women in 1947 to two and a half
463 13e Algemne volkstelling Deel 10A table 2.
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1947
Total Living with husband Not living
Working in the Other with husbani
Ag£ family business
15-19 8.69% 2.17% 4.08% 2.45%
20-24 8.48% 3.36% 3.74% 1.37%
25-29 8.24% 5.01% 2.44% 0.79%
30-34 9.52% 7.07% 1.91% 0.54%
35-39 12.02% 9.54% 2.02% 0.46%
40-44 11.97% 9.61% 1.93% 0.44%
45-49 12.04% 9.79% 1.81% 0.44%
50-54 11.22% 9.36% 1.50% 0.36%
55-59 10.03% 8.62% 1.14% 0.27%
60-64 8.12% 7.16% 0.76% 0.21%
65+ 4.83% 4.40% 0.30% 0.13%
Total 10.00% 7.67% 1.82% a051%
1960
Total Living with husband Not living
Working in. the Other with husbani
Age family business
15-19 13.45% 0.91% 10.06% 2.48%
20-24 12.47% 1.64% 9.23% 1.61%
25-29 7.74% 2.00% 5.23% 0.51%
30-34 6.59% 2.44% 3.89% 0.26%
35-39 7.30% 2.98% 4.09% 0.23%
40-44 8.08% 3.47% 4.36% 0.25%
45-49 8.08% 3.71% 4.11% 0.26%
50-54 7.12% 3.34% 3.51% 0.28%
55-59 5.31% 2.58% 2.48% 0.25%
60-64 3.04% 1.56% 1.32% 0.16%
65+ 0.83% 0.47% 0.31% 0.05%
Total 6.76% 2.52% 3.88% 0.36%
Source: 13t Algemene volkstelling Deel 10A table 19.
Table 57: Economically-active married women, as a proportion o f  the
num ber o f  married women in each age group, 1947 and 1960.
percent in 1960. The proportion of married women who worked outside the home more 
than doubled from just under two percent to just under four. The proportion o f wives in 
the paid workforce rose at all age levels, with around ten percent o f married women under 
the age o f 25 working in 1960.
The relatively high proportion o f younger wives - those who married below the average age 
- is probably part o f the explanation as to why a higher proportion o f wives worked when 
the husband was on a lower income. Table 17, above, gives some indication of the 
relationship between a wife working and her husband’s income. Three-quarters of men
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Occupational category Heads.of 
multi-person households
Living-atone
Head of agricultural of horticultural business 3318 1.56% 648 0.25%
Other heads of business with personnel: 
Shops
in industry with












income of f7,500 p.a. and over 
income of f5,500 - < f7,500 p.a. 
income of f3,750 - < f5,500 p.a. 
income of < f3,750 p.a.
Agricultural workers
Other manual workers:
income of f7,500 p.a. and over 
income of f5,500 - < f7,500 p.a. 
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212539 100.00% 263958 100.00%
Source: 13e Algemene volkstelUng Deel 10A table 9.
Table 58: The occupational distribution o f  female heads o f  household (1947
definition), 1960.
with working wives earned less than f7500 a year464 and nearly sixty percent less than £5500. 
The exception to this pattern was with those men working in the “non-scientific” 
professions465.
There was also a low proportion of households headed by a woman with an occupation.
464 As is noted later in this section, the mean income o f men in their forties and fifties in 1959 was around 
fBOOO.
465 There are slightly different figures for the percentage o f married women working outside the home and 
the percentage o f male heads o f  household working outside the home because there were slightly more male 
heads o f household (1947 definition) than married women.
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The distribution of female-headed households in 1960 according to the occupation of the 
head of household is shown in Table 58. As can be seen, more than three-quarters o f 
women who headed multi-person households (1947 definition) 466 and more than two-thirds 
of women living alone had no occupation. The large number o f older women in these 
groups probably explains this. O f those female heads o f household who did have jobs, the 
largest numbers were to be found in the lowest income groups.
Unmarried women, on the other hand, increased their participation in the paid workforce. 
Once again, there was a decline in the number working in the family business. However, 
unlike in the case o f married women, this decline was not large enough to offset the growth 
in numbers working outside the home, which amounted to more than ten percent467. This 
resulted in the female workforce growing younger. By 1960, more than fifty percent o f the 
economically-active female population was under the age o f 25, up from forty-six percent 
in 1947468, despite a rise in the proportion o f 14 to 19-year olds in full-time education from 
just under a quarter to almost a third469.
The increased participation o f married women may have had a larger impact on the growth 
o f household incomes than the simple figure suggests. The figure o f four percent o f wives 
working outside the home needs to be taken in the context o f two provisos. The first has 
already been noted. The participation rate of married women under the age o f 25 was 
nearer to ten percent than four, and so married women’s income will have been more 
important to the income o f households of young married couples than to those o f more 
established couples.
The second proviso is the point made by Goldin already noted in Chapter 4: the level o f 
labour force participation as measured by a census is ambiguous. This figure says nothing 
about the homogeneity or heterogeneity of women’s labour470. In the Dutch case, the 1960 
census was taken on 31st May, and the four percent participation rate actually means that 
four percent o f wives worked outside the home in the previous week. Complete 
heterogeneity means that some wives worked outside the home for the whole year, while 
others did not work at all. If  this were the case, the four percent figure would be exactly the 
proportion of wives who worked in 1960. On the other hand, complete homogeneity
466 The 1960 occupational census used the 1947 definition o f the household.
467 This is nowhere stated explicitly, but can be calculated from data in 13e Algemene volksteUing Deel 10A tables 
2 and 19. The number o f unmarried women working outside the home in each o f  the years is calculated by 
subtracting the number o f wives economically-active outside the home from the total number o f women 
economically-active outside the home.
468 /3e Algemene volksteUing Deel 10A p. 25.
469 Ibid. p. 18.
470 Goldin (1990) pp. 28-29.
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means that all wives worked an identical amount in the year, with four percent working at 
any one time - i.e. each wife worked for about a fortnight in 1960. It seems therefore to be 
probable that more than four percent of wives worked during the year. It is certain that not 
all wives worked identical amounts o f time, since young wives and those whose husbands 
earned low incomes were more likely to work than others. But it was probably also the case 
that these groups themselves were not completely heterogeneous, and that more than ten 
percent o f young wives worked at some point during the year.
It seems likely, then, that increased participation by married women had some effect on the 
growth of average household income. But because married women’s incomes are included 
in their husbands’ in the CBS income distribution data, this bald statement is all that can be 
concluded from the data used in this study.
It is, however, possible to make an approximate calculation o f the effect on incomes of 
increased participation by never-married women. The difficulty in doing this is that before 
they joined the workforce these women received no income, and that those who earned no 
income do not appear in the income distribution data. Their number is therefore not 
known, but the change in their number can be estimated. To do this, it is necessary to 
make the assumption that the potential workforce among never-married women and never- 
married men remained at a more-or-less constant ratio throughout the period. That is, the 
number o f never-married women who could have earned an income (not necessarily those 
who did) remained at approximately the same ratio to the number o f never-married men 
who could have earned an income (again, not necessarily those who did). On the basis of 
this assumption, an increase in the ratio who actually did earn an income, as represented by 
the assessable working population, therefore represents increasing participation, rather than 
an actual change in the ratio o f men and women. The number o f never-married women in 
the assessable working population in any specified year as a result o f increased participation 
since a base year can therefore be calculated from
w — (m *r)
where
w — the actual number o f never-married women in the assessable working 
population in the specified year
m = the actual number o f never-married men in the assessable working 
population in the specified year
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A B C D
1952 579000 65.65%
1953 596000 68.07% 21136 3.55%
1958 747900 82.93% 155835 20.84%
1959 752000 81.56% 146673 19.50%
Key: A) The number of never-married women in the assessable working population.
B) The ratio of never-married women in the assessable working population, 
to never-married working men in the assessable working population.
Q  The number of never-married working women due to increased participation since 1952.
D) The increase in workforce participation, as proportion of the number 
of never-married working women
Sources: InkomensverdeUng 1952 en vemogensverdeling 1953, table 1.
InkomensverdeUng 1953 en vemogensverdeUng 1954, table 1.
InkomensverdeUng 1958 en vemogensverdeUng 1959, table 9.
InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vemogensverdeUng 1960, table 16.
Table 59: The increased participation o f  never-married women, 1952-59.
r = the ratio o f never-married women to never-married men in the assessable 
working population in the base year
From this, it is possible to calculate how many households in the specified year were 
affected by increased participation by comparing the result to the distribution o f daughters 
of the appropriate age.
This calculation shows that the income o f more than one household in twenty-five, at the 
end o f the 1950s, rose as a consequence o f this increased participation. The income 
distribution data show a substantial increase in the ratio o f never-married women to never- 
married men during the mid-1950s boom, from just under seventy percent to over eighty
percent. Row C in Table 59 shows the number of never-married women that must be
subtracted from the actual total each year to keep the proportion at the 1952 level. This 
number is taken as the number of never-married women who entered the labour force as a 
result o f increased female participation. It shows that this increase was, by 1959, equivalent 
to about twenty percent o f the never-married female workforce. To put it another way, the 
never-married female workforce expanded by some twenty-five percent over those seven 
years. The size o f the increase in 1959 is equivalent to nearly six percent o f the number of 
heads o f household (1960 definition) in 1960. Using the same proportions for the 
distribution o f the number of daughters as was used above for the number o f sons (for 
every sixteen households that had one son o f working age, eight households had two and 
two household had three or more), then the incomes o f nearly four and a half percent of all 
households must have been higher because o f the increased number of daughters working 
for pay. Assuming, as with sons, a figure o f twenty-six percent of households contained a
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daughter or daughters o f working age, then about one in six of these households 
experienced rises in household income simply as a result o f the increased employment of 
never-married women.
The rise in income will have been substantial. If those who were working as a consequence 
o f increased participation were all aged 2 0  or under, their average annual income would 
have been fll90. This would probably be an underestimate for the group as a whole, since 
some of these women would almost certainly have been in the 20-25 year-old group, and 
so the figure should perhaps be considered as a lower limit. The male heads o f households, 
most likely their fathers, would have probably been in the 40-59 year-old age group, with 
an average income of around fBOOO471. This means that that the incomes of such 
households will have been some fifteen percent higher, per daughter, than their equivalents 
seven years previously. It is possible that this increased income went to the daughters 
rather than being shared within the household, as has been suggested occurred with the 
increased income of sons472, but there is a difference. The daughters in question would 
have being bringing no income at all into the family seven years previously, but would 
nevertheless have been consuming some o f the household resources. They needed to be 
clothed and fed. It is inconceivable that working daughters did not contribute something 
towards their food and clothing while they lived in their parents* households. Increased 
participation can therefore be said, in this respect, to have at least reduced a demand on 
household incomes.
Over a period, this will have affected a larger number o f households. It affected around 
four and a half percent o f them in 1959, but, as has been pointed out, households are 
dynamic. Daughters leave to get married, while, in other households, daughters grow up to 
be o f working age. Therefore, a larger number will have experienced the higher incomes 
that increased female participation brought It is not possible to calculate the extent of this 
from the data under consideration, but it clearly will have made a substantial difference to 
household incomes over the lifetime of a family.
7.6 Conclusion.
This chapter has tried to move away from a simple identification o f the growth in 
disposable income with earnings growth. It has done this by attempting to uncover what
471 InkomensverdeUng 1959 en vemogensverdeUng 1960, table 2.
472 Although it is by no means certain that the rules for distributing the incomes o f sons and daughters within 
the family were even remotely alike.
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happened to household incomes: how they were constructed, how this changed. This 
flowed from the argument that those who directly receive incomes, whether earned from 
wages and salaries, or from elsewhere, are not the only people with disposable incomes, 
and that it is in the household that the redistribution o f income between earners and non- 
earners takes place.
The chapter has shown that disposable incomes rose faster than this identification would 
suggest. Those who began to receive pensions as a result o f the changed legislation saw 
their incomes rise relative to mean incomes, although this seems to have had little or no 
knock-on effect on the income of others, such as their children - the old, in particular, 
seem to have lived alone. Sons, living with their parents, who began to work for their living 
were able to get married and set up their own homes earlier than previous birth cohorts, 
presumably as a consequence o f higher earnings from industrialisation. In this case, it 
seems likely that there will have been a knock-on effect on their parents* disposable 
incomes, as the cost o f maintaining a son was removed neady two years earlier than 
previously was the case. Increased workforce participation by women brought additional 
income into the household. In the case o f working wives, it is not possible to make even a 
ballpark estimate as to how much this was, since there are no figures available on wives* 
incomes. But the evidence suggests that increased participation here made some difference 
to the incomes o f households of the lowest-paid men. The increased participation of 
daughters between 1952 and 1959 affected approximately one in six o f the households in 
1959 that contained daughters o f working age, increasing the income of these households, 
on average, by something o f the order o f fifteen percent. There may also have been a 
further effect on parental disposable income due to the fall in the average age at which 
women married.
But, because o f the short period under investigation, it is not possible to say by how much 
these changes caused disposable incomes to rise. Although some estimates have been 
made, it is not possible to total these up - because there are figures that are unavailable, 
such as those for wives* incomes, and because it is not absolutely certain how the figures 
should be added up, even if all o f them were available. But the figures that have been 
estimated are, in any case, snapshots o f changes that had ongoing effects, altering the long­
term economics of running a household. Old-age pensions increased the income that 
people could expect at the end of their lives, perhaps allowing them to spend more at an 
earlier stage rather than saving. But, perhaps more significantly, the increased incomes of 
the young - both male and female - and the earlier average age at which they left the 
parental home would have reduced the costs o f raising children. This would have affected
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parental disposable income over the lifetime o f the parents themselves. To calculate the 
effect o f this would therefore involve looking at changes in lifetime disposable incomes, by 
definition over a period much longer than the scope o f this study. It would inevitably take 
us into entirely new territory. The extent o f this rise in disposable income will therefore, for 
the moment, have to remain unmeasured.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion.
This study has attempted to explain the massive rise in the level of consumption in western 
Europe in the 1950s. This rise involved not just an increase in the quantity of goods 
consumed, but also an increase in the proportion o f the population buying consumer 
durables. This increase meant a radical change to people’s lives.
The explanation for rising levels of consumption has been sought in the way that the 
labour market responded to economic growth. Higher consumption meant that people 
were buying more, which meant, in turn, that incomes were rising. Because most people 
received their incomes in the form of wages or salaries, this means that the origins o f the 
increase in consumption have to be sought in the labour market But at the same time that 
levels of consumption were rising, western Europe was experiencing unprecedentedly high 
growth rates. The thesis has therefore attempted to explain the rise in consumption in 
terms of the effect that economic growth had on the labour market, in particular on its 
structure, as new high-wage industries were developed and the proportion o f the 
population involved in the labour market increased.
The Netherlands has been used as a case study. No country was typical. They were all 
different in their various ways, and there are probably good reasons for using or rejecting 
any or all as examples. But the Netherlands had growth rates fairly typical o f north-west 
Europe as a whole, and, despite its unique set o f institutions governing its labour market, 
Eichengreen has argued that the Dutch merely formalised what other countries did 
informally. Furthermore, the Netherlands has a very good set o f data on the labour market 
during the period.
This chapter sums up the conclusions o f this study, and then attempts to look beyond the 
Netherlands. The first section summarises the conclusions of the research on the 
Netherlands, the second considers how typical the Dutch experience was, and the third 
looks at the more general implications.
8.1 Rising incomes in the Netherlands.
This study raised the question o f how it was possible for incomes to have risen if wages 
were held down. In the case o f the Netherlands, we saw that the rise in consumption was 
of the same sort as that in western Europe generally, but that this occurred in the context 
of a wage control system. The wage control system regulated the growth o f wage rates by
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means o f a system of institutions involving the participation o f government, trade unions 
and employers’ associations. The aim of this system was to ensure that funds were available 
for investment in industry, something that was regarded as necessary to provide jobs for an 
expanding population and to eliminate a threatened structural balance of payments deficit
Two positions were rejected. The first was that workers deferred increases in income in 
order to allow economic growth to feed into increased investment The argument was 
proposed by Eichengreen in order to explain where the funds for increased investment 
came from. This part o f his overall argument seems, however, to be wrong. It is clear that 
the necessary funds for investment in industry were made available, and that industry was 
able to grow. The figures for industrial production and industrial exports show that, in this 
respect, the ultimate objectives o f wage control were achieved. But Eichengreen’s argument 
that this was due to workers deferring wage increases appears to be contradicted by the 
growth in the consumption o f consumer durables. Not much in the way o f income growth 
seems to have been deferred. It is possible, o f course, that this consumption might have 
been higher in the absence of wage control, but this objection still leaves unanswered the 
question o f why it grew so rapidly to such a high - by previous standards - level.
The other position that was rejected was that wage control failed to hold down wages. This 
was the general position of Roberts in the 1950s, van Hulst in the 1980s and Brander, 
Mieras and van Hulst in the 1990s. There are differences between them. Roberts and van 
Hulst both argue that wage control failed to hold down workers’ earnings. This, however, 
was not its intention. Indeed, the trade unions hoped that, by increasing the number of 
jobs available, wage control would actually raise earnings. Brander et al\ on the other hand, 
deal with wage rates. They argue that wage control failed to hold the growth o f wage rates 
below their long-term trend, except for short periods. What they fail to show, however, is 
that the long-tem trend was unaffected by wage control. But, in any case, they accept that 
wage control did have some effect in the 1950s, which means the rise in consumption 
cannot be put down to its failure. Figure 9 also suggests that wage control had some effect 
It shows that, whilst wage drift clearly existed, particularly in years o f a low level of 
unemployment, the growth path of wage rates nonetheless followed that o f regulation 
wages.
It was suggested in the thesis, therefore, that wage rates and disposable incomes grew at 
different rates. Despite the fact that disposable income, for a wage worker, is dependent on 
a wage rate, it is also dependent on other things. Disposable incomes will only grow at the 
same rate as wage rates if the job composition o f the workforce remains static, if everyone 
remains in the same job, if every job pays a single rate (which can change its value, but is
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the only thing that does change), and workers do not have to share their earnings with non­
workers. This is a useful counterfactual, but in reality all these things change. The 
composition of the workforce changes. People change jobs. Jobs themselves have pay 
scales, rather than single wage rates, and people move their positions within pay scales - 
and at different rates. Finally, workers live within households, and their earnings are 
distributed amongst the household members.
The most important driving force behind these changes in the 1950s Netherlands was the 
expansion o f manufacturing. Industrial production was ninety-nine percent higher in 1960 
than in 1949, and had expanded in all industries. The smallest increase was the expansion 
o f textile production by more than fifty percent, while the output from metal working 
expanded by almost one hundred and seventy-five percent Industrial exports increased in 
value by a hundred and eighty percent between 1948 and 1962, and the proportion o f the 
economically-active population in manufacturing increased from twenty-five percent to 
thirty percent between 1947 and 1960.
The changes this brought about to the structure o f the labour force did not affect all 
sections o f the population equally. The expansion o f employment in manufacturing was at 
the expense o f agriculture, whose workforce declined from nineteen to eleven percent of 
the economically-active population. But the expansion o f employment in manufacturing 
affected different sections o f the population in different ways. It had a greater effect on 
men's employment than on women's, being responsible for three out o f five new male 
jobs, but only one out o f three o f the increased number o f women's jobs. It had a greater 
effect on young men than on older ones, with a higher percentage of men in the younger 
age groups being found in manufacturing. It also affected different industries in different 
ways. Some industries saw a decline in male employment. In the cases o f the tobacco 
industry and the leather and leather goods industries the decline was absolute, with a fall in 
the number employed. In many more industries, the decline was relative, as the number 
employed grew slower than the growth o f the manufacturing workforce as a whole, and 
their shares o f the manufacturing workforce fell. It was the newer industries that grew 
most, with the majority o f the new jobs appearing in metal working and chemicals.
In particular, the increased employment o f younger workers in manufacturing appears to 
have been a major factor in pushing up earnings. This was shown in two steps. Firsdy, the 
mean income of successive birth cohorts rose relative to mean incomes generally. The only 
exception to this was in the recession o f 1957-58. Secondly, this rise in relative mean 
income moved together with the growth in numbers o f those employed in manufacturing. 
Since it was also shown that the industries whose workforces expanded their share of
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manufacturing employment paid above-average wage rates, this implies that the main force 
pushing up earnings was the growing number ofyoung workers in these industries. Since we 
also know that it was the new, non-traditional, industries whose workforces grew, this 
implies, in turn, that earnings growth was driven by the growth in the numbers o f young 
workers in these new industries.
The impact was even greater when median income growth is considered. There are two 
factors behind this. Firstly, mean income tends to rise with age, and rises more sharply 
across the younger age ranges than the older. Secondly, the rapid population growth in the 
Netherlands reduced the median age o f the workforce. Median earnings are measured by 
creating synthetic birth cohorts: identifying the range o f years in which an age group was 
bom, and using income data by age group to follow the mean income o f each birth cohort 
thus identified across the 1950s. This gives a better measure of what people earned and 
how it changed over time than measures o f mean income by age group. Individuals pass 
through age groups, but they remain in their own birth cohort. Measuring the growth o f 
income by birth cohort therefore gives a rough indication o f how people actually 
experienced income growth.
By 1959, almost half the economically-active male population had been bom in or after 
1920, and the mean income of those bom  after 1920 had more than doubled in real terms 
since 1950. In other words, although wage rates rose by less than per capita national 
income between 1950 and 1959, because o f the combined effects o f the changing age and 
occupational structure o f the workforce, most men experienced much greater rises in their 
earnings.
Increased female participation in the labour force added to the growth o f disposable 
income. This is because disposable income is mediated through the household. Those who 
receive income as a result o f their own economic activity - whether they are wage earners 
or receive other kinds o f income - are not usually just providing for themselves. This 
income is added into a household income, which is then distributed within the household. 
Ceteris paribus, the greater the number o f people in a household that are earning an income, 
the greater the household income will be. The crucial increase in the proportion o f 
household members within the Dutch workforce during the 1950s occurred amongst 
daughters. Between 1952 and 1959, the number o f working daughters grew by about 
twenty-five percent These young women were low-paid, but previously, being outside the 
workforce, they would have brought no monetary income into the household at all. A 
rough estimate suggests that each additional daughter in the workforce increased 
household income by an average of around fifteen percent.
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The consequences o f all this was that disposable income grew more rapidly than wage 
rates. Male earnings rose faster than wage rates because workers moved into higher-paying 
industries and occupations - and specifically because young workers went into these. 
Household incomes rose faster than male earnings because more women went into the 
paid workforce, thereby increasing the amount of income that came into the household at a 
faster rate than the growth o f male earnings.
This has implications for the discussion o f workers’ attitudes to wage control. Wage 
control operated on wage rates. However, workers’ reactions to it will have been based on 
what happened to their disposable incomes. It is disposable income that is spent and 
determines the level o f consumption, and workers - along with the other members o f their 
households - will have judged their own wages growth by the growth o f their disposable 
incomes, not by the growth o f the underlying wage rates. The fact that disposable incomes 
rose faster than wage rates will, at the very least, have taken some o f the upward pressure 
off wage rates.
8.2 International comparisons.
Was the Netherlands an exception? This study began with a general question about the rise 
in living standards across western Europe as a whole, but has concentrated on the case o f 
the Netherlands. It has shown how changes to the structure of the Dutch labour market 
during the 1950s caused disposable income to rise. But the Netherlands had specific 
economic problems in the period relating to its rapid population growth and the loss o f its 
empire in Indonesia. It also had specific solutions to these problems in the shape o f a set of 
economic institutions and practices not found elsewhere. This then raises the question as to 
whether the conclusions are specific to the Netherlands.
Census data suggest that, in fact, the same broad features o f the Dutch labour market can 
be found elsewhere in western Europe during the period. This is something that can only 
be stated broadly using these data without further qualification for two reasons. Firstly, 
labour force census data in this period are not necessarily comparable between countries to 
any degree o f precision: industries and occupations were not defined in the same way 
internationally. Secondly, as we have seen with the Netherlands, these data are not 
necessarily compatible between two censuses across the 1950s for the same country. Only 
where published data are described as such, can they be considered as comparable.
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Year Total Aged.4Q Aged 30
and under and under
Belgium 1961 36.16% 39.06% 42.76%
France 1962 29.72% #N/A #N/A
Italy 1961 22.37% 26.01% 30.10%
The Netherlands 1960 32.24% 34.22% 34.04%
West Germany 1961 41.23% 45.72% 48.27%
Key: #N/A = data not available
Sources: Recensement general de la Population au 31 decembre 1961, Tome 8, table 11.
Recensement Geniral de la Population de 1962, Population Active, table 2.
10 Censimnto Generate della Popofoqone, Volume VI Profession, table 6.
13e Algemene volksteUing, 31 mei 1960, Deel 10A, table 4.
Volks- und Berufs^ aeblung vom 6. Juni 1961, Heft 12, pp 80-185.
Table 60: The proportion o f  the male workforce in manufacturing in selected
countries c. 1960.
But two important features are evident at the beginning o f the 1950s. The male 
manufacturing workforce was biased towards the young, and female employment had 
grown since the Second World War.
The same age pattern in men’s employment in manufacturing can be seen in a number of 
countries. Table 60 shows the five large countries that originally signed the Treaty o f Rome 
- Luxembourg, being substantially smaller than the others, is omitted as not comparable. In 
the case o f France, there are no data for employment by sector and age in the census of 
1962. But in the case o f the others, it can be seen that there was a higher proportion of 
young males in manufacturing then there was o f men as a whole. The table shows the 
proportion o f the total male workforce - all economically-active men - in manufacturing, 
together with the proportions o f economically-active males under 40 and under 30 in
Proportion of manufacturing workforce 
Year Aged under 40 Aged under 30
Belgium 1961 56.30% 32.21%
France 1962 #N /A  #N /A
Italy 1961 66.96% 44.17%
The Netherlands 1960 59.00% 34.43%
West Germany 1961 60.82% 39.39%
Key: #N /A  = data not available
Sources: Recensementgeneral de la Population au 31 decembre 1961, Tome 8, table 11.
Recensement General de la Population de 1962, Population Active, table 2.
10 Censimento Generale della Popolaefone, Volume VI Profession, table 6.
13e Algemene volksteUing, 31 mei 1960, Deel 10A, table 4.
Volks- und Berufs%aehlung vom 6. Jura 1961, Heft 12, pp 80-185.
Table 61: The male manufacturing workforce by age in selected countries c. 1960.
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West Germany #N /A 14
The Netherlands 13 14
Sweden 18 24
United Kingdom 25 27
Source: Pott-Buter (1993) p. 127.
Table 62: Labour force participation rates o f  wom en in waged and salaried 
employment in selected countries c. 1950 and c. 1960.
manufacturing. In all four cases, the proportion o f men under 40 who were employed in 
manufacturing was higher than the proportion of men o f all ages, and the proportion of 
men under 30 was higher still. The difference in percentage points between the columns 
seems to be slightly less for the Netherlands than for the other countries, suggesting that 
the growth in young male employment was less in this country than was the case for the 
others. This may be due to the rapid population growth, as can be seen from Table 61. 
Here, the proportion o f the male manufacturing workforce under the age o f 40 is very 
similar in the Netherlands and West Germany. Italy, with a smaller proportion of 
economically-active males overall in manufacturing, has a much higher percentage o f its 
manufacturing workforce overall under 40, whilst Belgium, noted by Kindleberger as one 
of the countries in which the labour did not substantially increase473, had a slightly lower 
percentage.
The increase in women’s employment during the 1950s can also be seen in a number of 
countries. There are problems measuring women’s participation in economic activity, since 
the total figures for economically-active women include wives working in the family 
business. As we have seen with the Netherlands, a decline in the number o f these women 
can mask an increase in female participation in other economic activity. But the data on 
female participation in waged and salaried employment, shown in Table 62, confirms a 
general increase here. O f the countries listed, only Belgium showed no increase in the 
participation rate, while some other countries showed a much greater increase in 
participation than the Netherlands.
It would seem therefore that the Netherlands was not different By and large, the structural 
profile o f the labour force does not seem to have been exceptional. Indeed, the trends that 
helped create rising disposable income in the Netherlands may well have been less strong
473 Kindleberger (1967) p. 3.
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there than in other countries. This does suggest, therefore, that the common phenomenon 
of rising disposable income may have had an origin in common changes to the structure o f 
the labour force.
8.3 Some implications.
The conclusions made in this study have implications both for the explanation o f Europe’s 
“Golden Age” and for the more general consideration o f the relationship between 
economic growth and the growth o f disposable income. The study pardy supports 
Eichengreen’s analysis. But it also suggests that the relationship between economic growth 
and what people have to spend is not a straightforward one. This final section briefly 
discusses these points.
The results of this study are consistent with Eichengreen’s argument concerning the rate o f 
wages growth. He argued that wages growth had been generally moderated, enabling funds 
to made available for investment The Dutch experience confirms that this describes the 
outcome o f how wages grew. Hourly wages in industry grew at a slower rate than per capita 
national income, while manufacturing rapidly expanded, both in terms of the volume o f 
production and o f the proportion o f the workforce employed in the sector.
But there is little evidence that workers had to defer compensation to any great extent This 
point should not be exaggerated. Discontent did appear at times, with the Dutch strike rate 
increasing during the mid-1950s, in 1960 and in 1963. Dutch families did face economic 
pressures and their incomes did not always grow, in the short term, by enough for them to 
deal with these. Nor was the absolute level o f consumption reached during the 1950s high 
by later standards. A million television sets in the Netherlands in 1961 still meant that more 
than five out of every eight households did not possess one. But what is important is the 
rapid rise in income, its speed. This is evident from the rate of growth in ownership of 
consumer durables, and it is evident from the calculation o f the median rise in male 
incomes made in Chapter 6 .
Wage costs appear to have been held down largely as a consequence of the structure of the 
workforce and the way that this changed. This was particularly the case with male labour 
moving into manufacturing. In the Netherlands, the entry o f young workers into 
manufacturing, paid at lower wage rates than older workers, held down the mean. 
Kindleberger sees the Netherlands as the only country in which the workforce expanded by 
a growing population, but census data show that, in other countries, whatever the source of
the increase in the manufacturing workforce, it tended to grow most amongst the young.
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But the fact that the mean wage was held down did not mean that the wages o f every 
worker were held down. As a worker got older, his earnings tended to rise, rising the fastest 
when he was youngest. We have seen this process in operation in the Netherlands, but we 
also know the process is a more general one. The age-eamings curve is found in all 
developed countries, which means that the similar age structure of the male manufacturing 
workforce in the countries of western Europe around 1960 will have made male earnings 
grow in a similar manner.
Eichengreen was correct in his description of the institutions used to moderate wages 
growth, but it is not clear how much difference these institutions actually made. In the 
Dutch case, it is true that the trade unions supported wage control, but it is not clear just 
how much their members noticed it. For many workers, for a good deal o f the time, the 
speed at which their earnings rose may have meant that wage control was something they 
did not notice. This study has not looked at earnings growth during the last period o f wage 
control, but it may well be that this was the period when wage control began to have a 
noticeable effect on earnings. It may well have been the case that wage control collapsed at 
the point when workers noticed i t
In any case, the fact that the rise in disposable income resulted from structural change 
means that it was a historically-specific phenomenon. It was not something that could have 
been artificially prolonged or could be recreated. The increase in women’s employment was 
limited by the number o f women in the population able to be employed, and at a certain 
point was bound to level off. Similarly, the increase in the manufacturing workforce as a 
result of the employment of young workers could not last forever. It was inevitable 
eventually that there would be diminishing returns to manufacturing employers from 
increased employment, and employment growth in the sector would cease. As 
manufacturing productivity increased, there was also bound to be a decline in employment 
in the sector - something that began to happen in the Netherlands in 1967474. And as 
industries declined, the mean age o f their workforce will have tended to rise, pushing up 
wage cost per employee at a faster rate than hourly wages.
The point here is not that manufacturing is special, but that its growth during the “Golden 
Age” had specific features. It was generalised growth, affecting all industries, and as such 
had an impact on a large proportion o f the economically-active population. The growth o f 
manufacturing employment meant a net shift o f labour into higher-paying jobs, and its 
general expansion meant that higher earnings were available right across the working
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population. This has not been the case with later changes to the structure o f the workforce. 
Jobs created in the service sector during the period since the number o f jobs in 
manufacturing in western Europe began to decline have also offered higher pay, and there 
are o f course those who have increased their incomes by moving to these. But the effect of 
these on the labour market has been less general. In particular, the demand for unskilled 
workers in the service sector, by the nature o f the sector, is less than in manufacturing, and 
Nickell and Bell have calculated that, in the case o f Britain, the decline in the relative 
demand for unskilled labour accounted for about twenty percent o f the long run increase in 
unemployment up to the 1980s475. What we have here, then, is the reverse situation to that 
of the 1950s, where economic growth has not meant a net shift into higher-paying jobs.
The rate o f economic growth does not, therefore, necessarily give a good indication o f the 
rate o f growth o f disposable incomes. Milward identifies the growth o f disposable income 
in western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s with the growth of per capita national 
income476, but as we have seen, this seriously underestimates the growth o f disposable 
income. But if, under certain circumstances, disposable income can rise faster than per 
capita national income, it raises the possibility that there are circumstances when it could 
rise at a slower rate.
The growth o f disposable income is not secondary to economic growth. They are not 
independent. It is not the case that the growth path o f disposable incomes merely 
fluctuates about the growth path o f per capita national income due to exogenous factors. 
On the contrary, the relationship between economic growth and disposable income is 
dependent on how the economic growth occurs. For example, suppose that, following the 
Second World War, the Netherlands had held onto Indonesia, and the same Dutch growth 
rates that actually occurred had been achieved but in this case as the result o f expanded 
trade in colonial gpods to the USA or wherever. It is clear that, in this case, growth would 
not have had the same effect on disposable incomes as the expansion o f manufacturing, 
because it would not have had the same impact on the Dutch labour market.
The relationship of economic growth to the growth o f disposable income is therefore 
historically specific. How they relate to one another changes with the changing historical 
circumstances. This can be seen in the ambiguous relationship between the growths of 
national income and disposable income. National income is a summary figure. If the 
disposable incomes of the mass o f the population grow, then - except in circumstances of
474 Van Zanden (1998) p. 85.
475 Nickell & Bell (1995) p. 59.
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short-term redistribution - per capita national income will grow. But the growth of per 
capita national income does not necessarily mean that the disposable income o f the mass o f 
the population grows. To find out what has happened to disposable incomes, it is necessary 
to look deeper.
The mechanism by which growth rates during the “Golden Age” were related to the 
growth o f disposable incomes was confined to that historical period. In other periods, 
there are other mechanisms, which have to be investigated empirically. While high growth 
rates and a rapid rise in living standards went together during the 1950s, the two may not 
necessarily be bound up. Economic growth should not be taken at face value.
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